


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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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Kochetov Notes 150,000-Man Reduction of Construction Troops

90UM0239C Riga ATMODA in Russian 18 Dec 89 p 5

[Unattributed report: "The Construction Battalion and the Restructuring"]

[Text] At a meeting of the Collegium of the Office of the Military Procuracy held at the end of November, Deputy Defense Minister Kochetov announced that even now the construction battalions could be reduced by 150,000 servicemen.

The military construction workers are used as a practically gratuitous work force at projects of more than 16 ministries. It was reported at the meeting that the enterprises pay each soldier between R2 and R7 a month.

It is not surprising that the higher military ranks are advocating a reduction of the construction battalions. The Soviet Union has announced its intention to reduce the army by 500,000 men, and the discharge of students did not account for one fifth of this figure.

Yudin Reflects on Size of Defense Budget

90UM0239B Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 1, Jan 90 p 11

[Article by I. Yudin, doctor of economic sciences, professor, under the rubric "The Economics of Disarmament": "The Price of Knightly Armor"]

[Text] Defense expenditures are being vigorously debated today at mass-meetings, in student auditoriums and in the worker collectives. And the most diverse points of view are being advanced, some going as far as to question the expediency of having the Armed Forces in the situation of yet inadequately effective production and empty shelves. Emotions frequently get the better of common sense. The opinion is also expressed that the state has reached the limit below which it would be fatal to reduce defense outlays.

Just how much can we spend on defense without negatively affecting the state's economy?

It is wrong, of course, for the state to throw more and more materials, labor and financial resources into the arms race. Authoritative military leader and scientist B.M. Shaposhnikov believed that a war could be lost due to overspending even before combat operations begin. It is hardly a better situation, however, when the society gives in to illusions and forgets about strengthening the army.

So let us take a look at whether we are spending too much or too little on defense. Our defense outlays, we learn, amounted to 77.3 billion rubles in 1988, just before the reduction of the Armed Forces and the conversion of military production were begun, while the gross national product amounted to 866 billion rubles.

The specific portion of the gross national product spent on defense was therefore around 9%. In other words, defense outlays approached the maximum acceptable limit within the nation's economic capabilities.

What are our prospect for the immediate future. The State Budget of the USSR for 1990 reflects the overall trend to some degree. Defense outlays will amount to 70.9 billion rubles this year. This will presumably be around 8% of the gross national product. With the completion of the program for unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces and weapons in 1991, the burden of military outlays can possibly be reduced to approximately 7% of the GNP. An international situation conducive to this is developing.

And what about the USA? It is considering a reduction of military allocations by 180 billion dollars over the next five years. If the world community does not permit distortions in the military-political situation in the '90s and if the European nations and the USA reach a mutual agreement on reducing the numerical strength of their armies and weapons, the Soviet Union will be able to bring military outlays down to approximately 6% of the GNP by the middle of the next 5-year period. This would probably be the optimal level for our nation and would markedly affect the improvement of the Soviet economy without significant detriment to the state's defense capability. One can argue about these figures, of course, and such an argument is useful from all points of view, but the most important thing is that it will help rapidly to work out a long-term program for reducing the burden of defense outlays. What ways of doing this would be less burdensome to the society?

First of all, we need vigorously to improve the system for manning the army and navy, its training and indoctrination. Some people advocate a professional army, while others consider universal military duty to be a more effective and less expensive method of manning the Armed Forces.

Now think about the fact that in order to switch entirely to a professional army in the specific situation of our state, it would be necessary to pay the soldier and NCO an average not of R9 per month but 200-320, depending upon the skills level, the branch of the Armed Forces and the area in which they serve—that is 22-36 times more. Furthermore, they would need to be provided with space in a dormitory or even with an apartment (depending upon the family situation). This would require increasing housing construction in the Armed Forces by a factor of 6.75. Add to this the fact that it would cost 316-436 rubles a month to support the professional soldier. All of this would increase budget allocations for defense by more than 12-16 billion rubles a year. An enormous amount. What is the solution?

It lies in ensuring the necessary combat capability for the troops while cutting defense outlays by reducing the Armed Forces and increasing the partial professionalization of the army. Qualitative improvement of the Armed

Forces while reducing their numerical strength is the key to resolving the problem. This is confirmed by a historical analysis.

During various periods the numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR has fluctuated extremely significantly. I do not want to tire the reader with figures, but let me say that it has tended toward an optimum of 2.5-2.8 million men. As a result of the reduction of the numerical strength of the army and navy presently underway, they will have 3.7 million men by 1991. First-term soldiers and seamen will make up almost two thirds of the personnel. The professional part of the Armed Forces is made up of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and female personnel. According to M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, these groups make up 35% of the personnel.

Many specialists today believe that in the situation of qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces, it will be expedient to establish approximately a one-to-one ratio for first-term servicemen and professionals. Incidentally, this ratio already exists in a number of troop arms and on a number of combat ships. It would be painless from the military standpoint and advantageous economically to replace three first-term servicemen with one professional. We can still not get by without any first-term soldiers and seamen. A number of specialties and positions in the forces do not require a high skills level, after all. It is economically disadvantageous to use a professional soldier for them. Nor can we ignore the fact that the mobilizational reserves are made up of first-term fightingmen.

From the economic standpoint, you will say that replacing three first-term servicemen with one professional will increase public outlays on their upkeep by approximately 228 rubles a year. That is true, but only at first glance. A detailed study shows that the society would not be out anything. Let us illustrate this with an example.

With a numerical strength of 3.7 million for the Armed Forces and defense allocations of R70.9 billion, the total cost per serviceman is R19,200 a year. The public expenditures are not limited to this, however. The society misses out on national income totaling approximately R4,800 annually by drafting a young person into the Armed Forces. By drafting one and not three people into the army, the society would be getting an economic gain of more than R9,000. Replacing one million first-term servicemen with 333,000 professionals would therefore make it possible to reduce public outlays on defense by a total of R9 billion a year. Furthermore, if we base this on an optimal numerical strength of 2.5-2.8 million men for the Armed Forces, we can easily establish a ratio of 1:1 for professionals and nonprofessionals.

This kind of professionalization of the army will reduce the need for first-term servicemen, which will bring up the problem of making efficient use of the inducted

segment of the nonmilitary formations. It would apparently be expedient to establish alternate service in production organizations and in the nonproduction area, which are experiencing an acute shortage of workers and which require mobility of labor resources. In this case, in order to ensure the principle of social justice, young people of draft age could be given a choice of alternate service in accordance with religious, moral and other views.

It is economically essential now also to restructure the organization of the Armed Forces, including the troop element and central agencies of the Ministry of Defense. This restructuring has begun. A number of military districts have been combined, the size of the administrative apparatus has been reduced and a number of other important issues are at the stage of practical implementation. The changes are still more quantitative than qualitative, however. The service, supply and administrative components are still large. You will agree that the Armed Forces remind one of a medieval knight "covered" with expensive support gear, with some items duplicating one another.

Is it possible to simplify, make less expensive and even reduce the apparatus? Perfectly possible. Take the accounting system in the army, for example. It differs little from that which existed in czarist times. The food, clothing and billeting services have their own book-keeping systems, and there are also a finance service and other accounting agencies. It would be more simple to combine all monetary and material accounting into a single service directly subordinate to the commander of the military unit or the OIC of this or that military organization. The specialists have calculated that this alone would make it possible to reduce the number of accounting personnel in the army by a third.

It is difficult to understand why we have three times as many generals in our army as the USA. Positions for generals were established at some time where we could have gotten along perfectly well with a lower rank or even a civilian specialist. And the situation has remained the same. For some reason it is felt that the military tourism agency should be headed by a lieutenant general, the administration of agricultural enterprises by a major general. How does one explain the fact that a military philosopher and historian, even an extremely talented and productive one, should have the rank of colonel general? The list of questions in this vein could go on and on. Unfortunately, the apparatus of the society of military hunters and fishermen is maintained and other "programs" with no direct relation to combat readiness are generously financed out of the defense budget.

In order to effectively resolve pressing problems in the army we need also to review the social policy in military organizational development. I believe that we should base it on the principle of achieving the greatest social effect with the same or even fewer outlays of military economic resources. The housing situation for officers and warrant officers is extremely bad, for example.

The Armed Forces, as we know, meet their housing needs today from two sources: by building it themselves and with an insignificant portion built by enterprises and organizations of civilian departments. The Ministry of Defense annually releases around 86,000 apartments in buildings constructed by military construction organizations. In addition, it received an average of 14,000 apartments annually from the local housing fund until recently. Approximately 70,000 of these 100,000 apartments are "removed" each year due to natural personnel turnover. We see that the actual growth of the housing pool in the Armed Forces is only 30,000 apartments.

The statistics show that from one year to the next 150,000 officers and warrant officers lack housing in the army and navy. The possibility of obtaining housing from the local pool is practically ruled out as a result of the conversion of enterprises and regions to economic accountability and self-financing, which will exacerbate the housing problem in the army even more. The housing pool of the Ministry of Defense, enormous at first glance, is actually melting every year like ice in the summer sun, and construction in the Armed Forces will have to be tripled by the year 2000 to provide apartments for the officers and warrant officers. It is not difficult to see that this is Utopian thinking. How do we get out of this dead-end situation?

It lies in revising the military department's billeting policy. We know that the cost of housing construction at remote garrisons, in northern and a number of other regions costs 2-2.5 times as much as in the settled areas. Because they cannot acquire an apartment in another area or city upon being discharged, many officers and warrant officers continue to live at the military posts, which results in an even greater housing famine. This means that it would be economically advantageous to extend to a serviceman discharged into the reserve a loan amounting to 50% of the cost of building the housing which is due him under existing norms, with mandatory surrender of his housing at the garrison. Let him use the loan to build or buy an apartment or a house, whichever he prefers, and let it become his personal property following his discharge.

Common sense would indicate that our society has an opportunity to reduce defense outlays. Furthermore, it has an obligation to do so given the current economic situation. We need only to take a careful approach to the resolution of problems of military organizational development and take maximum advantage of the opportunities for reducing outlays in all components of the Armed Forces and the nation's military-industrial complex.

Maj Gen Stryapnin on Local Elections in Turkestan MD

90UM0215C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Maj Gen Valeriy Pavlovich Stryapnin, Deputy Chief of the Turkestan MD Political Directorate: "Deputy Mandates—For the Most Worthy"]

[Text] As we know, elections of deputies to local soviets were held on 24 December in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. How did they come out for representatives of the army? This is the question our correspondent asked of Major General Valeriy Pavlovich Stryapnin, deputy chief of the district's Political Directorate and chief of the operations group for elections in the Turkestan Military District. Here is what he reported:

On the whole, the results of elections to local soviets in the two republics, within which part of the Turkestan Military District is located, can be said to have been successful for serviceman deputy candidates. In comparison with prior elections, representation of the military in the soviets has even increased somewhat.

The results were as follows. A total of 724 army candidates ran in the Kazakhstan election. Five hundred thirty-nine were elected. Twenty-six deputy candidates will continue their fight for their mandates in repeat elections, since they were unable to win the needed majority of votes of the electorate the first time around.

The greatest success was enjoyed by our candidates in Semipalatinsk Oblast (75 out of 91 nominated candidates were elected), in Kzyl-Orda Oblast (63 out of 89 persons nominated to the soviets received deputy mandates), in Dzhezkazgan Oblast (67 out of 88 persons were elected), and in Tselinograd Oblast (out of 53 candidates for the local soviets, there will be 34 deputies from the army).

In the Tajik SSR, 175 deputy candidates running for local soviets were servicemen. Eighty-seven persons were elected. Thirteen deputy candidates are to undergo repeat elections.

It seems to me that servicemen could have won more deputy mandates. But unfortunately, not everyone has yet come to understand what an election campaign is, and that votes can be obtained only if voters can be persuaded as to the merits of a given candidate and his program. How is this to be done? It stands to reason that you can't be successful sitting around in an office. You must go out to the people, and deeply study the problems troubling them beforehand. In a word, you must measure your strengths against the burden that is entrusted to a deputy together with his mandate. I am certain that once you find you are capable of doing the work of a deputy, you must try to use all possible means—the spoken word, the press, television—to prove this to your electorate. A candidate's aggressiveness during an election campaign is like his "calling card," and it is well remembered by the people. In Alma-Ata for example, one of the candidates with whose work I was able to acquaint myself in the period prior to the elections staked his future on personal contacts with the voters. He visited practically every family, he talked with the people, he learned what was troubling them, and together with them he reworked his program with regard for their many problems and wishes. The voters trusted the future deputy, and gave him their votes in the election.

Much depended on the political departments and the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations. Their support helped candidates very much. The political department of the military commissariat of Leninabad Oblast, which is led by Colonel Aleksey Vasilyevich Bunin, worked well in the election campaign. Out of 21 candidates, 13 were elected to the soviets here. Rich experience in election political work in the masses was accumulated, the problems, proposals and demands of the voters were collected together and analyzed, and efforts to satisfy them were planned. It stands to reason that priority attention was devoted to those problems which pertain to patriotic and international indoctrination of the population, to preparation of young people for service in the army, and to concern for participants of the Great Patriotic War, soldier-internationalists in the reserves, and the families of servicemen.

During the past campaign for the elections to local soviets of the two union republics, ties between military and labor collectives grew even stronger, and the authority of the army increased in the eyes of the population of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

Military-Political Working Group Prepares for Komsomol Congress

90UM0215B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Working Group Created"]

[Text] Less and less time remains prior to the 26th All-Union Komsomol Congress. Nomination and election of delegates to the Komsomol Congress is beginning in armed forces Komsomol organizations, and drafts of the Charter and Program Declaration of the All-Union Komsomol are being actively discussed. Different, frequently mutually exclusive proposals on the future of the Komsomol, on ways of improving its structure, and on restructuring the life and activities of youth organizations, including in the army and navy, are being offered in the course of the Komsomol debate.

The editor's office posed the following question to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: How will these numerous proposals be implemented? Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Pyatygin, senior instructor of the Komsomol work department of the Main Political Directorate, responded to this question:

"A working group selected at a conference of active army and navy Komsomol members in September of last year in Moscow is generalizing the incoming proposals and drafting the 'Principles of Organizing the All-Union Komsomol of the USSR Armed Forces.' As a member of this group, I invite active Komsomol members and all soldiers to take part in preparation of the principal document of the army and navy Komsomol. It is for them to decide its future. The draft principles are to be brought up for discussion in the primary Komsomol organizations of the armed forces in February 1990.

Useful advice, constructive proposals and, perhaps, independently written drafts would be of special value."

Please send letters to the following address: 103160, Moscow, K-160, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Komsomol Work Department, Working Group. Readers may communicate by telephone: 296-45-50, 293-29-11.

Effect of Residency Rules on Military Candidates

90UM0215D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Maj M. Orlov, candidate for people's deputy of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy City Soviet by Capt Ye. Zorya, Far Eastern MD: "A Minimum of Promises, a Maximum of Effort"]

[Text] A year ago, during elections of USSR people's deputies, the sympathies of the voters were often found to be on the side of those who spoke louder and promised more. This is perhaps why candidates are now being asked far more frequently how they intend to solve particular problems and what mechanisms will be utilized to satisfy the demands of the voters, the interests of whom they intend to represent in a given soviet.

This is the issue with which our unofficial correspondent began his interview with Major M. Orlov, candidate for people's deputy of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy City Soviet.

[Orlov] In my opinion the system of power which we want to create in the country—I'm referring to the renewed and empowered soviets of people's deputies—is the mechanism which is called upon to implement primarily the will of the electorate, with maximum possible effectiveness, without waiting for coaching from behind the scenes. And I am not embarrassed to say that this is the sort of system of power toward which I am striving, since I recognize quite clearly that work in the renewed soviets will be as interesting as it is difficult and important.

[Zorya] Mikhail Boleslavovich, to be specific, what is your impression of the work of a city soviet deputy, and namely of a serviceman-deputy?

[Orlov] Frankly speaking I do not see any grounds for separating deputies into occupational categories. Irrespective of departmental subordination, a deputy is required and obligated to represent the interests of all voters residing in the given territory. It is another matter when servicemen and their families make up the absolute majority of the electorate. Naturally their concerns would be the main and determining factor in this case. And if it is my destiny to be elected by them, I will strive to express their will as fully and thoroughly as possible.

[Zorya] As we know, demands for introducing all sorts of "residency requirements" for candidates to local soviets have been sounded, and this principle has even been enacted by the corresponding laws in a number of

republics. How do you feel about this? And what do you see as your future, if you are elected as a deputy? After all, as a serviceman your presence here is limited to three years, since this is a preferred region in which to serve, while the city soviet is elected for five years.

[Orlov] In my opinion introducing "residency requirements" for servicemen is an attempt to deprive them of the possibility for full participation in elections. In the meantime the fact that they must be represented in local organs of power is undebatable from my point of view. As far as the inconsistency between the time of service in a preferred region and the term of a deputy's power is concerned, there are at least two possibilities for resolving this conflict. First, I don't think it would be difficult to lengthen the tour of duty of a particular serviceman serving as a deputy in this region. Second, there are no obstacles to running an early election in connection with transfer to another place of service. It is important that the military retain the right to be represented in a local soviet in principle.

[Zorya] Please describe your program.

[Orlov] Let me make the qualification right away that I am categorically opposed to misleading statements in such a serious matter. My slogan is a minimum of promises, and a maximum of real effort. Perhaps from an advertising standpoint it isn't very well suited to an election campaign. But I truly intend to achieve concrete results not in words, not in the distant future, but in reality, and namely in the first days of work of the new soviet.

For example I propose returning to the garrison the apartments it had "lost" previously. This is both necessary and just. For example, Senior Lieutenant V. Popovich no longer wished to serve, and he retired from the army, but he still holds on to his housing space. Today he is working in a cooperative, and he boasts of his high wages to former fellow servicemen. In the meantime many conscientious officers, who are carrying all of the burdens of military service, are compelled to rent private apartments for years on end, paying maddening monthly sums for them. Among them, by the way, are former "Afghans" as well. The apartments should belong to the unit, and if a serviceman takes an early retirement into the reserves, and continues to occupy his apartment, the city should immediately compensate the garrison for the loss.

[Zorya] Do you think that the city authorities will go for this?

[Orlov] The deputy's mandate, were it to end up in my hands, would make me a representative of these same city authorities.

Going on, child care is an acute problem for our garrison. The demand for it is barely 30 percent satisfied. Correspondingly, around 50-60 percent of the wives of servicemen are unable to take jobs, even though they live in the city. How can we solve this problem in the foreseeable future?

First, we need to reserve a strictly determined quantity of places in children's preschool institutions for military units. But this will not be enough, and therefore, secondly, we could create a cooperative child care center where the wives of servicemen could work. All this would require is for the city to allocate suitable building space and maximally simplify the procedure for registering a cooperative. In this way we could also solve the problem of female employment in the garrison—we could create a cost accounting or cooperative enterprise in which the creative possibilities of our women could be realized with maximum benefit both to the city and to the units and the families of servicemen. The terms of employment at such an enterprise would account maximally for the features and unique status of the wives of servicemen.

[Zorya] Well, I will grant that this is tempting to officers, warrant officers and their wives. But what do you offer to privates and NCOs?

[Orlov] Let's be honest, a deputy of the city soviet does not have the power to change the present circumstances of personnel. Though I personally feel that every soldier should be entitled to a mandatory annual short leave. In regard to those who serve in northern regions and in regions equated to them, it would be fair to add their time of service to their total work time on a preferential basis.

But when it comes to things that are really in the power of the city soviet, such things would include allocating special recreation areas for privates granted passes to the city on weekends and days off. Cafes or video shops with reduced rates. There are many ways to go. In addition the city soviet could help soldiers discharged into the reserves to find employment at the city's most prestigious enterprises, where wages are higher and the social base is more fully developed. On the condition that they had served conscientiously, of course. This is perhaps all that I promise to personnel of our garrison. Besides this, it stands to reason that I will put all of my effort into fulfilling any other mandates which they will present to me as voters in the course of the election campaign.

[Zorya] Might it not happen that the demands which residents of military garrisons impose on city soviets will raise sentiments against them among city residents?

[Orlov] I am certain that this will not happen. First of all, the number of these demands is not all that great. Second, the city itself has an interest in the military, especially if you consider that we live in an earthquake zone. And third and finally, I feel that this ill-feeling has no grounds of any sort, that it is artificial. If city residents come to see that the residents of military

garrisons are not favorites or parasites, but that they are citizens just like them, concerned with the same problems, that they are the same sort of laborers, I think that mutual understanding will necessarily be achieved.

[Zorya] How do you assess your chances of success?

[Orlov] I find it hard to answer this question. All I know is that despite all of the difficulties of the election campaign, the chances are there, and I will try to capitalize on them.

Residency Rules Complicate Election of Military Candidates

90UM0215A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Mikora: "Bureaucratic Games Are Being Played in Tashkent Around Nomination of Servicemen as Deputy Candidates"]

[Text] A young officer by the name of B. Tuychiyev was nominated as a candidate for people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR in Tashkent's 52d Election Okrug by the Turkestan Military District's thousands-strong aviator collective at a Komsomol conference of the district's air forces. But the okrug commission refused to register the serviceman. He was guilty of a misfortune befalling many officers of the Tashkent garrison, as well as others: The officer did not have his own housing as yet, and he was forced to rent an apartment in another rayon of the city. And although the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR makes the qualification that "as a rule" a candidate must reside in the territory of the okrug, and although the air force command submitted a letter of guarantee that homeless B. Tuychiyev would receive housing space in a rayon located within the okrug, the members of the election commission would not budge on their decision.

This principled behavior of the commission might have been simply challenged, had it not been for a certain nuance associated with this decision. The fact is that F. Nazhimitdinov, first secretary of the party committee of Tashkent's Khamzinskiy Rayon, had been nominated as the other candidate for this okrug. And as the election campaign showed, a rival would have been dangerous to his career.

An initiative group from our unit decided to nominate Colonel V. Vasin, a member of the military council and chief of the political department of the air forces of the Turkestan Military District, as a people's deputy of the republic. In our opinion he was an active proponent of perestroika. We asked labor collectives located within the 53d election district to examine his candidacy. But because Vasin was an "unplanned" candidate, workers of the Khamzinskiy Rayon Party Committee imagined some sort of threat here as well, and began devising all kinds of obstacles.

In violation of the Law on Elections, rayon committee party organizing department director V. Lychev and district election commission chairman V. Bakhholdin, who were present at the conference of the collective of the Saoselenergoprojekt institute, at which Vasin's nomination was offered, attempted to influence the participants of the conference and the voting results. Nonetheless the overwhelming majority of the conference voted in favor of V. Vasin's nomination. On the following day a group of workers of the rayon committee and the rayon executive committee visited the institute, and discovering a few technical sins in the minutes, declared the proceedings to be illegal. Let me emphasize that what was involved was not violations of the rules of representation or the Law on Elections, but minor details not affecting the essence of the matter.

Two days later the institute conducted a repeat conference. This time rayon party committee first secretary F. Nazhimitdinov was nominated as an alternative to Colonel V. Vasin. The conference participants immediately realized the sort of game the bureaucracy was undertaking. Many unflattering words were spoken in regard to Nazhimitdinov. The overwhelming majority of the conference—save for two persons—once again voted for Vasin. It was then that meetings of the labor collectives of the trade bases, schools and other organizations located within the territory of the 52d election okrug were quickly held in behalf of F. Nazhimitdinov's nomination. It was in order that the young Officer B. Tuychiyev would not be a bother to him that the overly principled behavior with which I began this story was displayed toward the latter.

But perhaps the grossest farce in the election campaign was played out by workers of the Khamzinskiy Rayon party committee and the rayon executive committee in the 50th election district. Colonel V. Vasin's nomination was offered here as well. As an alternative to him the labor collectives of a number of schools quickly nominated a worker of an aviation production association, B. Ibragimov. The district election commission, which was headed by worker Vitaliy Tsvetkov, refused to register Ibragimov on the grounds that the minutes of the meeting had been falsified in regard to the number of participants of the meeting, and that the candidate did not reside or work in the okrug.

Two days after this, most members of the commission were delivered by official vehicles of the rayon committee and the rayon executive committee to the office of the chairman of the rayon executive committee, where they were met by rayon committee secretary M. Chumichev. V. Lychev mentioned above, rayon executive committee deputy chairman T. Tursunov and rayon executive committee secretary R. Talipov. Exercising my right granted by the law and on the basis of a corresponding certificate, as a member of an initiative group nominating one of the candidates, I requested permission to be present at this meeting. But Chumichev declared that this was not yet the meeting of the election commission, that it would be held later, in another room.

Forty minutes later the members of the commission went to the deputy room, accompanied by the same officials. The commission chairman wanted to raise the question as to the lawfulness of the presence of workers of the rayon's apparatus at the meeting, but the commission members lacked the courage to support him. And so a second meeting began in violation of the law. The commission did not have the right to convene to rescind its first decision—this could be done only by the central election commission. Vitaliy Tsvetkov immediately declared that the meeting was illegal, he confirmed the grounds for refusing to register Ibragimov, and cited figures proving that a quorum was absent at the meeting. In addition he officially declared that Chumichev had cast doubt upon his right as commission chairman to verify the authenticity of the minutes.

On 29 December, after the central election commission failed to recognize the lawfulness of Ibragimov's registration, the district election commission held a third meeting. An inspection once again confirmed the absence of a quorum at the meeting of the school collectives. Then the commission was given a second notarized list, on which the number of participants of the meeting was overstated by a factor of two. When the persons whose names appeared on the list were interviewed, two declared that they had not attended the meeting. The idea of officially confirming this was flatly refused, in fear of the consequences. Ultimately yielding to pressure from above, the commission members ignored the results of the inspection, and registered Ibragimov with a majority of the votes. After this, commission chairman Vitaliy Tsvetkov, who was not a party member, brought up for discussion a statement in which he requested to be relieved from responsibilities as chairman. He gave as his reason his reluctance to work with the commission, which was itself violating the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR.

In the meantime commission member S. Babadzhanova, who was not a party member, did not change her initial decision either. It was she who raised the issue among the party workers as to how they could reconcile their appeals from the podium to observe the law, and create the foundations of a legal state, with what was going on at the commission meetings. The young woman never did receive an answer.

But people are different from what they were just a few years ago. The fact that the rayon bureaucracy put up its own workers in 12 okrugs for elections to the rayon soviet unopposed, and that it did so brazenly, on its own responsibility, did not slip by their attention. The rayon's residents found it ironic: "What are we to have—a sovietized raykom, or a raykomized soviet?" At any rate I think that the elections will put everyone in their place.

This reminds me of an incident during the election campaign for the nomination of candidates for people's deputies of the USSR. At the request of our initiative

group, the collective of the enterprise Uzspetsstroymon-tazh nominated Lieutenant General V. Shkanakin, commander of the district's air forces. However, after the enterprise director was summoned to the Khamzinskiy Rayon party committee, he gave orders not to release the minutes, and he himself left on a business trip. The workers then released the minutes. Without wavering, the secretary of the party organization and the trade union organizer signed them. It was then that I finally came to believe that perestroyka is irreversible. I think that life itself will also ultimately persuade those who continue to rely on authoritarian methods in their work with people.

Low Morale in Latvian Garrison Leads to Disbelief in Perestroyka

90UM0381A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 90
(Signed to press 02 Feb 90) pp 27-28

[Letter to editors from E. Nesmeyanova, serviceman's wife, under the rubric "The *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* Mail": "I Want to Share Something: In a Closed Circle"]

[Text] Right now there is a great deal of talk in the country about improving living conditions and supplies. It seems to me that there is no sign of it in the army, however. We are a long way from restructuring. The officers, my husband's colleagues, openly laugh when the talk turns to restructuring. They do not believe in it, because they live in terrible conditions. Some young officers and their families are still living in converted rail cars, and those with more seniority live as long as five years in barracks. The water is bad, the sewerage system is poor. All of the sewage goes under the barracks or, at best, runs off into the woods. The ecological situation is deteriorating as a result. There is practically no heat in the barracks. People use electric heaters in the winter, since the temperature in the apartments does not rise about eight degrees.

There is no health clinic at the garrison. We are forced to drive 10 kilometers to the nearest settlement to see a doctor, where, due to recent events here in Latvia, our treatment is not very friendly.

It is impossible to purchase scarce products and manufactured goods produced in Latvia, because they are all sold by coupons issued by the ispolkoms. Goods are not delivered to our post, since we are openly called occupiers here.

There were pickets at the entrance to our garrison last summer. The People's Front conducts all sorts of mass meetings with posters such as the following: "Officers, go home; your mother, the homeland, is calling." Another poster reads: "Move your radar to Red Square."

In its implementation of the restructuring, the party has the resolution of social issues as its cornerstone. My husband is required constantly to know the needs of his

subordinates, to make every effort to solve the problems of the military construction workers. For some reason, however, the matter of dealing with us wives of servicemen and with our husbands has been resolved only on paper. When our husbands are rebuked for their subordinates, they are called poor commanders. But if our husbands are poor commanders, then why are those over them good ones? Where is the logic?

I want to discuss specifically the following incident. In February of 1989 I answered an ad from Post Exchange No. 568. Sales clerks were urgently needed in the grocery department. Not until four months later was I told to get the papers together and that the application had to be accompanied by several signatures of approval: from the commander, the chief of the political section and others.

Everyone signed except political worker Nigmatulin. He claimed that this was not part of his duties.

I took the application to the administration of Post Exchange No. 568. All of the papers were filled out there, and the application was signed by the chief of the personnel section, the chief of the planning section and the main accountant of Post Exchange No. 568. I was to go to work after my leave from my old job.

After my leave I went to senior sales clerk Z.A. Tkach, who told me that the application had to have the signature of the political section chief, because he had ordered that no one be hired at the post exchange without it. He received me but told me that he would not sign the application until he received an audit report from the unit where I had worked as an accountant. Maj Olifer, chief accountant for the UIR [engineering work directorate], had the audit report. From a telephone conversation in my presence between the chief of the political section and the chief accountant I learned that there were no acts of disobedience indicated in the audit report. Olifer told me that he would show the report to the chief of the political section later.

On 31 July I went to ask Col N. Kuzmenko, deputy commander for rear services, about the matter. He sent me to the chief of the political section for a signature. I had just reached the threshold when I heard: "I'm fed up with you. You show up several times a day and complain about everyone." I had complained only once—during the winter, about a lack of heat in the apartment—and my complaint was registered in the UIR office.

Having said this, the chief of the political section summoned Maj Stepkin, UIR auditor, and Col Kuzmenko. Maj Stepkin explained that everything was in order with the audit report. Col Kuzmenko added nothing to this. And then, in the presence of the officers, the chief of the political section called me a witch, even though I had no serious complaints on my record. Turning to Col Kuzmenko, he said that he had repeatedly told me it was pointless to keep showing up, that Kuzmenko himself should tell me the next time.

There had never been such an exchange between me and the chief of the political section. Had there been, I would have given up trying to obtain his signature long ago. Later I learned from the commander that the chief of the political section had signed the application for the position for the wife of Maj Olifer, who had not even arrived yet....

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Statement to Estonian Residents on Demilitarization of Estonia

90UM0443B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by A. Ryustel, I. Toome, and V. Vyalyas: "To the Residents of Estonia"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, the Government and the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee have taken a number of sequential steps to demilitarize the territory of Estonia and ultimately to achieve a nuclear-free North. Meetings between republic leaders and representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense commenced in Moscow on 5 February and will soon be continued in Tallinn. The purpose of these meetings is to settle at a governmental level the status of Soviet Armed Forces military units in Estonia and to resolve issues connected with military service by youths from Estonia.

We are concerned by relations between the civilian population and USSR military personnel stationed in Estonia, relations which have recently become strained, a situation which could greatly complicate progress in scheduled talks and achievement of the stated goals. Elements denouncing the reestablishment of our sovereignty are deliberately attempting to exert influence on Armed Forces personnel, but there has also been an increase in the number of instances of abusive treatment and harassment of military personnel and actions taken by certain authorities which are contrary to the law. Creation of artificial difficulties for the families of military personnel in their daily lives is contrary to the principles of a democratic society. Such politicization of problems connected with the military contains a serious danger to the resolution of Estonia's present problems. This can be avoided only if we treat Soviet Armed Forces officers and enlisted personnel with tolerance. After all, we want the same kind of treatment for soldiers of Estonian nationality who by force of circumstances are stationed on the territory of other union republics.

Let us give some thought to all this, and let us avoid unworthy behavior along the road toward a democratic state governed by rule of law, behavior which can also lead to dangerous consequences.

Environmental Pollution from Kapustin Yar

90UM03194 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by M. Verzhba: "Missile Graveyard: Missile Destruction Count Reaches 329 at Kapustin Yar; first paragraph is RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA introduction]

[Text] The air is full of rumors. It is a fact that no rumor is beneficial. Take the example of the Kapustin Yar Proving Ground, which is located on the boundary between Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts. It is well known, since this is where the first Soviet ballistic missile was launched. Today it is one of the bases where the RSD-10 medium-range missiles are being eliminated. Every month explosions resound above the Volga steppe. This method, which is not quite up-to-date, is used to destroy weapons that have only recently been removed from the active inventory.

These very blasts are the cause of the many rumors. There is talk of higher radiation levels, mass deaths of animals, and high morbidity among children living in the area. The words "Kapustin Yar" are heard often at ecological meetings. Most often in a negative context. But is it always possible to separate fact from fiction? So I paid the facility a visit.

An illuminated display was set up in the office of Lieutenant General N. Mazyarkin. It made the meteorological situation clear at a glance. On that particular day, cloud height was 450 meters; wind direction, 160 degrees; atmospheric pressure, 762 millimeters of mercury. Conditions were favorable. But it is not always that way. The general explained that it is sometimes necessary to wait days—even weeks—for a favorable change in wind direction or cloud height. The chief makes a decision to explode the missiles a mere several minutes before the designated hour.

Why take such precautionary measures? The fact is that the aerial explosion produces an aerosol cloud that is saturated with components that are less than benign. For example, this may include hydrogen chloride, perchloric acid ions, and aluminum oxide. In this connection, located close by are inhabited localities—large ones at that: Volgograd, Volzhskiy, Akhtubinsk. Although the installation is considerably less guilty in amounts of harmful emissions compared to the nearby giants of the chemical industry, no one is in favor of exacerbating the existing difficult situation.

On the day before, vehicles carrying 10 mobile ecological monitoring teams headed for various points. Other subdivisions of this type are also functioning: three in Volgograd and two in Volzhskiy. They take air samples before and after the explosion so that they can compare the results. However, they will be analyzed in Moscow, by civilian specialists. Incidentally, the USSR Ministry of Health does charge for its services: Every year the

military pays the medics R400,000. It was necessary to discharge several hundred men into the reserves to cover this amount of money.

We left the administration area for the proving ground. Fourteen RSD airframes and canisters were lying on the ground. They were awaiting their time. Twenty-seven missiles were slated for elimination in the course of those two February days. The last explosion was scheduled for May of 1991.

All this was being explained to me by officers as we were heading for the observation point. Accompanying us were representatives of the "green" movement from Akhtubinsk. This kind of guest is a frequent visitor to the facility. The officers and the public-spirited persons were engaged in a heated discussion: Is the proving ground to blame for the deterioration in the ecological situation in the area? Military Surgeon Colonel O. Kovalenko was prepared for this kind of occurrence, he carried a thick file. It contained documents produced by various commissions and expert assessments. They all led to the same conclusion: There was no danger to the populace. The authorities at the Astrakhan Gas Condensate Complex were to blame.

The argument continued until we arrived at the observation point, where it was joined by missile elimination technical supervisor Colonel O. Medvedev. No one else is better qualified to discuss all the details of this complex matter. The guests asked questions and received informative and thorough replies. The dialogue was approximately as follows:

"The bodies of dead animals contained cadmium, selenium, mercury, and arsenic."

"I beg your pardon, but I tell you that there are no components such as those in the makeup of the missiles," countered Medvedev.

"Also, the emissions include perchloric acid ions. They accumulate in tissues and can cause death," insisted the "greens."

"That is not possible, since their life is only 30 days."

What can one say? It is difficult to deny the obvious. For example, it seems that foxes and hares live in the craters, at the very epicenters of the blasts. No dead animal has ever been found. In addition, a shepherd and his family live only a few kilometers from the explosion field. Neither people nor animals experience any ill effects.

Meanwhile, Sergey Kirichkov, a major of medical service, was measuring radiation levels. His instrument indicated 10 microroentgens per hour, an amount that does not exceed the background figure. Indeed, it could not be anything but that, since the entire nuclear component is removed at another location. Sergey made a few more measurements for our benefit: the instrument gave normal readings.

Facts are stubborn things, but rumors are just as stubborn. This means that we must know as much as possible. That is both wiser and less expensive.

Lithuanian Commission on Military Service of Lithuanian Citizens

90UM0443A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 22 Feb 90 p 2

[Legislative enactment: "Enactment of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR on the Status of the USSR Armed Forces in This Republic and Military Service by Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] Guided by the 7 February 1990 enactment of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet entitled "On the 1939 Soviet-German Treaties and Abrogation of Their Consequences for Lithuania," which declares the 21 July 1940 Lithuanian National Parliament Declaration of Accession to the USSR to be unlawful, inasmuch as it fails to express the will of the Lithuanian people, and to be therefore null and void, and which further declares that the 3 August 1940 USSR Law on Acceptance of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is unlawful and is therefore not legally binding on Lithuania, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic hereby resolves:

1. To note that the presence of military forces of the USSR on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR is without legal foundation

2. To form a government commission (list of membership annexed) and to instruct it to prepare by 1 April 1990 proposals pertaining to the status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Lithuanian SSR, as well as pertaining to military and alternative (labor) service by citizens of this republic, and to submit them to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

3. To declare that any actions by the USSR Armed Forces which could hinder or impede agencies of government authority and administration of the Lithuanian SSR in the performance of their constitutional functions shall be considered interference in the internal affairs of the Lithuanian SSR.

4. To direct Military Commissar of the Lithuanian SSR A. Visotskis to submit proposals pertaining to the recall of citizens of the Lithuanian SSR who are performing military service in the Transcaucasian Republics.

5. To direct Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR V. Barauskas not to turn over materials pertaining to criminal matters to the Military Procuracy of the USSR in regard to citizens of the Lithuanian SSR who are serving in the USSR Armed Forces and who leave their military units as a result of acts of violence carried out against them, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

A. Brazauskas, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

L. Sabutis, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Vilnius, 14 February 1990

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Membership of Commission

Barauskas Vidutis—Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR

Bichkauskas Egidijus—special investigator, Office of the Prosecutor of the Lithuanian SSR, USSR people's deputy

Vinkus Antanas—Minister of Health of the Lithuanian SSR

Visotskis Algimantas—Military Commissar of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Zhilinskayte Vitaute—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Writers, member of the Central Board of the Lithuanian Union of Women, deputy chairman of the Commission on Republic Youth Military Service Affairs under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Zabarauskas Vatslovas—Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR

Ignotas Pyatras—Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Kuris Pranas—Minister of Justice of the Lithuanian SSR, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Laurinkus Mechis—senior scientific associate at the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law, USSR people's deputy

Laurinchyukas Albertas—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Journalists, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Matsaytis Alfonsas—First Secretary of the Central Committee of Lithuanian Komsomol, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Olekas Yuozas—senior scientific associate at the microsurgery problems laboratory of the Faculty of Advanced Medical Training at Vilnius University, USSR people's deputy

Sabutis Lyudvikas—Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Stankavichyus Laurinas—Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Security of the Lithuanian SSR

Shadreyka Valeriyonas—Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Bar Association, chairman

of the Commission on Republic Youth Military Service Affairs under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR

Yasukaytite Vidmante—member of the Lithuanian SSR Union of Writers, chairman of the Lithuanian Union of Women

Case of Dedovshchina False

90UM03264 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Feb 90 First Edition p. 2

[Unattributed article: "A Postal Detective, or, How Private Kurepkin Deceived Himself"]

[Text] **Greetings from Poland. Hello to you, my dear papa, mama, Galchonok, Mashenka and Aleshenka.**

"A little bit about myself. I don't want to upset you, but things are bad with me. Senior servicemen have beaten me and injured my kidneys. I am in terrible pain. They make fun of me whenever they feel like it. They wake me up in the middle of the night and ask me how long I have left in the service. If I give the wrong answer, they beat me.... I cannot serve any longer here. I can't take it. Go to the military commissariat and ask them to transfer me somewhere nearer to Moscow.

"A big hug for you all. I dream of my son Aleshenka at night. I want to see him very much and I miss you all a lot.—Andrey"

"To Comrade D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, from the parents of serviceman Andrey Stanislavovich Kurepkin:

"Our son was inducted into the Soviet Army on 1 December 1989. He is now in Poland. He wrote us to say that senior servicemen beat him up.

"Please issue instructions at once to have the case investigated and medical treatment provided, and then have him transferred to another unit which does not have the verbal abuse and mockery. We are all suffering for him. Why are they making a cripple out of a good son, brother, husband and father? What has he done to deserve this?"—his mother and father."

"Respected Tatyana Andreyevna and Stanislav Nikolayevich, at the instructions of Army Gen D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, we have investigated the facts presented by you in your request to him.

"In the first place, there is no reason for you to worry or suffer. Your son Andrey was never ill. He is absolutely healthy, and a hospital military medicine commission has declared him fit for active duty. He has now taken the military oath and is serving in his military unit.

"Everything which Andrey said in the letter was made up from beginning to end. He wanted to gain your sympathy and get a quick transfer to the Moscow Military District. At our request the General Staff of the Air Forces of the

USSR has transferred Andrey to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Military District to continue his service

"Respectfully, Major General N. Domashev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces"

"Letter of explanation: I, Private Andrey Stanislavovich Kurepkin, lied because I became very homesick for my family, my wife and son when I arrived in the unit on 10 December 1989, and I found it very difficult to serve there. Before being inducted into the army I had never been away from home for long. I first wrote a request to be transferred to the MVO [Moscow Military District] or discharged from the Armed Forces. I then decided to take an illness, bed-wetting, and began complaining about flat-footedness. I told Lt V.N. Sorokopudov, platoon commander, that I had been beaten in the latrine by privates Lysenko, Pogosyan and Zherebtsov

"I want it to be known that no one in the unit beat or offended me.—A. Kurepkin"

"Greetings, dear papa, mama and sister Galochka. Dear parents, please forgive me, if you can, for the deception. I deceived you when I said that I was beaten. I did it because I did not believe that I would be moved here, to the Moscow Military District, and I therefore decided without thinking, in my empty-headed way, on a way to get myself transferred here...."

From the editors: The mail to the Ministry of Defense and its central agencies contains many letters from parents referring to letters from their sons and asking that they be protected against tyranny in the barracks. We give special attention to all these reports, commanders and political organs, offices of the Judge Advocate and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents are enlisted to investigate them. Far from all of the cases are confirmed, however.

Unfortunately, nonregulation relations are a reality. It is also a reality, however, that some of the youth turn out not to be prepared to fulfill their military duty under the conditions which this requires and resort to claims of "dedovshchina" to make life easier for themselves. Kurepkin's family situation (a wife and son) were grounds for petitioning for him to be allowed to serve closer to home. The young soldier chose another route, however—that of deception. An enlightening case.

Gorbachev, Politburo Members Sign Gen Army V. F. Margelov Obituary

90UM03704 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Mar 90 First Edition p. 3

[Obituary of Gen Army V. F. Margelov]

[Text] General of the Army Vasily Filippovich Margelov

The prominent Soviet military leader, active participant in the Great Patriotic War, Laureate of the State Prize of the USSR, and Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Margelov, Vasily Filippovich, died suddenly on 4

March, 1990. He had devoted all of his conscious life to selfless service to the socialist Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1929.

V. F. Margelov was born to a worker's family on 27 December 1908 in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. From an early age he began to work as an apprentice, assistant master, and worker in a coal mine. In 1928 he volunteered for the Red Army and in its ranks he traveled the path from cadet of the Military School imeni TsIK VSSR to general of the army.

V. F. Margelov was in the active Army at the start of the Great Patriotic War. He fought on the Leningrad, Northwest, Stalingrad, Southern, and Fourth and Third Ukrainian Fronts, and showed himself to be a brave, energetic, and experienced commander. In the difficult conditions of combat, he displayed steadfastness, personal bravery, and fearlessness.

In the postwar period, V. F. Margelov was graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and commanded an airborne division and corps. For some time he was the commanding general of Airborne Troops and did great work in providing them with modern equipment, arms, and assault gear, instilling a high level of morale, political qualities, and fighting spirit in the Airborne Troops. He wrote scholarly works and became a Candidate of Military Sciences. Since 1979 he was a military inspector and advisor to the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

V. F. Margelov actively participated in sociopolitical life, and was elected a delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress. By his efficiency, party principle, exactingness toward himself and subordinates, and caring attitude toward his men, V. F. Margelov gained the profound respect of all who knew him and served with him.

For his services to the Communist Party and the Soviet State, V. F. Margelov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and four Orders of Lenin, an Order of the October Revolution, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov Second Class, two Orders of the Patriotic War First Class, the Order of the Red Star, Orders "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," Third and Second Class, and many medals. He received a number of decorations from socialist countries.

The bright memory of Vasilii Filippovich Margelov, a loyal son of the Soviet people and a fiery patriot of the socialist Fatherland, will always remain in our hearts.

M. S. Gorbachev, V. I. Vorotnikov, L. N. Zaykov, V. A. Ivashko, V. A. Kryuchkov, Ye. K. Ligachev, Yu. D. Maslyukov, V. A. Medvedev, N. I. Ryzhkov, N. N. Slyunkov, E. A. Shevardnadze, A. I. Yakovlev, A. P. Biryukova, A. V. Vlasov, A. I. Lukyanov, Ye. M. Primakov, B. K. Pugo, G. P. Razumovskiy, D. T. Yazov, O. D. Baklanov, M. A. Moiseyev, P. G. Lushev, K. A.

Kochetov, A. D. Lizichev, A. S. Pavlov, Yu. P. Maksimov, V. I. Varennikov, I. M. Tretyak, A. N. Yefimov, V. N. Chernavin, M. I. Sorokin, V. M. Arkhipov, V. M. Shabanov, N. V. Chekov, V. L. Govorov, D. S. Sukhorukov, Yu. A. Yashchin, S. F. Akhromeyev, V. G. Kulikov, S. K. Kurkotkin, N. V. Ogarkov, V. I. Petrov, S. L. Sokolov, P. N. Kuleshov, N. G. Lyashchenko, I. G. Pavlovskiy, I. N. Shkadov, V. A. Achalov, N. V. Kalinin, V. A. Polevik, Ye. N. Podkolzin.

Presidium Of All-Union Council Of Veterans Meets

90UM03864 Moscow VETERAN in Russian
No 12, 19-25 Mar 90 p 2

[Report on the results of a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Veterans: "A Meeting of the Presidium"]

[Text] On 11 March a meeting of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces took place.

During the meeting questions concerning the next plenum of the All-Union Council were examined.

Next there was a substantive conversation about the participation of the Turkmen SSR veterans soviets in carrying out the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the VTSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] from 12 June 1988 entitled "On Additional Measures to Improve Living Conditions of Veterans of War and Labor." Chairman of the Republic Soviet and USSR People's Deputy S.A. Atayev delivered a report. He said that in Chardzhou and Mary territorial social services centers have been opened, charity centers have been organized and special stores for invalids, war participants, soldiers-internationalists and for the families of the Motherland's defenders who lost their lives have been opened. During the past two years 1185 families of veterans have received new apartments and 181 houses have been built for them using resources from the collective farms.

The Presidium of the All-Union Council approved the practice of the joint work of the Turkmen SSR veterans soviets with state organs and public organizations in the republic for the improvement of living conditions of older people. Along with this it was noted that certain soviets are still working passively and are not always persistent and principled in defending the interests of veterans. Problems about commercial services available for those living in rural areas are resolved slowly. The plan for the construction of residences for invalids and the elderly is being carried out poorly.

Special attention was directed to the fact that the veterans councils have relaxed the attention shown to carrying out the complex "Zabota" programs.

At the meeting of the presidium a permanent commission of the All-Union Council on working with veterans

of the Armed Forces was created. General Colonel I.S. Mednikov, retired, was chosen to be its chairman. General Colonels A.N. Klyuyev, retired, and I.P. Repin, retired, were chosen to be deputy chairmen.

A permanent commission of the All-Union Council on questions of the ecology was also created. Ye.A. Kozlovskiy, who formerly worked as USSR minister of geology, was chosen as its chairman.

Ligachev Speaks At Plenum Of All-Union Council of Veterans

90UM0386B Moscow VETERAN in Russian
No 12, 19-25 Mar 90 p 2

[Report on Results of Plenum of All-Union Council of Veterans: "Plenary Session of All-Union Council"]

[Text] On 16 March in Moscow at the M.V. Frunze Central Home of the Soviet Army a plenum of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces took place. The plenum discussed the draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress entitled, "Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism." CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary E.K. Ligachev delivered a report. Participants of the plenum approved an appeal to the CPSU Central Committee which states that veterans have supported and will support strongly the socialist renewal of society.

At the plenum elections took place for the vacant place of alternate USSR People's Deputy from the All-Union Organization of Veterans. M.F. Lavrinovich, a veteran of labor and general director of the "BelavtoMaz" production association, received the majority of votes.

The matter of organization was analyzed.

The plenum unanimously elected Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov to be chairman of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces.

V.Ya. Azarov, I.S. Mednikov, D.I. Karabanov and B.T. Shumilin were elected members of the presidium of the All-Union Council.

Several people, mainly deputy chairmen of republic soviets, were elected as members of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces.

The membership of the commission on the elaboration of a new edition of statutes of the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces and the Organization of Soviet War Veterans was approved. Chairman of the commission is A.I. Golyakov; his deputies are P.I. Kravchenko and A.P. Maresev.

A report on the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress and the appeal to the CPSU Central Committee will be published in the next issue of our newspaper.

Akhromeyev Interviewed on Military Doctrine

90UM02264 Moscow AGITATOR (ARMY FLEET) in Russian No 24, 1989 pp 2-4

[Interview with Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev by NOVOSTI military commentator V. Pogrebenkov: "Our Military Doctrine"]

[Text] As requested by the editors of our magazine, an NOVOSTI military commentator, V. Pogrebenkov, interviewed Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Pogrebenkov] Sergey Fedorovich, you participated directly in drafting the new Soviet defense doctrine. Would the doctrine have been possible without the new political thinking?

[Akhromeyev] The new political thinking and the defense doctrine are most inseparably connected. A country begins to experience the need for a new military doctrine when it introduces new foreign and domestic policies. Until there is a new policy there can be no new military doctrine, since practically nobody needs it. After 1985 when the new CPSU and government leaders came to power in our country, from 1985-87 they worked on the new foreign and internal policy which received the approval of our society. An objective need arose to work out a new military doctrine also.

[Pogrebenkov] What is the essence of the new foreign policy?

[Akhromeyev] To put it very briefly, if not incompletely, the essence of this policy can be defined by three characteristics. First, demilitarization, i.e. exclusion of force from the foreign policy weaponry. This fundamental concept has been proven true in reality through our relations with every country of any social structure. This concept resulted in major positive changes in the international situation. It goes without saying that we act in such a way only if nobody else is conducting his foreign policy towards us from a position of strength either. Second, democratization—creating a basis of equality in our relationship with any country, whether big or small. Third, deideologizing, i.e. removal of ideological aspects from relations between countries; these relations should be based on international law.

These fundamental decisions radically changed our foreign policy and the military doctrine we had been following in the mid-1980's ceased to conform in any way to the new policy. For that reason a new military doctrine was being designed both in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact countries in the period from 1985-87. It was published in May of 1987 and has since become the guide to action for the USSR Armed Forces.

[Pogrebenkov] The doctrine has been in effect for over two years. Have you discovered any drawbacks in it during this time?

[Akhromeyev] I do not see any shortcomings in it. The theoretical basis of the doctrine has been well conceived and its military and political part is rooted in our foreign policy. Everybody knows its basic provisions. The Soviet Union will never start a war under any conditions, it will never be the first to deploy nuclear weapons, it does not consider any government or any nation as an enemy. The USSR does not have any territorial claims to anyone else.

Of course, some new problems do arise. But basically these are the very provisions that constitute the essence of our foreign policy and of the military and political part of the doctrine.

If we mention the military-technological side of the doctrine, it is more flexible because it directly depends on the concrete military and political situation. So far we have not found any drawbacks in this area either. This aspect of the doctrine should provide answers to four basic questions: Who is a possible adversary of the country that designed the doctrine? What kind of aggression should the country be ready to repel? What kind of armed forces should it have? How should they be trained to repel the aggression? Our doctrine answers all four of these questions.

Some foreign countries often express their doubts about the contents of the doctrine. But they do not reproach us for lack of details in it, they claim that we say one thing and do something else. But statements of this nature have nothing to do with reality as the Soviet Union does exactly what it says. At the same time the Soviet Union does a lot more to decrease the military tensions than other countries.

[Pogrebenkov] Going back to the definition of a possible adversary of our country, could you present him as more concrete? Who is he, our possible adversary?

[Akhromeyev] This should not be answered by us but by those who call us a possible enemy. Look at the speeches made by the leaders of some NATO countries and you can start with those of U.S. President G. Bush, Secretary of State J. Baker, and Secretary of Defense R. Cheney. The leaders of the NATO military bloc speak the same language. They all call the Soviet Union their enemy. For that reason we do not have to select a possible adversary. He declares himself—the United States and the NATO military bloc.

[Pogrebenkov] Does the Soviet military doctrine include combat operations outside its national borders?

[Akhromeyev] Soviet troops are located on the territories of Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR in accordance with the postwar decisions of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain, and also in accordance with the Warsaw Pact and bilateral agreements. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries specifies that the first major operations of both our strategic and tactical forces will be entirely defensive in character and

meant to repel an aggression. In our view such operations can be long lasting, they might go on for several weeks. During that time the political leaders of the Warsaw Pact will, as we think, take measures to confine the ongoing conflict and to prevent the expansion of war. If political means prove inadequate in eliminating the conflict then it is totally impossible for us to predict now what direction events might follow from then on. The sides would deploy their military forces according to war-time plans

[Pogrebenkov] From your experience in speaking to foreign audiences do you think that the people of the Western countries have reason to be concerned about the application of our defensive doctrine?

[Akhromeyev] The problem is that the NATO countries are still guided by the outdated military doctrines of "flexible response" and "nuclear deterrence" and the leaders of those countries do not want to change them. So they are trying to compromise our doctrine in order to justify their own actions. And these are intentional moves since the words of the North Atlantic bloc are at considerable variance with its actions. The major political figures of the leading NATO countries praise the Soviet Union for its democracy, for glasnost, and for its foreign policy. They insist that this policy is correct and enjoys their support. But when it comes to considering problems of military policy those same leaders claim that the Soviet Union in reality is not reducing its armaments, that it preserves its enormous military power in a volume considerably larger than NATO's. All this allows for an essentially incorrect conclusion: The NATO armed forces should not be reduced but developed further

Why do they act like this? Don't they know what we are really doing to reduce our armed forces and to stabilize the international situation? Yes, they do. But the thing is that they would have to undertake similar actions to respond to ours and there may be many reasons why they do not want to do this. Maybe it is worthwhile to name the main one. Why, for instance, does the West not wish to compare military doctrines?

If one openly compares in full detail the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and at the same time looks at the actions of both sides in practice, then the picture would seem unfavorable for the North Atlantic Treaty. It would become obvious that NATO continues to escalate its military effort while the Warsaw Pact is diminishing it. That must be the gist of the matter.

[Pogrebenkov] On one hand, we adopted a defensive doctrine and now we transfer the Soviet Armed Forces to new quality characteristics of military structure. That is quite necessary as the military threat for the USSR has not disappeared. On the other hand, we heard it announced at the 2d Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that our military expenditures will be cut. Isn't there a contradiction?

[Akhromeyev] Contradictions exist always and everywhere in life. What is important, is to take them into account when making decisions. True, the military threat has declined in the last four years and this is a fact. In all fairness I must say that the effort was made by both sides: the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This made it possible to cut the armed forces and armaments. We need it even more now because of the complex economic situation in our country. However, we should be realistic when considering the international situation. As you correctly noticed, the military threat for the Soviet Union is still there. So far the United States and the NATO countries preserve strength as the basis of their foreign policy. When we negotiate with a partner who is guided in his relations with us by a policy which operates from a position of strength we can feel equal only if we are sufficiently strong ourselves. At first glance, this contradicts my earlier statement about demilitarizing our foreign policy, but it does not. We excluded use of force from our intergovernmental relations with any country that would not use force in its relations with us. But we have to act correspondingly with those who base their foreign policy on force. Therefore, we have to maintain the defense capabilities of our country at the necessary level

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Kokoshin, Lobov Discuss Military Thought of General Svechin

90L M03894 Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian
No 2, Feb 90 (Signed to press 5 Jan 90) pp 170-182

[Article by A.A. Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Army General V.N. Lobov, doctor of military sciences: "Foresight (General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War)"]

[Text] The 1920s and early 1930s were a time of stormy development of social thought, including military-political and military-strategic thought. Diverse military-strategic studies led to bold conclusions and profound generalizations, and many military-scientific works were noted for their depth of judgments and a high degree of professionalism and competence. Nothing interfered with the free exchange of opinions, participants in debates felt relaxed and believed that they did not at all have the right to the absolute truth—later on this no longer was the case

The works of A.A. Svechin, a professor at the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) Military Academy and head of an entire school of strategic thought, evoked the sharpest debates

Brief Information. Aleksandr Andreyevich Svechin was born in 1878 in Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) into the family of a general. He completed the Artillery School and the General Staff Academy. He was a company commander and an army corps staff officer. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. He served in the Main Staff and General Staff until

1914. During World War I he was an aide-de-camp for the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief; later he was commander of a regiment and division and chief of staff of the 5th Army. In 1916 he was promoted to the rank of "Major-General."

After the October Revolution, he went over to the side of Soviet power. In the Red Army he was chief of a division, military supervisor of Smolensk Rayon, chief of the All-Russian Main Staff, and an instructor at the General Staff Academy. He was chairman of the Military History Commission for Studying the Experience of World War I. From 1927 he was deputy chief supervisor of RKKA military academies for strategy, and from 1936 was assistant chief of the Department of Military History of the General Staff Academy. In 1935 he was promoted to the rank of "Division Commander."

He was discharged from the RKKA in 1938 and arrested. Information concerning A.A. Svechin's fate after that is contradictory.

The following is from an efficiency report signed in 1924 by R.A. Muklevich, commissar and assistant chief of the RKKA Military Academy and a prominent party and state figure:

"This training year he is running the department of the history of military art (chief supervisor) and actually supervises the department of strategy in the senior and junior courses.

"A thoroughly educated military specialist. Has a tremendous amount of experience (from the Japanese and imperialist wars) in the most varied positions (from work at the General Headquarters to work as a regimental commander). Quite a talented person and ingenious professor. Svechin is the most valuable professor at the Military Academy. His classes on strategy, thanks to an invariable originality of thought, always simple and clever, were one of the greatest achievements in the senior course this training year (applied classes on strategy—a report work of a corps commander).

"...Paradoxical by his nature, extremely malicious in everyday life; he does not miss an opportunity to get in a sarcastic comment for any reason.

"However, he works extremely productively.

"A monarchist, of course, by his convictions, being a realistic politician, he took the situation into account and adapted. But not as clumsily as Zayonchkovskiy ("he sympathizes with the Communist Party"), and not all sugar and honey as Verkhovskiy, but with dignity, with a sense of a critical attitude towards political issues, of which he has his own opinion for each, which he expresses. He is especially rated as a fighter against the slavery to routine and conservatism of his comrades from the old army (present instructors at the academy), whose weak points he knows better than anyone else.

"Svechin is the most outstanding professor at the academy."

The efficiency report has at least one transgression against the truth: A.A. Svechin was not a monarchist—this is convincingly evidenced by his scientific works.

One can safely say that none of our military theorists of that time could compare with A.A. Svechin in analyzing military-political problems and questions of strategy. A.A. Svechin was not a Marxist, but in his works he emphasized the importance of the dialectical method, formulated, as a rule, fundamentally important materialist concepts, and carried them through with greater consistency than any of his opponents who had sworn adherence to Marxism. V.I. Lenin was the highest authority for him. He quoted him many times and noted that in Lenin, as a politician, the inflexible will in moving toward the fundamental goals of socialism was combined with flexibility and a capability for political maneuvering as the requirements of the changing situation required. These qualities, he believed, were also necessary for strategists and military command.

A.A. Svechin was one of few Soviet military theorists who deeply and concretely analyzed the ideas of K. Clausewitz, whose work "On War" was rated so highly by F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. Rigid outlines, direct edification, and didactics in scientific research and in outlining its results, which became increasingly prevalent beginning in the late 1920s, were unacceptable to him. A.A. Svechin's creative multi-variant approach to problems of strategy was not met with understanding on the part of a considerable portion of command personnel of the RKKA, who did not possess the level of thought and did not strive to add to their knowledge.

A.A. Svechin was the author of numerous interesting scientific works which have not lost their importance ("Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Military Art], "Voyna v gorakh: takticheskoye issledovaniye po opytu rusko-yaponskoy voyny" [Mountain Warfare: A Tactical Study Based on the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War], "Strategiya" [Strategy], "Strategiya XX v. na I etape" [Strategy of the 21st Century in the First Stage], "Evolutsiya iskusstva" [Evolution of Art], and others), which are impossible to examine within the framework of one article. We will dwell on three topics.

1. Politics and Military Strategy

In the 1920s, the views of those prominent Western military leaders and military theorists who advocated autonomy of military strategy from politics, modifying in their own fashion the well-known formula of Clausewitz and even declaring it obsolete, are widely known. Prominent Red Army commanders, including M.N. Tukhachevskiy, accepted these views unequivocally. Defending Clausewitz' formula, A.A. Svechin analyzed in detail the views of those who spoke out against the "dominant influence of politics"—Field Marshal H.K. von Moltke Sr., Field Marshals E. Ludendorff and P. Hindenburg, and the then quite popular French military theorist Laval.

According to Laval, war should be viewed separately as a duel between two nations, noted A.A. Svechin. Rulers should specialize in politics, generals in strategy. Politics has a bearing on war only to the extent that in peacetime it determines what sacrifices the people must make to organize armed forces. During war, politics should not affect military plans. Discussing strategy with politicians causes anemia and a loss of will and energy. Politics is opium for strategy; it leads to impotence. Politics strings delusion, mistakes, and deviations, undermines resolve, leads one astray, and makes one feel nervous. Laval believed that a politician who understands something in military affairs is a chimera. At the same time, a military leader must not be distracted from his direct dealings with questions of politics.

A.A. Svechin compares such views with the views of Bismarck, who wrote: "The task of the high command is to destroy enemy combat forces; the goal of war is to win a peace corresponding to the conditions of the policy which the state supports. Establishing and limiting the goals which must be achieved by war and giving advice in this regard to the monarch during the war, as well as before it, is the task of politics; the methods of performing this political task cannot help but influence the conduct of war."

A.A. Svechin does not simply refute the views of those who did not recognize the superiority of politics over strategy. He explains the reasons by which strategy can strive to get away from the subordination to politics and even turn politics into its own servant: "The assertion about the domination of politics over strategy, in our opinion, is of world-wide historical importance. It is beyond doubt when the creator of policy is the youthful class, which is going for the broad future and the historical health of which is also reflected in the form of healthy policy it pursues. But it always causes doubts in those states which represent the organizational domination of the class that has already had its day, which is in the position of historical defense, whose regime has begun to rot, and which is forced to conduct an unhealthy policy and sacrifice the interests of the whole to preserve its domination. In this case, the unhealthy policy inevitably is continued by an unhealthy strategy. Therefore, the protests of bourgeois military writers, especially the French, impressed by the disastrous influence of the Second Empire's corrupt policy on strategy, are quite understandable. Strategy, naturally, strives to be emancipated from bad policy; but strategy cannot exist without policy, in a vacuum. It is doomed to pay for all the sins of policy."

In arguing with foreign and Soviet advocates of the autonomy of military strategy and alluding to the fact that strategy has to pay for the mistakes in policy, A.A. Svechin wrote: "Erroneous policy bears just as bitter a fruit in military affairs as it does in any other area." But "we must not confuse the protest against mistakes in policy with a refusal to recognize that policy has the right and responsibility to determine the leadership of war in its basic features."

At the same time, A.A. Svechin repeated many times that political decisions should also conform to strategy and military capabilities and that a politician must lend an attentive ear to the opinions of military professionals and know how the war machine works, what the state's military mobilization mechanism is, and so forth. "Responsible political figures should be familiar with strategy... A politician who sees a political goal for military actions must realize what is attainable for strategy given the resources it has and how policy can influence a change in the situation for better or worse. Strategy is one of the most important instruments of policy; in peacetime, too, policy should to a considerable extent base its calculations on the military capabilities of friendly and hostile states." This thought is particularly obvious if you consider the tragic events of the war with Finland in 1939-1940 and during the first period of the Great Patriotic War. The fact that Stalin and those closest to him did not sufficiently understand the military-strategic and operational issues significantly exacerbated Red Army's already difficult situation in 1941 and 1942. Stalin did not properly enlist the help of the General Staff and military professionals in working up and making decisions during the first months of the war.

Today, when the thesis that war cannot serve as a rational instrument of policy (at least in relations between the United States and the USSR and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO) is receiving recognition, it is all the more important that the top state and political leadership know the theory and practice of military strategy and the implementation by the military mechanism of decisions made by policy. After all, such decisions on the boundary of politics and military affairs can lead to the most fatal, irreversible consequences. They should especially know, it seems, the real capabilities of command and control systems and equipment—theirs and the enemy's—communications and reconnaissance systems, and missile warning systems. The general public should also understand the basic military-strategic issues, so glasnost is necessary here, too. Otherwise policy will not be able to exercise real, but only declarative control over military strategy, and there will be no correspondence between the political and military-technical components of a state's military doctrine.

The Nature of a Future War

A.A. Svechin gave specific military-political predictions of the nature of a future war. In 1926, he concluded that Poland would become Germany's first victim in this war. He considered the system of international relations that had taken shape in Europe after World War I to be quite unstable, corresponding, in his opinion, primarily to the plans of French policy. "The thinking of French foreign policy has for ages, since the times of Richelieu, been brought up on creating in Europe such conditions of a state of comminution, strip holding, and undefendability. As a result of the work of French policy, the ideas of which were expressed in the Versailles 'Peace' treaty, the entire middle of Europe—Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so forth—have been placed in conditions

precluding defense and a positional nature. The vassals of France have been skillfully put in the position of a squirrel obliged to turn the wheel of militarism. The art of France's policy lies in the deliberate creation of unstable situations. Hence the short life of the 'creation'... Poland will still have the opportunity to think over how it should thank France for the gift of the Danzig corridor, which ensures that Poland will be first in line for the German strike." A.A. Svechin wrote that the world has entered a transitional period in which not only Europe but the entire world is beginning to appear as a "completely new strategic landscape" and in which the art of war in many schools is turning to new methods and techniques of waging war and is acquiring new forms in a situation of social upheavals coming to a head.

A.A. Svechin's views of the nature of a future war were formed and promulgated primarily in 1925-1926—less than half-way between the two world wars. Many Soviet military theorists at that time believed that all wars which the USSR would face would be revolutionary wars and, therefore, the Red Army's strategy should only be offensive. An influential group of leaders of the Red Army, in overestimating the experience of the Civil War, especially its offensive operations, considered a future war from the standpoint of these operations. They preferred not to remember that the Civil War consisted of not just some victorious Red Army offensives. A warp toward the ideological side and a substitution of strictly military-political analysis with propaganda slogans became increasingly clear. Many of the military constantly reiterated that only an offensive "strategy of destruction" was peculiar to the Soviet state, by its very nature, as a state of the progressive revolutionary class. Here, incidentally, M.N. Tukhachevskiy and K.Ye. Voroshilov, who clashed on many other questions of military affairs and organizational development of the Red Army and Red Navy, held similar positions.

Part of the RKKA command personnel and scientists involved in military-political problems believed that the rear area of capitalist countries would be just as unstable as that of the White governments during the Civil War; therefore, after the initial strikes, the Red Army would begin advancing just as victoriously as it did during the final periods of the Civil War.

Here they actually did not take into consideration the most important lessons of the concluding stage of the Soviet-Polish War, when hopes for the uprising of the Polish proletariat did not materialize and the rear area of the Western Front advancing on Warsaw was becoming increasingly unstable. A.A. Svechin considered the Warsaw Operation of the Western Front to be primarily a mistake in strategy, which did not correspond to the party's political and economic policy in 1920—a policy most distinctly expressed, in his opinion, in Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder." M.N. Tukhachevskiy and those holding the same views categorically disagreed with A.A. Svechin, believing that they were on the verge of taking Warsaw and thus destroying the entire Versailles system, since the creators

of this system stood behind Poland—France, the United States, and Great Britain. The opinion that the Western Front's Warsaw Operation could have been successful upset M.N. Tukhachevskiy. For example, prominent Soviet military theorist G.S. Isserson developed this opinion in his works of the 1960s. A.A. Svechin not only criticized the actions of Yegorov and Stalin, who actually violated the directive of Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev, but also called attention to the insufficiently distinct nature of this directive and the operational mistakes by M.N. Tukhachevskiy and his staff.

Not ruling out the probability of a revolutionary nature of future wars, at the same time A.A. Svechin believed that it was dangerous to structure policy and military strategy on such an ideological guideline and that in this connection "the experience of history is not too comforting"—it shows that overestimating the capabilities of strategic offensive operations can lead to catastrophic consequences for the attacker.

A.A. Svechin's assessment of the nature of a future war based on in-depth knowledge and understanding of history, and not only on the recent experience of the Civil War, and on a consideration of the industrial and economic capabilities of the sides, mainly proved to be correct. The local armed conflicts with Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the KVZhD [the Chinese Eastern Railroad] in 1929, with Japan in 1938 and 1939 on Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River, as well as the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, and the war with Nazi Germany and its satellites in 1941-1945 basically refuted A.A. Svechin opponents, who maintained that he "was following an anti-Soviet path," since all wars which the USSR would face would be revolutionary wars.

The Nazis and the state apparatus captured by them managed to use ultra-chauvinistic slogans and terrorism against the opposition to force the bulk of the German people to fight against the Soviet Union, and to fight with quite a high degree of military effectiveness. The rear area of Hitler's Germany remained stable right up until the fall of the Third Reich, which completely controlled the Nazi state machinery.

A.A. Svechin constantly maintained that the war would be difficult, it would most likely be protracted in nature and would require a step-by-step mobilization of tremendous resources and the straining of all the people's forces, and that we could not count on rapid successes and implementation of the ideal of "strategic destruction," which make it possible to decide the fate of the war of the Soviet Union with its main capitalist adversaries by a brilliant series of offensive operations in a short time period.

Studying the totality of political, economic, and military-technical capabilities of the sides, A.A. Svechin concluded that today, when powerful states and their coalitions clash, wars inevitably take on a protracted nature in which the forms of struggle, above all armed struggle, can be quite diverse. The term "strategy of attrition," he

wrote, "in no way reflects fundamentally the destruction of enemy personnel as the goal of the operation, but sees this as only part of the tasks of the armed front, but not the entire task"; "we have to think not only about the projecting of efforts, but also their dosage." Equally decisive military and political goals can be pursued with a "strategy of attrition" as with a "strategy of destruction."

A.A. Svechin organically combined his economic and geographical thoughts with his military-political and strategic conclusions on the nature of a future war. He repeatedly writes that the capture of a portion of the USSR territory by a Western aggressor is not ruled out and, therefore, it is necessary to take into account military-strategic factors when building new industrial facilities in the western part of the country. "...The construction of powerful sources of electrical energy—Dneprostroy, Svirstroy—which in the future are destined to industrialize entire regions, requires not only a preliminary technological and economic, but also a competent strategic examination by experts." A.A. Svechin recommended concentrating industry primarily in the Urals as the least vulnerable region in a future war. Leningrad caused him special alarm—"the Sevastopol of a future war," is what is called it, having in mind Sevastopol's vulnerability during the Crimean War. Cautioning against a further concentration of industry and population in Leningrad, A.A. Svechin wrote: "The disadvantages of Leningrad's strategic position are exacerbated by its distance from sources of grain and raw materials." The first 5-year plans changed our country's economic geography. The Ural Metallurgical Base and a fuel base in the Far East and in Eastern Siberia were created, and industrial centers were set up in Central Asia. The decisions of the 18th Party Congress (1939) especially pointed out the need to locate plants in the eastern regions of the country. Nevertheless, when the Great Patriotic War began, this proved to be clearly insufficient; many decisions were made too late. The rapid advance of Nazi Germany's troops forced the relocation of a huge number of industrial enterprises, equipment, and raw materials and the evacuation of the population deep into the rear area in an extremely short period of time and with considerable losses. What could not be moved out was blown up and destroyed so it did not fall into enemy hands. The Dnieper and Svir hydroelectric power plants were among other installations that were rendered unusable.

During the first three months of the war, we had to evacuate more than 1,360 large, mainly military enterprises. As a result of war losses and also the evacuation of enterprises, the USSR's gross industrial output from June through November 1941 decreased by a factor of 1.1. Production of rolled ferrous metals decreased in December 1941 by a factor of 3.1 compared to June 1941; production of rolled non-ferrous metals decreased by a factor of 430; production of ball bearings, without which it was impossible to produce either aircraft, or tanks, or artillery, decreased by a factor of 21.

In all his main works, A.A. Svechin called upon not only state and political leaders but also military leaders to carefully take into account economic factors and the industrial and economic resources of the sides, emphasizing the importance of an optimal distribution of resources, the amount of which is always limited among the armed services. In particular, he questioned the advisability of creating a large surface fleet for the USSR. "Our army," A.A. Svechin wrote concerning Russia's armed forces on the eve of World War I, "could have been comparable in technology to the German army only if we had rejected the building of a battleship fleet, the latter, in conditions of an extremely unfavorable location of Russian ports in the depth of operational backyards of the seas, deprived of any proper basing, was doomed to inaction. However, after Tsushima and the first revolution, we again began building the argonauts, which diverted a large portion of the sums allocated for defense, and an even more substantial portion of our still weaker industry."

Construction of the newest battleships for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets to a considerable extent, if not decisively, was determined by the desire to restore the naval prestige of the Russian Empire, lost after the Russo-Japanese War, and not by profound operational-strategic considerations. We began building expensive dreadnought-type battleships for the Baltic (and then for the Black Sea) Fleet back when new cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were much more needed.

A.A. Svechin similarly assessed the battleship "open seas fleet", which Kaiser's Germany created and challenged the sea power of Great Britain. He wrote that Germany's desire to prepare the grounds to fight England for domination on the seas had quite a negative effect on the German army: of the sums allocated by the budget for military purposes, the ground forces received two-thirds, and one-third went to creating a navy. "Moltke's [senior] land army did not know such derogation of funds." Here, A.A. Svechin's views coincided with those of M.V. Frunze, who favored restoring the navy, but emphasized that the scale of its construction should be strictly regulated: "Even under the most favorable budget conditions, we will limit ourselves to a program of small defensive vessels." M.V. Frunze substantiated this conclusion with the following considerations: first of all, "a navy is a very expensive weapon," and with a general shortage of funds it is better to use them for more critical and immediate needs that are of determining importance for the country's defense; secondly, the fate of a future war will be decided on continental theaters of military operations, and the navy's main task is to support the actions of land groupings on maritime axes; thirdly, our fleets do not have a direct access to major waterways. M.N. Tukhachevskiy was of the same opinion and noted, in particular, that during the period of preparation for World War I, Kaiser's Germany, predominantly a land power, violated Bismarck's behests and made a cardinal mistake: in striving to be equal in naval power with Great Britain, it weakened its

land forces. "If the power of the German land army had been prepared on a greater scale, it is quite possible that the outcome of the fall campaign of 1914 in France could have ended up in the complete collapse of the latter, which would have predetermined the outcome of the war."

M.V. Frunze's policy with respect to the Red Navy was not followed for long. Already in 1937 an extensive shipbuilding program was adopted which called for building expensive, metal-intensive battleships and heavy cruisers, to which I.V. Stalin was partial. The designing and laying of the ships were conducted with an ever-increasing scope at an extremely fast pace, especially after Hitler's attack on Poland in September 1939. This required enormous expenditures to create naval bases, docks, shipyards, and so forth. During that period, the production of all types of land-based weapon systems was being increased—cannons, tanks, and so forth. There was a shortage of metal and capacities. The program for building large ships was curtailed in the spring of 1940 and revised in October. Now we began building only submarines and small surface ships—destroyers, minesweepers, and so forth, and the unfinished battleships remained in the building slips. With the start of the war, the critical shortage of minesweepers, minesweeping equipment, and special assault-landing ships came to light, shipborne air defense weapons proved to be quite weak, and ships were insufficiently equipped with radar and sonar. All this resulted in heavy losses from enemy mines and aviation. There were no combat clashes of our battleships and cruisers with large enemy surface ships during the course of the war. So, on the very eve of the war, resources were spent in vain which could have been used for strengthening the land forces and for more optimal development of the navy itself. The ideas of M.V. Frunze, A.A. Svechin, and M.N. Tukhachevskiy about the place and functions of the navy in safeguarding the interests of the state are still quite timely today, taking into account, of course, all the new realities and the increasing role of a number of ocean water areas for USSR national security.

In talking about A.A. Svechin's contribution to domestic military science, one cannot fail to mention the shortcomings inherent in his works. Thus, he noted the great importance in a future war of tanks, aviation, motor transport, and the latest communications equipment, but dealt very little with the study of their effect on strategy, operational art, and tactics. I.P. Uborevich, Ya.Ya. Alksnis, and other military leaders and experts, and also M.N. Tukhachevskiy, including in his criticism of A.A. Svechin's concepts which turned into unsubstantiated political accusations, devoted attention to questions of this effect.

A.A. Svechin believed that, above all, certain potential adversaries of the USSR in the West would have the capability for massive use of artillery, tanks, and artillery. The industrial-economic and cultural level of the USSR, despite industrialization and development of education, would not make it possible in the foreseeable

future to be equal to the West in the level of being equipped with combat equipment and the ability to properly use it on a strategic and operational scale. A.A. Svechin called for placing the main emphasis on the Red Army's infantry and equipping it with reliable and effective close-combat weapons. In particular, he wrote: "It would be a gross mistake and a harsh departure from reality to forget about those huge primeval expanses on which the Dneprostrov and the future Nizhegorodskiy Motor Vehicle Plant are only grains."

We would remind you that A.A. Svechin made these conclusions on the nature of a future war in 1925-1927. Opponents attacked him primarily in 1931—after the 16th Party Congress. This congress adopted without any serious discussion Stalin's proposal to double and triple many of the already strained 5-year plan quotas. Not a single one of them was fulfilled, although the development of industry (at the expense of agriculture, the population's standard of living, and the strictest repressions) had been accelerated considerably.

Much of what A.A. Svechin wrote, noting the weakness of the technical equipment of the Red Army in a future war, proved to be valid, despite the fact that the scale of industrialization was much more significant than he had assumed, extrapolating into the future the course of development of industry, agriculture, and the economy as a whole in the second half of the 1920s. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army turned out to be insufficiently supplied with the most important equipment for a mobile war and offensive operations—motor transport, light automatic weapons, tractor-drawn artillery, and radio communications equipment. Even the latest equipment, such as the T-34 tank and KV heavy tank, Il-2 ground-attack aircraft, and Pe-2 dive-bombers, which were unequalled in the world at that time, were very poorly equipped with radios, as were staffs at all levels. The network of highways and railroads was poorly developed in the border areas. And although the RKKK had many more aircraft and tanks in its inventory by the start of Hitler's aggression than A.A. Svechin could have assumed, the quality and material and technical support of a considerable portion of this equipment did not conform to the demands being imposed by the military-political situation.

The Offensive and Defense

A.A. Svechin's thoughts and conclusions on the correlation between the offensive and defensive on a strategic scale stem from his views on a future war, on the material capabilities of the USSR, and on the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union. The majority of his contemporaries devoted primary attention to strategic offensive operations. Among them were also representatives of the old military intelligentsia who served in the Red Army, for example, A.M. Zayonchkovskiy.

The statements of those who participated in the destruction of the school of A.A. Svechin indicate the views that prevailed right up until the start of the Great Patriotic

War. Someone named I. Duplitskiy, for example, wrote: "If there is a war, we will of course act according to the directions of the leader of the Red Army, who said that we must achieve a situation in which we fight not on our soil but on foreign soil."

A.A. Svechin wrote in "The Evolution of the Art of War": "Defense in strategy has the opportunity of using the boundaries and depth of the theater, which forces the attacking side to waste forces in order to strengthen the spaces and to waste time crossing it, and any gain in time is another plus for the defense. The defending side reaps where it sows...., since an offensive is often stopped by false reconnaissance data, false fears, and inertness." He directed attention to the statements by Clausewitz, who considered the defense to be the strongest form of waging war for the materially weaker side. Noting that even the most ardent admirers of Clausewitz failed to take his ideas into account, he recalled the tragic consequences to which this led, particularly in World War I. With respect to modern military-political conditions, A.A. Svechin did not consider it a mistake to recognize the defense as the strongest form of waging war: "at least in the conditions of Europe, not enveloped by the revolutionary movement. The national economic fences of Europe have a tremendous historical standing."

Contrary to the accusations of putting trust only in the defense, he examined it in dialectical unity with the offensive—as a means of ensuring conditions for going over to an effective counteroffensive, resulting in the defeat of the enemy. "...In the majority of cases, the effectiveness of a strategic counterattack far surpasses in scope the initial thrust of the attacker. Did we not see throughout the World War a confirmation of the profound correctness of these views of Clausewitz? Was not his thought fully justified in the strategic counterattack by Foch in July 1918 and by the Poles in August 1920?"

A.A. Svechin's conclusions were confirmed in many operations of World War II and also have not lost their importance today—of course, with all the corrections for the development of military technology and new tactical and operational forms of conducting combat operations. The statements by Clausewitz and Svechin that the defense is the strongest form of combat operations are also timely in light of the concept of reasonable (defense) sufficiency for the USSR and the Warsaw Pact as a whole. It is noteworthy that prominent military experts and political and public figures in the West are increasingly turning to these statements, striving to respond to the ideas of new thinking advanced by the Soviet Union in questions of strengthening international security.

Striving to gain an understanding of the source of the unpopularity of strategic defense, A.A. Svechin wrote about such a stable category of the art of war as aggressiveness: "Quite often, mistakes observed in assigning a target that does not correspond to the weapons available for it are explained in part by the false ideas about aggressiveness. The defense has been given the less than honorable epithet of 'despicable'. All academic courses

before the war (World War I—**Author**) unanimously praised the virtues of the offensive, aggressiveness, and seizing the initiative." However, "true aggressiveness lies primarily in a sober view of the conditions of the struggle; one must see everything as it is and not build an illusory perspective. Initiative can be interpreted as a narrow concept defined exclusively by time—anticipating the enemy and seizing initiative of actions. However, it is possible to interpret retaining the initiative more deeply, too, as the art of implementing one's own will in the struggle with the enemy."

A.A. Svechin used the events of World War I to convincingly show that the most prominent military figures made mistakes for the sake of aggressiveness and retaining the initiative, which in the end led to defeats. In works on military history and military strategy and in official memoranda, he used historical examples to demonstrate cases in which a strategic defense was the only sure method of defeating the enemy, but was rejected by both the political leadership and the military command authorities and was not supported by the public. What is more, it happened more than once that supporters of "decisive actions," an offensive, and immediate battles remained in favor even after it turned out that their actions led to grave defeats. The roots of this, apparently, lie in the sphere of social psychology. A.A. Svechin illustrates his conclusion using an example from the history of the Punic Wars, talking about the fate of two consuls who were at the head of the Roman Army, which suffered a crushing defeat by Hannibal at Cannae. "...Of the two Roman consuls, the wise Paulus Emilius was killed in the battle at Cannae, but Terentius Varron, responsible for the defeat, saved himself by fleeing the battlefield, later thrived, and left behind numerous progeny; every leader who sensibly directs an operation can count on finding one of the ideological progeny of Terentius Varron in the person of his partner." As A.A. Svechin prophetically concluded, "the tribe of the apologies for military leaders is ineradicable."

Among those who adhered to the same views as A.A. Svechin in the 1920, one can mention such a prominent figure as B.M. Shaposhnikov. In a memorandum prepared in 1923, "Outline of Modern Strategy," he criticized A.M. Zayonchkovskiy and spoke out against the absolutization of the offensive: "defense and the offensive are used in war, and we not only must not recommend just the offensive, but it is even harmful." A.A. Svechin did not at all believe that the vast expanses of our country, the lack of roads, and the severe winters would ensure a strategic defense, as his opponents claimed he did. He saw the strategic defense primarily as a totality of operations which included counterstrikes and counterattacks at various pre-prepared lines, he cautioned against putting hopes on the capabilities which our territory and climate grant us. Back in 1924, he wrote in the essay "Dangerous Illusions": "The Soviet power received a complicated inheritance from the old regime, including that feather bed which was represented by the idea about the endlessness of Russian territory

providing a wide field for retreat, about the invulnerability of the political center for an external enemy, and about the Russian winter which would stop any invasion." He noted that telegraph, radio, aviation, motor vehicles, and all modern equipment are "great devourers of space." His foresight was completely confirmed on all fronts of World War II. It is especially valid today, when command and control and communications equipment, transportation equipment and means of delivering ammunition to the target have developed rapidly.

History, A.A. Svechin noted, teaches that the strategic importance of capitals is directly dependent "on the tension of political passions." Therefore, in a future war, which undoubtedly will assume the most acute political nature, he recommended reliably ensuring, first and foremost, the protection of Moscow as the political center of the Soviet Union, for "the decisive game must be played here." The Great Patriotic War, which began in significantly different conditions, confirmed the special importance of the capital of our state in Hitler's political and strategic plans. The Wehrmacht launched offensive operations immediately on three strategic axes, but the main thrust was made in the direction of Moscow. The main grouping of the Red Army was concentrated to the south, forming the Southwestern Front after the start of the war. There was almost one-third more forces and weapons here than in the Western Front covering Moscow.

One of the consequences of the destruction of the A.A. Svechin school was the insufficient attention of Soviet military science on the eve of the Great Patriotic War to the theory of strategy as a whole, and to the strategy of defense in particular. Thus, in 1935, at the Military Academy (imeni M.V. Frunze), the curriculum in the military-history department called for a 32-hour course of lectures on the theory of strategy, but not a single lecture was given. When the General Staff Academy was established in 1936, a strategy course was not included in its curriculum. Representatives of the supreme command, as G.S. Isserson recalls, avoided reading lectures on strategy (other than M.N. Tukhachevskiy, who spoke once in early 1937 on the general problems of modern war). Everything pertaining to strategy gradually began to be considered the exclusive right of the supreme leadership, in the person of Stalin. Many of the concepts and tenets stated in the 1920s and early 1930s were declared alien and hostile. The unjustified repressions to which the already small group of military leaders and theorists was subjected halted the development of strategic theory.

The consequences proved to be fatal for us at the beginning of the war. "A certain confusion and inability to grasp the complex situation as a whole, make an expedient decision on a large scale, and subordinate to it the entire course of events were to a considerable extent the result of strategic disorientation and unpreparedness to think in large categories of strategic importance," recalled G.S. Isserson. "A rapid change in the frame of mind of the military command, who had already entered

into a deadly clash with the attacking enemy, was not provided by an education in flexible thought not subordinate to any declarations and free in making the operational decisions it considered necessary in the situation at hand." Ending the discussions on questions of the theory of military strategy also adversely affected operational art, the priority in the development of which belonged to the Soviet scientific school. "We were bound by specific tenets of a declarative nature on the offensive conduct of war, on the fact that our army itself would be an attacking army, on the fact that we would shift the military actions to the enemy's territory, and so on and so forth," attests G.S. Isserson. "These suggestions were presented from above as immutable guiding directives of our military policy and were placed at the basis of all military thinking of command personnel. During Stalin's personality cult, they took on the meaning of law and were not subject to discussion."

The works on the topic "The Army in the Defense," accomplished by the General Staff Academy in 1938—the first in the entire history of such academies—went virtually unnoticed. The thesis of the superiority of the offensive over the defensive, preached by both the political leadership and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, proved to be an obstacle for comprehending these works. No attention was given to the dialectics of the correlation of defense and the offensive.

The idea of the necessary shifting of the war at its very outset to the enemy's territory had become ingrained in the state leaders and a considerable portion of the supreme military command. Not justified either theoretically, or by an analysis of the specific military-political situation, or by operational calculations, it stemmed primarily from ideological guidelines. In the practical respect, too, it was worked out far from consistently, and, of course, this had a particularly adverse effect on preparing not only the defenses on forward lines, but also the theaters of military operations as a whole in the depth of our own territory. Organizing and conducting a strategic defense was one of the most difficult tasks that the Soviet Supreme High Command had to carry out during the very first days. The Great Patriotic War convincingly showed that it is impossible to repel a strategic offensive by a well-prepared enemy in passing, simply as an intermediate task—it requires long and fierce defensive battles and operations. If they had been prepared, the groupings of personnel and equipment would have been positioned in a totally different way, taking into account defensive missions, command and control would have been structured differently, and the positioning of material supplies and other mobilization resources would have been accomplished differently. Oriented on an immediate counteroffensive, shifting to a general offensive, groupings not covered by a deeply disposed defense were themselves quite vulnerable to powerful surprise strikes. The command and control and communications system proved to be particularly vulnerable. Its disruption was almost the main factor that

sharply changed the balance of real combat capabilities in the aggressor's favor. It seems that this factor has not been sufficiently taken into account to this day.

The mistakes of a military-political, strategic, and operational nature resulted in grave defeats for the Red Army, millions of human casualties, and the loss of considerable territory and enormous material assets including a significant portion of the industrial potential.

Up until recently, works on strategy and operational art of the Great Patriotic War examined primarily the experience of successful strategic offensive operations beginning with the second half of 1943. It is often not even mentioned that they became possible only after a series of strategic defensive operations. We managed to wrest the strategic initiative from the most dangerous enemy at the cost of enormous sacrifices.

Inattention to the first period of the Great Patriotic War is understandable from the psychological standpoint. However, it is just as harmful as the inattention in the 1920s and 1930s to the lessons of the defeats and defensive battles of the Red Army in the Civil War. This inattention could not but be reflected in the development of Soviet military thought. Only recently, especially after the Warsaw Pact's announcement at the Berlin meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in May 1987 of its strictly defensive military doctrine, is the situation beginning to change.

The military-technical portion of Soviet military doctrine (in strategy and operational art) has changed considerably. In the summer of 1987 the thesis that the main method of the USSR Armed Forces in repelling aggression would be not offensive, but defensive operations and combat actions, and also the counteroffensive was announced.

The structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries is also changing accordingly. This structure that had taken shape by the time of the announcement of the Consultative Committee on military doctrine, in the words of the General of the Army P. Lushev, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, did not fully meet the doctrinal requirements. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries are being reduced and their structure and composition are being changed to give them a more obvious defensive orientation.

One of the chief principles of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces today is the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency. For all practical purposes, this means giving them a non-offensive structure, limiting to the maximum extent their number of strike systems; changing deployment on the expectation of carrying out strictly defensive missions; lowering the parameters of mobilizational deployment of the armed forces and also the volume of military production.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War, illuminated with considerable distortions, given all its unquestioned

value and given all the outstanding achievements of our military art, was often made absolute. This interfered with full-scale consideration of the increasingly new political, economic, scientific and technical, and operational-strategic factors which, following World War II, fundamentally changed, using A.A. Svechin's expression, the "strategic landscape." These factors included, above all, nuclear weapons, as well as the evolution of conventional weapons, a different appearance of local wars, and the use of military force not only on the battlefields but also for direct and mediated political influence.

After World War II, conventional arms passed through at least three stages in their development, which are sort of permeated by the trend toward an increase in the role of electronic command and control, communications, and intelligence equipment and, accordingly, electronic warfare (EW) equipment. The success of combat operations of any scale on land and at sea is determined now by winning superiority not only in the air, but also over the airwaves. This conclusion has a direct bearing on foreign policy and international relations. Without understanding the patterns of development of military affairs, it is impossible to resolve through negotiations issues of reducing armed forces and arms and strengthening strategic stability.

Our political and military literature devotes insufficient attention to local wars of the postwar period; but, you see, we must approach their experience quite cautiously, extrapolating it into the future and on the pattern of military-political confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and between the USSR and the United States. Research of a historical-political, operational-strategic, military-economic, and scientific-technical nature are not combined very much; use of system analysis methods lags behind.

A comprehensive—in the political, operational, and tactical respects—study of the war in Afghanistan and the joint operations of the Soviet and Afghan armed forces over the course of 10 years is extremely important in this context.

While American aggression suffered a defeat in Vietnam, the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973 are more distant from us than the Soviet-Polish War was from the participants in the debates of the 1920s and early 1930s. However, the level of specificity of the study of these wars, the decision-making mechanism, and the assessment of the role of our advisers and our weapons lags behind the scientific level of those years. After all, at that time we were infinitely weaker and more vulnerable, and we did not have such numerous cadres of specialists at our disposal.

The armed conflicts of the postwar decades between socialist states—the USSR and the PRC, the PRC and the SRV—have also not been studied. Conclusions and

recommendations which could completely preclude such conflicts in the future have not been formulated sufficiently clearly.

One should bear in mind that the period of the struggle by colonial and dependent countries for national liberation has to a considerable extent ended in the traditional idea. More and more conflicts are taking place among developing countries themselves who are in the stage of forming their own national and multinational (multi-tribe) statehood. The scale of the use of military force in this zone is not decreasing, and is increasing for a number of parameters. The process of devaluating the role of military force here has not yet begun, so the question of just and unjust wars must be largely resolved anew.

A qualitatively increased level of interdependence has changed the nature of the struggle of capitalist states for a market and sources of raw materials—it has become different than it was not only between the two world wars, but also during the first postwar decades. Most significant in this respect is the policy of Japan, which does not possess many types of raw materials (beginning with energy resources) and is significantly inferior to other capitalist states in military power.

When assessing the military-political situation in the world, we do not fully take into account the fact that today's bourgeois-democratic regimes in the leading capitalist countries, even if conservative governments are in power, differ sharply from the extreme right-wing regimes of the likes of Hitler or Mussolini. To this day, in assessing the likelihood of war, some of our scientists

virtually do not take into consideration either these differences or the fact that the results of World War II had a profound effect on the social consciousness in the majority of developed capitalist states. Of course, this does not rule out the need to be constantly be aware of the activities and the scale of influence of various extremist groups and organizations on the masses and the governments. They are capable of changing the political, and through it the military-political, situation.

The nature of the military-political interrelations between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has changed noticeably, the international situation has become less tense, and the immediate danger of aggression has decreased; however, the threat of war remains. Consequently, vigilance is necessary; it is necessary to know how the armed forces of the United States, NATO, and a number of other states are developing.

Of course, we have not exhausted all the major military-political problems which need to be studied.

Now, when these problems of the theory of strategy, the art of war as a whole, and limiting and reducing armed forces and arms are being widely discussed, it is important to consider them in a historical context and turn to the forgotten or half-forgotten works of Soviet politologists and military theorists of the 1920s and early 1930s, a prominent place among whom belongs to A.A. Svechin.

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Moiseyev, Other People's Deputies on Future of Armed Forces

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[Transcript of meeting of All-Army Officer's Assembly:
"What is Your Position, Comrade Deputies?"]

[Text] As you know, the delegates of the All-Army Officer's Assembly, held in Moscow, met with the USSR people's deputies who are representatives of the Armed Forces. It is rumored that a very sharp conversation took place about each deputy's position on the fate of the army and the fate of the country. Just when will we stop using just rumors? Doesn't glasnost apply to the Army press? Can't your journal tell us just what was said at that meeting? We ask you to do this, but only honestly, the way it was.

Colonel Yu. Krivov, chairman of the council of the Officer's Assembly

Officers N. Litvinov, V. Skidkov, V. Kravtsov, A. Sekachev, and V. Lyubomudrov expressed similar desires in their letters. We are fulfilling their request. But we will point out in advance that the article was prepared from a tape recording, with some condensation. At the same time, we tried not only to preserve the original text, but also to relay the very atmosphere of the meeting. This also seemed important to us.

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk, chairman USSR people's deputy, USSR pilot-cosmonaut, and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union] Before beginning our discussion, and perhaps there will not be one, I should say the following: We have been in this hall for a long time now. We are receiving very many good proposals from you; the editorial board is here which is summarizing everything you are proposing. Over the course of 1-2 weeks, the questions, wishes, and proposals will be examined. After this meeting, we people's deputies will meet, analyze what you have told us, and advise what should be brought to the attention of the USSR Supreme Soviets and the participants of the upcoming Congress of USSR People's Deputies. If there are questions, we request that you ask them, and we will answer them right here. Okay?

[Question from the Hall] Defense of the socialist homeland has always been the sacred duty of every Soviet person. What about now? Do you insist that every citizen must fulfill his military duty to the homeland?

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] I believe that every young person who lives in our country and has reached a certain age should fulfill his military duty to the Soviet country. This is my personal position. But there are also other positions.

[Col A. Tsalko, co-chairman USSR people's deputy] I agree with the position that defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of every citizen of our country. But let us separate for now "service in the

armed forces" and "defense." These are different propositions. And we should structure the army according to the principle of how many persons we have who are subject to the draft and what the scale of our armed forces should be. This is my fundamental position on the question of military organizational development

[Noise in the hall and retorts. A voice from the hall:] You mentioned the body of persons subject to the draft. But it is constantly decreasing. There are all sorts of "loopholes" so young people do not have to serve in the armed forces. We should make it this way: If a person is not fit to serve in combat units, he must go into a labor army, and the term of service should not be less than in the armed forces. Thus we will preserve the combat army, which now is being pulled apart bit by bit. We need a combat army to preserve our state. If we bring the army to its knees by its poverty, we will lose it. We need a combat army, but not a great army of labor. What is your position, comrade deputies?

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] It is the same as your position. The USSR minister of defense has already spoken here and I think he largely answered your question. That is, we are also striving to see that our army is combat-effective.

[Voice from the hall] But that is your personal opinion. What about the rest of the deputies? Why did you keep silent when the law on students was being passed?

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] What law?

[A retort] The law on the early discharge of students from the armed forces.

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] I beg your pardon, but I am not a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. There are members of the Supreme Soviet here. Maybe they would like to respond? Here is Viktor Vasilyevich Gorbatko.

[Maj Gen Avn V. Gorbatko, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, pilot-cosmonaut, and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union] Comrades! Here you may not be totally informed on this. When we approved the minister of defense, this question was put to him. He very intelligently said that we now cannot discharge students who are serving. This closed the matter. Then at one session, quite unexpectedly, because the question was being considered casually, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov (the minister of defense was located where the government sits when we meet) came out and announced that the decision had been made, that is, it was being proposed to the Supreme Soviet to vote in favor of discharging into the reserve all students who were in the ranks of the armed forces. There was such applause in the hall, it was as if it was the victory of all Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. I got such an impression. And this was no longer subject to discussion and was voted on immediately. That was it! And the decision was passed in 1-2 minutes...

[Question from the hall] Comrade deputies, are you planning to raise before the Supreme Soviet the question of stopping the drafting of individuals who have served their prison sentence? And a second question. Will individuals located in civilian ministries, military construction workers for example, be returned to the Ministry of Defense?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev, USSR people's deputy and chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces] We understand the questions you pose, both at our Officer's Assembly and at this meeting, which concern the structure of the armed forces and the makeup of a Soviet officer. We understand your concern and difficulties, and the problems which we encounter. The minister of defense dwelled on this in particular in his speech. The General Staff has developed together with the armed services a concept of organizational development of our army up to the year 2000. Based on this concept, the makeup of the armed forces is being formed today, taking into account our defensive orientation and those technical changes which are taking place in our military sphere. We are undertaking certain new experiments today in order to reduce the armed forces by 500,000 without losing the quality of combat training and combat effectiveness, to create a new organizational structure, and to somehow ease the duty of the officer corps.

Of course, that structure we have and the quality of personnel which we have today do not meet the demands of the times either for maintaining equipment in the proper state or for improving the training and educational process. We are working on this.

At the same time, you know that the armed forces cannot be unlimited in size. We have 4.2 million people. We are cutting 500,000, and by 1991 the armed forces should number 3,700,000. These 3,700,000 include the 332,000 military construction workers of the ministries and departments. These are not the military construction workers who work on our installations, our bases, and troop facilities. These are the ones who work in the civilian ministries and departments, and also 162,000 in civil defense and road construction units. We have proposed to the Committee for Defense and State Security to actually give the makeup of the armed forces some structural integrity and to withdraw those construction workers who work in civilian departments and civil defense units. But manning and drafts—all this is left up to the General Staff, since today we have railroad troops, border troops, and internal troops in operation. Everything goes at the expense of the draft conducted by the General Staff. It is a different matter that we proposed to the Law on Defense that the draft be accomplished not based on an order of the minister of defense, but based on a decree by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That is where we stand on military construction workers.

[A voice from the hall] Are there any difficulties with the draft?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] You know that we are in the fourth generation of a demographic downswing. We will have difficulties with drafting young people for service in the armed forces until mid-1994. We have gone so far as to somehow make it easier for you today to work with the category which we are drafting. This year, you know, certain changes have been made to determining the status of health of those subject to the draft. We specify that persons who have previously had legal actions taken against them are not to be drafted into combat units—and this question has been posed in a very strict form. But there is a second aspect here, a purely human aspect. After all, we must also look at it from another viewpoint: the nature of the offense. Certainly, a crime subject to criminal prosecution is one thing; one that is punishable by probation is another matter. I think we need a specific, individual approach here.

[Question from the hall] As we know, the people's deputies at one time were discussing the need to bring citizens to account for inflicting moral damage and insulting by their actions servicemen and their uniform. But it has not yet been resolved. Meanwhile, instances of insulting the honor and dignity of servicemen performing official duty have become considerably more frequent. What are the people's deputies doing to protect servicemen from this?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] I have on my desk the first copy of the draft Law on Defense with your desires and proposals which you have sent to me and with those additions which were made to it. It was in the districts, groups of forces, and the fleets for discussion. This is the clean version today.

[Noise in the hall]

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] Don't make a fuss, be tactful. We are distributing this clean version to you today so you can see whether or not everything in it is in keeping with the spirit of the times, for this draft Law on Defense will be considered at the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense in the first quarter of 1990. Then we will pass this document to the Committee for Defense and State Security, and it will be submitted for approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

You will have time to become acquainted with this document. You should approach this in a weighted manner; maybe we did not provide for something. As far as our attributes and our military status are concerned... We live in one state, and we cannot separate everything that applies to the Soviet person. His dignity and his protection must also apply to the fighting men of the Army and Navy. No one has the right to encroach upon their honor and their personality.

[Question from the hall] Comrade Army General, in connection with the discharge of regular officers and also students from the armed forces and the reduction of military departments, problems of training the reserve and reserve officers arise with special acuteness. Is anything being done in this direction?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] In connection with the fact that we are approaching in a new way the process of training and education, manning of the armed forces, and creating a trained reserve, today we are very deeply revising the program for training reserve officers and the reserve. Unquestionably, there must be military departments in our institutes. But maybe not as many as there are now? We are presently working on this. Taking into account the fact that there are very complicated military vocations, we must determine those institutes and those military departments from which military specialists will be needed from among the graduates of these VUZes. And they will be given orders for induction into service in the armed forces if there is a need for this. As far as training reserve officers is concerned, we are shifting this training now, and this will be specified in orders, to our military schools. In connection with the reduction of a number of military schools, we are freeing up a material base, and we want to use this professional basis for training reserve officers.

[Question from the hall] Does the Law on Defense define the citizenship of a serviceman as a citizen of the USSR, in connection with the passage of laws on citizenship by the Baltic republics? And a second question. Does it specify some responsibility of the union republics for preparing persons subject to the draft for military service?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] Correct. Both questions are reflected in the draft Law on Defense.

[Question from the hall] There are a number of officers who in their time studied as VUZ students. Now, when there is a question about their discharge from the army, some lack three-four years. Can we count the years of study for them? This concerns the VUZes where they studied in military departments.

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] I think we will look into this issue some more, but in the future, time of instruction should be counted.

[Question from the hall] The report by the minister of defense stated that instilling honesty and decency is impossible without educating Soviet officers on the history of our units and large units. In this connection, allow me to ask you, as chief of the General Staff: How are we to comprehend the fact that in connection with the reduction in armed forces, regiments and divisions which covered themselves in everlasting glory are being reduced and disbanded?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] I receive dozens of letters from veterans and from those who did not fight. We have made the decision. In order to preserve the history of our glorious armed forces, in the reduction that is being made and will be made, we envision that the designations of the large units and units that have the richest history and have been awarded four-five orders will be transferred to those divisions and regiments that do not have this. I will give an example. A combat engineer unit was formed 9 or 10 years ago; it participated in the war

in Afghanistan almost all these years and has glorious combat traditions and five Heroes of the Soviet Union. Fulfilling the request of veterans of this unit, we are transferring all its history to one of the combat engineer regiments of the Moscow Military District, which prior to this had nothing.

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] Comrade officers! I beg of you, people's deputies who are officers and generals have gathered here; they are doing the same job as you. It is understandable that you have many questions because things are far from being in harmony in our job. But let us select questions that are more fundamental and discuss them together. If you have some concrete proposals, give them, and we will see to it that they are considered. But you must not act as if the deputies before you are guilty of something. It is turning out to be something like an attack on the Presidium.

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] In this light, I want to tell about something that hurts me. I have spoken in Moscow at many military academies and have been asked why I am passive and do not show aggressiveness as a people's deputy. I always answered this question and answer it now in this way. As chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, I am doing everything in my power in the interests of the armed forces and in the interests of personnel. I have never hidden; I resolve issues to the best of my ability and with great responsibility. Perhaps you want me, like some deputies, to jump up five times at each session? We are still military deputies and have the tact, dignity, and honor of officers. I will say that at the First Congress I was asked 1,215 questions, which I answered conscientiously, explaining all positions. Therefore, I believe that I am taking an aggressive stand, like all the people's deputies who are here. But why do you ask me such a question—not all deputies who are representatives of the armed forces came to this meeting? Look up those deputies and ask them.

[Retort] Lt Col Podziruk and Capt Tutov did not come to the meeting.

[Question from the hall] What steps are being taking with respect to those students who were discharged from the armed forces, but have not returned to the institutes and have found other employment? This is clearly deceiving the state.

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] When we asked the districts and fleets how many students we had serving, there turned out to be 176,000. To date, 173,000 have been discharged; of that number, 42,000 did not desire to return to VUZes for some reason or other. There is no document or order to return these individuals to the ranks of the armed forces. You see, the decision on discharging them was made by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] Comrade Army General, we deputies have now talked things over and decided: we will make a deputy inquiry, and then we will clear up this question once and for all.

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] I must also say that the USSR Procuracy is conducting an investigation of those individuals who were discharged on the basis of counterfeit certificates or ones they bought for money to show that they were students. Judicial proceedings will be instituted against the guilty parties.

[Applause]

[Voice from the hall] We officers of the Transcaucasian Military District ask the USSR people's deputies to see to it that at the upcoming congress, after the report of special investigator on the results of the investigation into the Tbilisi events also give word to the chief military procurator.

[Col A. Tsalko, USSR people's deputy] I believe we should stop asking questions and let those USSR people's deputies speak who did not have such an opportunity during the Officer's Assembly.

[Noise in the hall, shouts of indignation]

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] I don't think we can pose the question in this way. They invited us here, and we should not impose our will on them.

[Applause]

I respect the people's deputies and am one of them, but certainly today we should listen to what people are saying.

[Voice from the hall] Now under the new regulations, 25 percent of the draftees are remaining to serve in their republics. This applies to the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasian republics, and Moldavia. That means that within three call-ups, in the anti-aircraft missile battalion which I command there will be up to 75 percent soldiers of local nationalities. There will be very many problems here, particularly with strengthening military discipline and learning weapons and complicated combat equipment. What do you think about this?

[Army Gen M. Moiseyev] The question is essentially correct. The minister of defense received many appeals, especially from Transcaucasia, the Central Asian republics, and Moldavia, to leave part of the draftees to serve in their own regions. Recently this question was studied in the Baltic republics, and I will say that a small portion of the people are stirring up passions on this account, a small group of people who want their sons serving nearby. Moreover, 92 percent of the Baltic youths have not expressed a desire to serve in their republics. So, it seems to me that we need a differentiated approach. We on the General Staff are taking all this into account and keeping the situation under control. Otherwise there would not be anyone to serve after three call-ups. We need a control mechanism.

[Voice from the hall] There is a proposal to give the floor to Deputy Martirosyan.

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] The Presidium received the following note: USSR People's Deputy Col Martirosyan, what do you think about Article 6 of the Constitution? How do you explain your joining the movement "Rukh"?

[Col V. Martirosyan, USSR people's deputy] What do I think about Article 6 of the Constitution? Prior to coming here, I assembled the regiment and accordingly confided in the people that I was going to the Congress. The question was also posed about Article 6. In a secret ballot, the entire regiment, with one abstention, stated that it wanted me, as a people's deputy, to vote against Article 6. I cannot help but support the position taken by the regiment.

[Noise in the hall, indignation. A voice from the balcony.] You should be ashamed, Comrade Martirosyan, using the regiment to cover up your actions. This is your own position. It is better if you explain how you ended up at the congress of the "Rukh" movement which was held in Kiev and why you went there?

[Col V. Martirosyan] Comrades, I am a Soviet person, a Communist with 25 years of service. We people's deputies from the Ukraine, progressive deputies, decided to attend the congress of the "Rukh" movement... When Comrade Kravchuk spoke, head of the Ideological Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and now Central Committee secretary for ideology, he began his speech with the fact that comrades Kunayev and Rashidov had led our country and so forth... After Comrade Kravchuk, they gave me the floor. I said: Comrade Kravchuk, if you are an honest Communist, why do you criticize comrades Kunayev and Rashidov and not Comrade Sheherbitskiy, who leads the republic? If you are an honest Communist, why do you hit those who are down and not those who are at the helm?

Further, first of all, I have not joined "Rukh". The USSR people's deputies asked me to agree to become the chairman of the House of Nationalities in this movement. Because, as they told me, if you agree to it, considering the attitude of the people of the Ukraine toward you, they will support you. If a "Rukh" member becomes chairman of the House of Nationalities, nationalism will begin to flourish in the Ukraine. That is the only reason I agreed, so this position did not go to Comrade Chernovol, who is a "Rukh" member. I agreed to participate in "Rukh", but after this the council headed by me did not hold a single meeting. I believe that I must do all I can so the non-Ukrainian nationalities are assured that I, a colonel in the Soviet Army, an Armenian, will never permit other nationalities to be insulted and degraded.

[Question from the hall] How long will you be in "Rukh"?

[Col V. Martirosyan] I will be in "Rukh" as long as the non-native residents of the Ukraine need this.

[Question from the hall] Doesn't the fact that you, a USSR people's deputy and serviceman, belong to such a nationalistic movement put you in a compromising situation?

[Col V. Martirosyan] Comrades, one should not think that members of "Rukh" are all Petlyurites and Ouno-vites. There are many honorable people in the movement.

[Voice from the hall] Nevertheless, clarify your position with respect to the party.

[Col V. Martirosyan] The party should be the vanguard, but not the leading and guiding party, the vanguard! And it should prove its vanguard role through labor and deed...

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] Comrade Martirosyan, one more question. You heard the address of your officers in the regiment, see the hall's reaction to your statements, and understand that the vast majority of those present clearly do not share your position with respect to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. What do you think about that?

[Col V. Martirosyan] As a USSR people's deputy, I liked the meeting. People demonstrated boldness and express themselves and defend the interests of the personnel whom they are here representing. Any military leader can put people at the position of attention. But democracy namely lies in the fact that one must muster the strength to listen attentively to the speaker. But I cannot say honestly and sincerely that, in my opinion, before perestroika we were a long way from establishing true democracy in the army. Why do they speak according to a list compiled in advance and not give the floor to people from the localities? Why are there no microphones in the hall, and why can't the majority express their attitude toward many issues? Finally, why are all the commanders in chiefs and all the marshals on the presidium? If we are in favor of democratization of our army, the most respected people should be sitting there, not people with a position...

[Applause]

I would like to address all our generals. If you are indeed sons of peasants and workers, then be sons of peasants and workers...

[Voice from the hall] Comrades, some of our people's deputies work not for the army, not for strengthening its combat readiness. Why didn't Podziruk come to the meeting? Where is Tutov? Were they afraid to hear what we think of them?

[Applause]

[Col A. Tsalko, USSR people's deputy] I have received a note charging that I disgrace the armed forces and asks what I am doing in general. I ask that I be provided the specific facts of how my activities discredit the armed forces. If they are confirmed, I will be forced either to

apologize or to change my conduct on these issues. If my election (as an alternative to the deputy minister of defense for logistics) is seen as disgracing the armed forces, there is nothing I can do. This was the decision of the voters. Out of three oblasts, 1.3 million people voted for me. So, I ask that you not take this fact as a discredit.

[Voice from the hall] No one believes that, it involves something else. Here they handed out some military reform concept, who are its authors and how did it end up in the hall?

[Col A. Tsalko] I am one of the authors of this concept.

[Stirring in the hall]

I outline my own opinion, and every people's deputy has the right to disseminate information. As the author, I believe... (Noise in the hall. Col A. Tsalko gave up and left the podium.)

[Retort from the hall] Here Comrade Tsalko spoke and talked about the platform, that it was his personal opinion. Why is it his personal opinion if the voters stand behind him? In my unit, I called upon everyone to vote for Tsalko and hoped that he would express our common opinion, not his personal opinion. Now he talks on his own behalf...

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] I am often asked why I, Klimuk, have never spoken at the congress. Really, can one do this when we are so disorderly, when at times a person cannot get in a word? Do we have to form a line to the podium here like they do at the congress? Let us not quarrel, let us respect one another and constructively discuss the issues that affect the organizational development of our armed forces and defense of the socialist homeland.

[Col V. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy] The day before yesterday, preparing for the Officer's Assembly, I went to TASS where, as you know, they receive reports from all over the world and where information from various news agencies, press, radio, and television is summarized. I familiarized myself with these excerpts and was shocked by the assessment of the state of our armed forces being made in the West. The assessment is such. Never have our armed forces been in such a demoralized and such a neglected state. They have lost their combat effectiveness and combat readiness. Did anyone ask about this at the past meeting? No, they did not. Why are we trying to avoid our problems? Why, if a person appears who says what is bothering him, is he invariably wrong and we silence him? Why do we attack Col Tsalko and Col Martirosyan? Yes, it is possible that someone does not like Martirosyan and, possibly, he is not right about something, but he is stating his own opinion. And, by the way, the voters support him. This atmosphere that is supercharged around certain deputies is the wrong atmosphere.

[Noise in the hall. Voice from the hall] Excuse me, what if the two colonels are right and all the representatives of the Soviet Army are wrong?

[Lt Col V. Urvant, USSR people's deputy] If you have specific accusations against us as people's deputies, make them specifically to our face and give us the opportunity to express our opinion. Without a doubt, you 82 people can shout down those sitting in the presidium. No one doubts this. What is going on here reminds me very much of the situation that is being created by the opponents of the army and perestroika, when emotions go out of control. It is very unpleasant to me to hear accusations made against the concept advanced here. This is a point of view, not a document. You can accept it or not accept it, reject it, or change something. I make no secret of the fact that I signed it. This is simply a statement of the question. The Law on Defense is now being drafted. It certainly would not interfere to submit it for nationwide discussion in the armed forces; many have not yet seen it and have no idea what this law says. So, why speak badly about a concept which not everyone has even seen? And you accuse it and judge whether it is right or not. No one makes any claim to the truth in the highest instance with this concept...

[Noise in the hall, exclamations]

[Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk] I ask that you write down your questions and desires and pass them to us. We will examine them thoroughly. We will decide them as it is necessary for the sake of our armed forces.

[Col N. Petrushenko, USSR people's deputy] When I look out at this hall today, all that is going on reminds me of election rows. If you want us to speak frankly and turn this meeting into a rally, believe me, we have sufficient experience to do so. For example, during the election campaign I had a serious opponent—a woman who began her speech in this way. I am not a party member. And the audience applauded her. And when she proposed removing Article 6 from the USSR Constitution, I got up to the podium and said that I was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But I tell you this because I want you to remember: when we USSR people's deputies in military uniform came to the Moscow House of Scientists six months ago, we were met with a resolution that went something like this. A deputation of the Union of Designers signed an appeal: Comrades, the alma mater of parliamentarianism, democracy, is in danger. The military have come to the hall of the Supreme Soviet in full-dress uniform. We oblige our chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (then Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev) to issue instructions that the military are to arrive in civilian clothes... If we mentally look at the mood which reigned in the hall of the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions six months ago and that which reigns now, I must say with all responsibility that today the situation among the deputies, despite the decisions being hastily made, including those on the students and on the Semipalatinsk Training Grounds, is

much more favorable. My deputy corps colleagues, above all, deserve credit for this.

[Applause]

I understand that you grieve. But let us come to an understanding. We have a General Staff which has demonstrated its ability to effectively disseminate information being received. I think that if someone disagrees with the proposed concept on military reform and if someone has businesslike proposals, it is sufficient to return to his military units, go to the post office, spend his own R3 or send a telegram to the General Staff through military channels, and in two-three hours his proposals will be on the meeting table of the people's deputies...

Now, on the essence of the question. I would like you not to liken yourselves to those students who at the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov posed local questions. In my view, in the view of a USSR people's deputy, the situation in the country is complex today: the country, the fate of socialism, and the fate of the party is threatened. And I am afraid that many who are present in this hall, despite assurances of their patriotism and love for the homeland, have not yet felt this. It seems to me that, based on the agenda of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we must determine the main issue today: What stand should the military deputies take on the question of the fate of the federated state which occupies one-sixth of inhabited land and is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? It seems to me that we must talk about whether or not our state will remain a unified and mighty Soviet Union. It seems to me that today we must talk about what renewed socialism should be and whether it should be in general. Because among many people's deputies today the question is spreading about the need for private ownership, the need to attack communists with perestroika, and the need to attack socialism with perestroika, and forward to capitalism. I say this today because, certainly, I also do not have a clear picture of the way out of the crisis in which our country has found itself. So, comrades, let us look for realistic ways out of this crisis. I do not think that if we agree with Col Martirosyan today and vote in favor of eliminating Article 6 from the USSR Constitution, the society will immediately stabilize. No, this will not happen. This issue was discussed six months ago. Now this agenda is again being forced upon us. For the information of those present, yesterday several deputies called me and asked me to support the proposal to hold a warning strike on Monday (i.e., 11 December—Editor) from 10:00 to 12:00. And the deputies calling for this strike are the same ones who only recently voted in favor of passing a law on procedures for settling labor disputes. And tomorrow the Inter-regional Deputy Group is meeting, which, speculating on difficulties, including service difficulties, will call for destabilization of the situation. I understand that those in this hall may say that Article 6 was eliminated in Czechoslovakia and Germany, and nothing terrible happened. But it seems to me that if this

happens in our country, we will have even greater anarchy. I don't want to be one of those who sanctions anarchy in our country today. I am in favor of a strong executive power that would enjoy the trust of the people. And as a representative of this power, I call upon you to work more constructively today.

[Loud applause]

[Maj. V. Lopatin, USSR people's deputy] Yesterday I heard that we indeed need military reform. And the Law on Defense provides for everything, and all problems there were eliminated. And what has taken place here yesterday and today during the Officer's Assembly instills hope. I would like to believe, that that is the case. But permit me to have doubts about this belief. And here is why. We USSR people's deputies have studied the draft Law on Defense, and now a group of people's deputies—primarily officers—categorically do not agree with it. They do not agree with it because it makes an attempt at a cosmetic repair to the existing mechanism of the armed forces and military organizational development. The basic tenets do not change, the legal status of the army within society still remains without rights, and the legal status of service members is also not regulated. So, how can you talk about changes and solutions to existing problems?

[Retort from the presidium] Have you read the draft Law on Defense?

[Maj. V. Lopatin] Certainly. And then meetings with people during the work of our Officer's Assembly convinced me that the majority of the officers are opposed to passage of such a law. Therefore, I cannot help but say this. The fact that today at the All-Army Officer Assembly the question about honesty and dignity was placed on the agenda is good, of course. But it is distressing that this is the main issue today. Does man live by bread alone? What if there is no bread?

And another thing. Why is our truth different? We have one truth for the entire society; among us and within the party, we have another truth, the complete truth.

[Applause]

It seems to me that this is a fundamental question. Today we stigmatize the press. But we certainly should look at the cause and not the effect. Why is it that citizens of the USSR do not express their opinions so competently? It is because this depends not on the position of some or other newspaper or magazine, or of specific journalists, but on the position of the Ministry of Defense and the leaders of the military departments who have tabooed many problems of the armed forces. How can we shape public opinion if we are not permitted on the pages of civilian newspapers, not to mention the rank and file representatives of our armed forces? They do not let us speak.

We need reform, but not cosmetic repair. Many of the speakers at the Officer's Assembly talked about the need

to reduce paperwork, particularly from the top down, which erodes orders and diverts commanders and political workers from working with people. But isn't it more advisable to reduce the apparatus which produces the mountains of paperwork and sends to the troops the countless commissions which take the place of commanders and political workers locally?

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New Uzbek SSR Military Commissar Interviewed

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[Interview with Colonel V.N. Makhmudov, Uzbek SSR Military Commissar by L. Savelev, PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent: "His Place in the Soldier's Ranks"]

[Text] Colonel Vladimir Nasyrovich Makhmudov has been assigned as Uzbek SSR Military Commissar. He is forty five years old and has been serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR since 1963. He received his military education at Tashkent Higher Military Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin and at the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. The officer's service record includes positions of platoon, company, and battalion commander, and regimental chief of staff. While commanding a regiment, he fulfilled his internationalist duty in Afghanistan. Afterward, he took one of the units where young recruits are trained.

He commanded a division. Before being assigned as Uzbek SSR Military Commissar, he served as a deputy corps commander.

He was awarded the Red Star Order and the Badge of Honor.

Today V.N. Makhmudov is giving his first interview in his new office. The problems which the Voenkomat [Military Commissariat] is resolving today determined the topic of our conversation. The Fall draft is going on—the Republic is seeing its sons off to military service.

[Savelev] Vladimir Nasyrovich, before your transfer to Tashkent, you served as operational commander of multi-ethnic military subunits. Surely, young men drafted from Uzbekistan were also there. We frequently come to read in newspapers that they are poorly prepared for military service. Is that so?

[Makhmudov] I will not assert that all of my countrymen manifest themselves as dashing soldiers literally from the very first days. They are the same as young men from other republics. Some of the recruits do not speak Russian well and some of them are physically weak. Of course, all of this interferes with a soldier's development but national origin makes no difference here. We need to see social causes here. City lads are better prepared for service than country lads. It is very clear that cities

"speak" Russian more and that young men also have more opportunities for physical development here.

But the overwhelming majority of Uzbek lads exude qualities that are particularly valuable in the Army—they are highly disciplined, diligent, and respect their elders. These long-standing national character traits help young soldiers to master military science in a short period of time.

I saw the bravery, courage, and skill of my countrymen on Afghan soil. Uzbek lads and the representatives of other nationalities valiantly fulfilled their military obligation. Quite a few of them have received combat decorations and medals for their duty performance. The first decorations came precisely to our countrymen.

Thus, Army brotherhood was manifested as nowhere else. People gave their own lives to save their comrades. And nationality had no significance whatsoever in those situations.

[Savelev] In general, comrade colonel, no matter what the malicious critics may say about the Army, it was and remains the best school of inter-ethnic education.

[Makhmudov] Without a doubt. And this is explainable. Here, as in no other kind of organization, interrelations of soldiers of various nationalities are intertwined. They have a collective weapon—common combat training and even combat missions and a single vested interest in the high quality infrastructure of a military existence.

The Army strengthens our union on a nationality basis and in no way exacerbates inter-ethnic relations. Those forces that also want to split up the state are among the malicious critics.

[Savelev] Quite frequently people who cannot distinguish a private from a colonel expound upon the problems of military organizational development. But on the other hand, each such prophet feels that he is higher than a marshal in spirit. Maybe we should not focus attention on their unrestrained demagoguery, but it has its own harmful consequences. An anti-Army mood has manifested itself among some of our young men which the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee directed attention to in its resolution. Just recently I read in FRUNZEVETS that certain leaders of informal associations in Samarkand Oblast are collecting signatures on a declaration to the Ministry of Defense and to the USSR and Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviets that demands that young Uzbek men be afforded the right to serve only in their own republic.

[Makhmudov] Fortunately, even though the draftees are younger than their patrons, they are acting somewhat more responsibly. The Autumn draft in the republic is proceeding according to plan without losing a step. But with regard to officious demands to serve on one's native street, I will say that their authors cannot see past their noses. If we heed their [demands], then to what size do we need to reduce troops in the republic! Otherwise, only

a portion of the draftees would be able to don a soldier's uniform. And what do we do with the others? Do we form new military units for them? Does Uzbekistan need them? Or do we dispense privileges here, too?

In distant post-revolutionary times, the following wise decision was made based on Leninist instructions. To form a Red, and afterward a Soviet Army too, on an ex-territorial principle. Even today it corresponds to the realities of our lives.

[Savelev] By the way, we sometimes hear from those same patrons that Uzbek lads are not entrusted with more responsible Army duties than service in construction battalions.

[Makhmudov] Nonsense! Let us look at the documents from the Spring draft. Just from Tashkent Oblast, young men left for service in the strategic missile forces, ground forces, air assault and railroad forces, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] units, National PVO [Air Defense], and civil defense. The Navy has already been receiving reinforcements from Uzbekistan for many years in succession and is very satisfied with the lads who have completed training at the Tashkent Naval School.

And only several percent altogether left for the construction troops.

It is another matter that there is quite a large number of military construction units not at all associated with combat readiness but, in short, patch up deficiencies in the activities of ministries or departments. No matter where you direct the voice of society, you cannot release soldiers from this duty obligation! Then the percent of the draft to military construction units will be even lower.

[Savelev] And what is the Army geography of our lads? Where are they serving?

[Makhmudov] From Moscow to the most remote areas! It is easier to say where they are not serving. I recently spoke to an old friend and heard many kind words about our countrymen who he is commanding in the Western Group of Forces.

[Savelev] Incidentally, our colleague—a female journalist of the group newspaper SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA recently arrived from there especially to get fresh news for Uzbekistan soldiers.

[Makhmudov] That means that even Lieutenant Viktor Makhmudov reads it.

[Savelev] Your son?

[Makhmudov] Yes. This year he also graduated from TVOKU [Tashkent Higher Military Command School] and is now commanding a motorized rifle platoon in the Western Group of Forces.

[Savelev] But nevertheless, there are soldiers who do not go that far to serve. I am talking about married soldiers...

[Makhmudov] Yes, in accordance with the Minister of Defense's order and beginning with this year's Spring draft, married recruits are drafted to units of garrisons nearest to their homes. This principle is being complied with in practice: Voyenkomats are strictly guided by the Minister of Defense's order.

So much has already been said about the benefits that I think they serve other categories of young men of draft age. According to logic, we need to place correspondence school students on a par with classroom students who are released from Army service until they graduate from the Vuz. By combining work with study, they are following a more difficult path toward their diplomas. Army service multiplies these difficulties during the time when the correspondence school student has to interrupt his education.

I think that students of preparatory courses who have successfully passed their examinations should also enjoy the right to a deferment.

Active military service draft procedures for technicum students also need to be changed. They mainly leave for the Army in Spring, on the eve of defending their degrees. The might of the Armed Forces will not be weakened if we begin to draft technicum graduates in Autumn. But they will bring great benefits in the forces as specialists with diplomas.

[Savelev] Comrade colonel, we have been talking about those who are standing in ranks. But Voyenkomats have an enormous volume of work with those who are in the reserve. Normally the words "might of the Fatherland" are heard in combination with the words "economic and defense." Essentially, these very same people strengthen it. And they continue to serve in the reserves and from time to time those with military obligations once again put on their Army uniforms. Has the cost-accounting that many workers collectives have transitioned to introduced any turmoil into the call-up system for reservists' active duty periods?

[Makhmudov] I would not call it turmoil but it is undeniable that Voyenkomats have begun to take a more responsible approach to their work. Right now we are attempting to tear people away only for the most urgent reasons. We are not practicing any unplanned active duty periods for reservists. And those who are called upon by the need to maintain a high degree of mobilization readiness pass under the control of the Republic Voyenkomat and the military district military soviet.

It is gratifying that Voyenkomats' concern with keeping the gunpowder dry is met with complete understanding from party, government, and economic agencies.

Incidentally, this understanding also found its reflection in the Uzbekistan Communist Party's pre-election platform. It stated:

"The work to form a readiness among our young people to defend the creative labor of the Soviet people, to

defend the Socialist Fatherland, and to consolidate the unity of the Army and the people is in the sphere of constant party attention."

[Savelev] While saying good-by to Colonel Makhmudov, I would like to conduct an interview with General Makhmudov as soon as possible.

[Makhmudov] I understand the hint. Your desire and mine totally coincide. But the gold thread of the shoulder boards costs enormous labor.

[Savelev] Let it be noted in the USSR Council of Ministers whose resolution bestows general's rank. I wish you success! For the sake of our tranquility!

New Appointment: Col Gen A. N. Kolinichenko

90UM0426 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 2, Jan 90 p 66

[Biographical notes on Col Gen A. N. Kolinichenko under the rubric "Appointments"]

[Text] He was born on 16 March 1932 in the village of Shirokaya Balka in the Belozerskiy Rayon of the Kherson Oblast to the family of a kolkhoz worker. He was not graduated from secondary school until 1952 (he did not go to school for three years due to material difficulties in the family, but worked at the kolkhoz). Then he entered the Odessa Military School imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov. Upon graduation he received an appointment to the Red Banner Odessa Military District. He was elected secretary of a battalion Komsomol organization, later a regimental Komsomol organization. In 1959 he was appointed deputy chief of the political section for Komsomol work of a motorized rifle division, and a year later was promoted to the apparatus of the District Political Directorate as a senior instructor in the section for Komsomol work. Just one year later he became the deputy chief of the District Political Directorate for Komsomol Work.

In 1966 he was graduated (by correspondence) from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin and the Odessa State University imeni K. I. Mechnikov. In the same year he was appointed deputy chief of the political department of a motorized rifle division. Subsequent service progressed as follows: chief of the political section of a large unit, first deputy chief of a political section, member of military council and chief of Army political section, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District.

From 1984 to 1987 he was a member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District, and since 1987, of the troops of a strategic sector.

He is Ukrainian. He joined the CPSU in 1956. He has been elected a member of the bureaus of municipal and oblast CPSU committees, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and a

deputy of the Supreme Soviets of the Buryat ASSR and the Belorussian SSR. He was a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. He is a people's deputy of the USSR from national-territorial district No. 514 (city of Ulan-Ude).

He has received four orders: the Red star (1986), "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 2nd Class (1981), 3rd class (1975), and the "Badge of Honor" (1968).

He was made a Major General in 1976, Lieutenant General in 1982, and Colonel General in 1988.

He is married. His wife Ida Alekseyevna is Ukrainian, a radiologist by profession. After graduation from the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute, his daughter teaches history and social science in school, and is married to an officer of the Soviet Army. His granddaughter is seven years old.

Lines for a Portrait (Comments from colleagues)

"Gregarious by nature. Self-controlled. Calm. Concerned for his men."

"He possesses qualities such as accessibility, simplicity, modesty, implacability toward deficiencies, and constant exactingness."

"He has a great work capacity and a sense of the new, and is persistent in achieving his goal."

From responses to questions in a "KVS" questionnaire:

Has everything turned out in your career the way you expected?—Practically everything. I consider myself lucky. I have always been fortunate in my good, kind, demanding, and responsive friends, colleagues, and senior comrades.

Your ideal?—Lenin. In my work I take my example from my senior officers.

Is there a question to which you have still not found the answer?—When and why have we lost touch with people? Why are we so slow in achieving closeness between leaders and subordinates?

What pleases you, and what displeases you, in today's army service? - I am pleased by the unconstrained attitude, self-criticism, and openness of the men. I am displeased by the absence of high culture and morality, especially in some young officers.

Your favorite newspapers, journals, books?—Newspapers: PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Journals: KOMMUNIST, PART'YNAYA ZHIZN, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, NOVYY MIR. I love to read classical Russian and Soviet literature.

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Conversion: Land Returned to Agricultural Use

90U M02204 Moscow KR ISN 111 ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj I. Ivanyuk: "Returned to the National Economy"]

[Text] More than 15,000 hectares of land freed for peaceful labor; instead of a missile base... a cheese plant; without neglecting the nation's defense interests...

The conversion of military production and the reduction of the Armed Forces have an external, striking aspect: combat vehicles which have found peaceful uses, consumer goods produced at defense plants. There is also a little-noticed aspect: the return to the national economy of that which was recently under the control of the army or navy.

Lt Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, tells about some aspects of this work.

[Ivanyuk] Nikolay Viktorovich, the territory behind the gates depicting the red stars have always seemed something of a forbidden zone to strictly civilian people. The times are changing, however. As a result of the current reduction of the Armed Forces, it is only natural to ask whether some of the land allocated to the Ministry of Defense will be returned to national economic use: for cultivation, pasturage, housing.

[Gryaznov] I want to clarify this at the outset so that no one has the impression that the Ministry of Defense has in effect shut itself off from everyone and constitutes a sort of state within a state with respect to land use. The laws governing this matter are the same for all departments. The land codes of the republics do differ, to be sure, but extremely insignificantly. And land is made available for army and navy needs ordinarily at this level. In the cities these matters are decided in most cases by the city ispolkoms. This is a constant process, and a two-way one. And it is not at all rare for land to be returned to agriculture and to city authorities.

As of today the Ministry of Defense has 42 million hectares at its disposal. It should be noted that three quarters of this area is taken up by large ranges. Naturally, worthless land and nonarable land, land of little value, was primarily selected for them. They are ordinarily in regions with harsh climatic conditions: in the permafrost zone, in semiarid areas and deserts. In such places as the environs of Semipalatinsk, at Plesetsk, Baykonur and Kapustin Yar, for example.

On the other hand, around two million hectares of land designated for the Ministry of Defense has been put to use—and with full effectiveness—in agriculture. Military sovkhozes, among other things, are located there, which make a perceptible contribution to the food supply for the Armed Forces.

Nonetheless, we found additional possibilities for turning around 1,000 hectares over to the national economy in 1988 and more than 15,000 hectares last year.

[Ivanyuk] Two questions immediately come to mind: At the expense of what was this done? For what purposes will these areas be used?

[Gryaznov] Part of the land was freed following the disbanding of military units. It would be difficult to expect a rapid return from them, to be sure. If a missile battalion is located in the woods, for example, ordinarily a long way from populated areas, it is not a simple matter even to reach it.

The transfer of land to the national economy presently involves the territories of ranges—more precisely, the so-called "buffer" zones around them. This is not being done to the detriment of security or the health of the people, of course, and includes essential steps to protect the environment.

For example, a section totaling 2,000 hectares has been transferred in Armenia, on which the tuff so essential for construction in the earthquake zone will be worked. More than 500 hectares of land was turned over to local soviets of people's deputies in 1988-1989 alone for setting up horticultural societies. A considerable area has been freed for the construction of housing, kindergartens and boarding schools.

[Ivanyuk] I imagine that most of the readers think of this as land deformed by tank tracks and vehicle wheels, land covered with ruts and pits. How else could the territory of a former range appear?

[Gryaznov] That is possible. But these fears—pardon me for the unintentional pun—are groundless. In every case in which this is necessary a land recovery plan is compiled. It is ordinarily prepared by a specialized civilian organization with trained personnel. If there was pasture on the land before it was turned over, the military unit must "release" pasture to the local authorities; where there was a meadow, it must be a meadow. The fertile layer of soil must be restored wherever this is required.

The simple jobs are performed by the military, but it is sometimes necessary to enlist contract organizations to perform large-scale leveling and reclamation work. A great deal of concern is shown for the ecology. The land must be returned to its "peacetime" life in its original condition, as it were.

Unfortunately, there are deviations from these rules. We sometimes receive messages of alarm from local authorities. In every case we immediately take the steps necessary to put things into order.

[Ivanyuk] And what becomes of the buildings and installations located on the areas turned over to the national economy?

[Gryaznov] These are also turned over to the national economy. The Cherskiy Sovkhoz located in Pskov Oblast, for example, recently acquired full control over everything remaining from a former missile base—that is, not only more than 400 hectares of land but also hangers, heating garages, barracks, vegetable storage facilities and many other structures. It would have cost the kolkhoz millions of rubles to build the housing, production buildings and the boiler-room and to build the roads if it had set up the new division in an empty area. Just because of this, according to the specialists, it will be possible within the near future to increase milk production by 20%, to fatten twice as many hogs and to set up a cheese plant with the facilities acquired.

Right now, for example, work is underway on the transfer of two churches located on the grounds of a military sanitarium in the settlement of Martino near Moscow to a religious community. It has been decided jointly with the Rovno City Ispolkom to return the buildings of a former church (kostel) located within the city limits to believers of the Roman Catholic faith. Several other cultural facilities have already been turned over for their intended use in Ashkhabad, Pushkino and other cities.

Naturally, it is difficult in every case to monitor what happens to this or that facility or section of land turned over to the national economy—and that is not even our job. I would like to see it all benefit the people, however. It belongs to all of our people, after all.

This is not always the way it turns out, however. Last year, for example, we completed a new building for a rayon billeting unit in the Moscow area. The city community wanted it to be used as a children's general health clinic. That sounded like a good thing, so we agreed. Six months have gone by, however, and not only is there no medical facility functioning there; no preparatory work is being performed. The vacant building is gradually becoming useless.

I want to say in conclusion that there have also been excessively persistent requests and even ultimatums to release this or that building or territory. As I have already stated, when this is possible we do our part. Let us not forget, however, that the locations of military units are not decided on the basis of someone's whim but based on the needs for defense development and on our homeland's security interests.

Continued Discussion of Financial Authority of Unit Commanders

90UM0220B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col A. Komarovskiy, Far East Military District, under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion": "Are They Going to Remove the 'Financial Fetters' from the Commanders?"]

[Text] The same old story in the new times...." I want to use precisely these words in response to the answers given by Maj Gen V. Belov, chief of the Navy's Finance Service, in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview ("Oppressed by the Paragraph," 22 October 1989). One is amazed at the stubbornness with which the military finance experts oppose granting greater freedom to the unit commanders in the finance and economic work, using the same old excuse that they need supervision because of their poor legal literacy. And frankly speaking, I also do not like the typical theme of those articles in which the position of the financial expert—the person servicing the commander's functioning—is presented as a fact of the highest instance, while the suggestions of those who actually experience the enormous difficulties caused by the conservative nature of the existing system of financial support are evaluated as the timid voice of a dilettante.

I would like to ask just how the commanders' literacy can be improved in this area. By reading orders which dictate what is permitted and what is not? Or in the process of "financial operations" with a commercial check for the amount of 2 (two) rubles? It should be clear to everyone that it is nonsense to expect to improve oneself in "commerce" with this kind of authority. Only if the commanders are granted greater freedom can they master the necessary financial cannons and acquire practical skills.

Enterprise directors handle financial affairs, after all. And what about the cooperatives? Look at how profitable they are. They roll in money, thinking primarily of their own pocket. The unit commander with his responsibility for hundreds of subordinates goes to the store with two rubles in his pocket. I would like to stress once again the fact that many cooperatives are set up by fairly young people, frequently lacking practical management experience. And they do not "go down the tubes." But the paternal commanders, every second one with grey hair, with their considerable finance and management apparatus consisting of their deputies and service chiefs are, in the opinion of the finance experts, incapable of anything but waste, squandering of funds and mismanagement without monitoring on the part of the majestic "article." The right to operate with 100 rubles instead of two (of which we are beneficently informed by Comrade Belov) can in fact be called nothing other than a cosmetic measure.

The commander needs financial freedom as a principle and not as another sop in the form of a few rubles. This will permit him to demonstrate proper enterprise and flexibility in deciding economic matters and to maneuver personnel and funds, so essential today, in order to focus the main "strike" where the best situation exists for it. The algorithm of the commander's financial performance continues to be assigned by the financial expert, however, who has no interest in the end results of either the combat training or the organization of the service and life of the personnel. He guards the paragraph. And the sole-commander racks his brain to figure out how in the deficit situation to make the outlays

specified in the articles, how to spend the allocated funds before the end of the fiscal year (before doomsday, one wants to say).

The financial postulate "There is money on 31 December but none on 1 January," for example, cannot be expressed in any language. Today, Comrade V. Belov says, it is possible to carry certain amounts under individual articles over to the following year. But this was instituted only recently, and, once again, not for all of the articles by far. Why not? If not for these procedures, after all, the unit commanders would not be making outlays which they could get by without. They would no doubt try to save in some area in order to acquire what they particularly need at another time. Incidentally, the financial experts have their own dogma also concerning this: "Why request money if you cannot spend it"? This can be accepted only by those who have not served in management, however, those who do not know how the material support is set up, whereby funds are not allocated for many items and there is nowhere to buy the materials.

Returning to the matter of the commanders' competence in the area of finance law, I consider to be naive the point of view that certain commanders do not know how to properly utilize the finances and therefore sometimes take actions contrary to the law. The truth is that the commander is systematically forced deliberately to violate these "statutory requirements" called procedure. Because of the great shortages of an absolute majority of goods one has to buy that which is available at the time, without regard for what is allowed and what is not under a certain article. And then the breakdown by articles begins. If something is not covered in the articles, the forcing begins—going as far as calling certain goods something else.

To this should be added the fact that the regulation of the procedure for paying for goods and services is also a major retardant to a commander's economic functioning. It essentially involves limitations on paying with cash. But then not everything can be acquired on account. And special resourcefulness is required in order to do the job and not be caught by the financial inspector. This gives rise to a certain kind of "underground" economic activities in the army. This is just one aspect of the matter, however. There is another abuse. It stems from the same logic that since one can violate the law in the interest of the cause, why not violate it for oneself. And this deformed symbiosis generates oppression by the paragraph.

The fact that every article has its own boss creates certain barriers in financial operations within the unit. It is therefore not always possible to effectively unite the efforts of the services to resolve vital problems of the unit. All sorts of limitations and delimitations make it impossible to take care of the needs and requests of the personnel (particularly in the area of living conditions). Just try to buy for the soldiers an extra ball, dumbbells.... One can suddenly find himself under the

watchful eye of an auditor. There are norms for everything, which are adjusted extremely rarely, while the needs increase considerably more rapidly. When (flow-masters) became available for purchase (in the not too distant past) it was a big problem to acquire them. Today, figuratively speaking, the functions of possibilities and needs have risen even more abruptly, while the norms, which undergo discreet changes, immediately lag behind.

The thought creeps in that the finance agencies oppose granting the commanders freedom in finance and management activities with their own interests in mind. It is due not to zealous concern for state interests but primarily to the fact that the rigid regimentation simplifies the process of monitoring the use of funds. One tosses out the fine-mesh net of "paragraphs," and everything which does not pass through its openings is the catch. The absence of such a net would make it necessary to check out operations conducted "not according to the regulations," which, of course, would replace the system of financial control. It might even make it possible to reduce the size of the auditing system, because it would only be necessary to verify the purpose of the expenditures and not the procedure whereby they were made. And is this not why the financial inspectors so carefully protect the existing regulations?

Now a few words about the economic work. The unit and its subunits should have an interest in this, although there is not a trace of it. Let us say that a company saves 100 liters of gasoline. It would be expedient for 25% of the savings to be placed at the disposal of the company and another 25% at the disposal of the unit, while the remaining 50% could go to benefit the state. I am confident that this would produce positive results.

The military unit should also have an incentive to turn in secondary raw materials. Units of the Far East Military District now have a solidly defined plan for turning in scrap metal, for example. Not all of them have the internal capabilities, however. Naturally, they have to collect metal from scrap heaps. We understand the importance of this task and try to carry it out. The personnel work without any particular enthusiasm, however, because it requires a great deal of effort and there is practically no material incentive. The meager remuneration provided in the form of a small sum used as incentives for the personnel is not a stimulus in this unquestionably important matter.

Interest in turning in metal could be stimulated by transferring money from the payment for the metal into a unit fund to be used at the commander's discretion and also for ordering items made of the metal (expendable materials) or as wages or separate payment. It is obvious that with the proper incentives the units could turn in rags, dry cells and waste paper.

All of this would have to be worked out by the finance agencies. But for now, unfortunately, the unit commanders frequently view them only as banning agencies.

I realize that not all of my opinions are incontrovertible and that alternatives might be presented. However, I do want my concern (and not just mine) to be properly understood. I would like to see our finance agencies functioning as active promoters of creativity and efficient entrepreneurship. It is precisely in this sense that we need to review the process of restructuring in the finance and management area.

Ulyanovsk Radar Moved, Seen as Health Hazard

90UM02224 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 90
Second Edition p 8

[Article from Ulyanovsk by PRAVDA Correspondent N. Senchev: "Radars Change Location: Top Secret"]

[Text] A powerful radar located on the northern outskirts of Ulyanovsk ceased operation on 13 January. Another position already has been found a safe distance away from the populated point and will be urgently built. Oblast center residents who had not yet been officially notified nevertheless learned of this that same day, and immediately it was as if a load had been taken off their minds. The word "relaxation," customarily perceived by us as a military-political term, showed its customary human meaning in the Ulyanovsk episode.

It all began with a scandalous incident. Multistory residences began to be built on the outskirts of Ulyanovsk last summer according to general development plans. Builders soon began complaining about indisposition: headaches, weakness and nausea usually overcame them by the end of the work week. One robust, sturdily built installer even fainted once.

The heads of the Ulyanovsk Proyecktstroy Association turned to the medical and epidemiological station. The physicians declared: "Do you know that your people are working in the immediate proximity of a radar?" Specialists of the Radio Scientific Research Institute invited in from the neighboring city measured electromagnetic field density levels. Permissible limits were exceeded by several tens of times. Further measurements and calculations showed that over 140,000 persons were living in a zone with an unfavorable electromagnetic situation.

The first decision, which was made without delay, was to mothball the new construction project. Installers, painters, and plasterers were sent for a medical checkup. This fact alone caused a mood of panic among people who had lived in the northern part of the city for a long while: What were they to do? Where was the guarantee that harm was not being done to their health?

"The consequences of powerful electromagnetic irradiation have not yet been studied clinically," says V. Nikishin, the city's chief sanitary physician. "Only one thing is known: in time they may appear as cardiovascular system ailments and vision and sexual function disorders." This is not simply a supposition. Such a

conclusion is substantiated by medical personnel. Therefore compromise solutions were precluded when the question arose about the city's dangerous proximity to a radar.

But one thing was disturbing: this installation belonged to the Army. Therefore they counted on the military's proper understanding of the existing situation.

Having returned from the Congress of People's Deputies, Party Obkom First Secretary Yu. Samsonov immediately phoned the military command authority. The telephone line carried a surprised voice over hundreds of kilometers: "Well, is there cause for concern? Who said that this is dangerous to health?" Our officers and their families have been living near such installations for years and nothing has happened, it was alleged.

"It is bad that you believe this," objected Samsonov. "Both you and we have to think of the officers and their children in more than just the last place."

A commission that arrived agreed with arguments of local party and soviet entities and with conclusions of medical personnel, but there was one objection which delayed the date for relocating the radar: Who will finance construction of the new position? The fact is that the military people are not at fault for the fact that the city came right up to the radiotechnical installation in expanding its boundaries.

"Financing is a secondary matter. Let us make a fundamental decision: today we stop the radar's operation and tomorrow we transfer it to a spot remote from the city," replied Samsonov. "If you are not empowered to make such a decision, say so."

I tell about this in detail because the situation really demanded decisive action. It might not have happened. Had it not been for the persistence of the party oblast committee, the oblast executive committee and the city medical-epidemiological service, who knows how much more time the city's residential blocks would have spent in a zone of electromagnetic irradiation dangerous to the health?

A call to Minister of Defense D. Yazov was the next and final effort by the obkom first secretary. After consultations and clarifications, Gen G. Dubrov, who flew in to Ulyanovsk on behalf of the minister on the following day, agreed with the proposal by local entities to stop the radar's operation and relocate it. As it was declared, these actions will not harm the quality of radar support in this region.

One would like to end this here, but the question automatically arises: What is the prehistory of this not-so-simple situation? How did it happen that a developing city's interests came into contradiction with an Army subunit's defense missions?

SOVETSKIY VOIN 1989 Index of Articles

901'401,222C Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian
No. 24, 1989 pp. 94-95

[Article: "SOVETSKIY VOIN for 1989"]

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Career History, Discussion With Candidate Col Gen Stefanovskiy

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[Interview with Col Gen G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by correspondent Capt 3d Rank V. Yermolin: "In Coauthorship With the Voters"]

[Text] This year's election campaign differs in one significant way from the election campaign of the past: The voter already knows that no one but he can elect a deputy, and moreover one who could really turn our life toward the better. This is why value is now being attached not to bold dreams, not to devastating criticism and not to tempting promises, but to a balanced, sober view both on yesterday and on tomorrow, to the ability to achieve specific changes for the better. Perhaps not sensational changes, ones which astound the imagination, but concrete ones. And day after day.

These are the thoughts that came to mind during a meeting of Colonel-General G. Stefanovskiy, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy for the Kolomna National-Territorial Okrug.

with workers of the Shatura Furniture Production Association. Questions asked of him were most diverse, but as a rule they reflected one concern: Are the moral and working qualities of the people's deputy candidate and his ideological and political views such that he would be capable of representing the interests of working people in the supreme organ of republic government?

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kokorin, the candidate's campaign manager, acquainted the audience with Colonel-General G. Stefanovskiy's biography. He was aware that many wondered whether or not the success of the general's military career lay in his family ties. In our times this is not an idle question. No, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich was not born to the family of a military chief. His parents were peasants. His father did of course remain with the army after the war. He served to the rank of lieutenant colonel. His mother, who raised and educated her son, lives in a kolkhoz to this day. In 1954, after graduating from rural school, Stefanovskiy entered the Tambov Military Aviation Radiotechnical School. In 1957 he graduated with honors. Then followed service in the Far Eastern, Moscow and Turkestan military districts, and in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Being a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Turkestan Military District (1985-1988), he participated directly in organizing party-political work among personnel of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, and after it was withdrawn back into the USSR. In the tragic December days of 1988 he was on the commission responsible for recovery from the earthquake in Armenia.

Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Stefanovskiy combines army service with constant study. He graduated as a correspondence student from the law faculty of Voronezh State University and the military law faculty of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, and as a regular student from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

We can add to this that Stefanovskiy is married, and his daughter is a student at Moscow State University.

What were workers of the Shatura Furniture Production Association, and two hours later at a meeting in the city club, citizens of this Moscow suburban industrial center, specifically interested in? First of all—this may seem strange to some military readers—the people wondered how the processes occurring in the society, reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces and conversion of defense industry are affecting the country's defense capabilities. What is life in the army and navy

like today, what needs are they experiencing? And Colonel-General G. Stefanovskiy openly described the details concerning the state of affairs in the armed forces, and concerning the problems they must solve.

Much is being written and said today about the army, sometimes in rough tones, and even with open hostility, with no concern for objectivity and validity of arguments. But meetings of this kind make it possible to hear the real voice of the people, who are concerned with the health of their army, of their armed protectors.

At the conclusion of the discussion with Shatura voters I asked Colonel-General Stefanovskiy a few questions.

[Yermolin] The election marathon is only just beginning to accelerate, but you have already held dozens of such meetings. What do they mean to you—are they nothing more than a possibility for presenting your election program?

[Stefanovskiy] It is precisely during such meetings that my election program is being perfected. Specifically, one of the goals of my campaign stops in the okrug is to study the real situation. Economic, social, political, ecological.... To study the moods of the people. Rather than me talking to them, more often it is they who talk to me, telling me what needs to be addressed on priority, and what has to be done first. It is in this way, in coauthorship with the voters, that my program is coming to life. It is also very important for me to hear what people think about the armed forces, and in turn, for me to describe our concerns, to report to the people our progress in fulfilling their mandate—dependably defending the tranquillity of the socialist motherland.

[Yermolin] But judging from your speeches the foundation of your program has already been determined: It is the political platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Stefanovskiy] That's absolutely true. Besides, the political platforms of rayon party committees included in the election okrug, and the most acute problems troubling the voters are also accounted for. Unity of purpose means, after all, unity of effort as well, and consequently the fastest possible progress toward real results. I can also say categorically that I am in favor of fundamental dismantling of the obsolete authoritarian economic and political structure. I am in favor of guarantees against its revival in the future. I favor restoring the authority of the Communist Party in society and strengthening its role as the guiding and consolidating force of perestroika. I am for gradual increase in the proportion of national income spent on consumer goods, and I am in favor of actively utilizing the possibilities of conversion in behalf of the program of social development. By the way, plans have been made to repair and build residential buildings,

hospitals and children's institutions and finish construction of a school sports complex by means of the efforts and resources of the appropriate military formations in behalf of residents of the Kolomna Election Okrug. And all of this is to be done on the basis of assets freed as a result of conversion.

I of course have my own views on strengthening the unity of the army and people. There is an entire complex of measures in this area. I hope that their discussion with the voters will ultimately result in a program of joint effort by different public organizations together with the armed forces. There are also plans for reducing the ecological stress upon Moscow suburban areas. And this stress is very high. Spiritual life and culture are also items of my draft platform. And finally, there is the military sphere. Here my positions are clear: The armed forces need perestroika based on new political thinking and the principle of sufficient defense. We need a law on defense which would free the army from functions atypical of it. The armed forces need to be manned only on the basis of the extraterritorial principle, and on the basis of universal compulsory military service. The social protections of servicemen and their families must be increased. And there are a number of other points, which I hope will be supplemented in the course of meetings with voters.

[Yermolin] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, the opinion exists that owing to his official position, a candidate with a general's rank would have greater opportunities for campaigning than would other candidates. Is equality of opportunity not being violated here?

[Stefanovskiy] I don't think so. The Law on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies states directly that the okrug commission organizes and supports the election campaign of candidates. Each individual is free to select his campaign managers, as well as his campaign groups, at his own discretion. Our leaflets are also published centrally. We are all equal before the mass media. For example, isn't KRASNAYA ZVEZDA going to interview other candidates besides me?

[Yermolin] You and many other candidates as well.

[Stefanovskiy] Which means that a candidate's fate is in his own hands today. If you manage to prove to people that you will serve the people's interests faithfully and truthfully, with an understanding of the issues, honestly, in keeping with your conscience, then you can also count on the votes of the people. And if you can't, then you have only yourself to blame. The main thing, it seems to me, is that we candidates for RSFSR people's deputies should remember that the problems that have accumulated in Russia are too many to count, that it has already heard enough of loud voices, assurances and promises, and that what it expects now—and not only expects but demands—is deeds.

PCs Introduced in Military District Headquarters

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[Article by Capt M. Kislov, Transbaykal Military District: "How Computers Are Serving the Staff"]

[Text] To be honest, having read in the report on the All-Army Officers' Conference published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA a statement of one of its participants concerning the inconsistency between the army's demand for highly intelligent personnel to service modern weapon systems and the real intellectual level of these personnel, at first I thought that he might be exaggerating. But on looking into this problem just a little more deeply I was persuaded of the reverse.

This time around we decided to do without the services of a printing office in our okrug's headquarters when planning our work for the new training year. Its functions were to be taken over by a personal computer. We fed the data into it, and the printer clattered happily into action. One copy, and then another, and a third....

To an unenlightened person this picture might seem to be the ultimate dream. But to electronic specialists, I learned, this was not any reason for joy. To them, seeing a computer transform into an ordinary printing press is heartbreaking. And this sort of "typewriter" with an electronic memory is not so rare any more in our headquarters. What is the matter here, why is the role of computers sometimes reduced to such primitive tasks in the troops?

Alas, were we to furnish the headquarters of all formations, units and battalions with these highly sophisticated computers, and install them in company administrative offices, they would probably suffer the same fate as in some grade school classes studying information science. I am referring to the information with which the computer memory is loaded. As we know, this is a laborious process, and the main thing is that few officers know how to do this. And without the appropriate bank of reference data, it would be senseless to try to solve applied problems with a personal computer in behalf of troop command and control. All the more so because headquarters frequently does not possess the software for solving such problems.

Thus we find that personal computers such as those found in the headquarters of our okrug are left to their own devices. The personal computer at headquarters is unable to exchange data via different communication channels because a person working with it cannot obtain any information with the computer except that which is already stored in its memory. But as was noted above, data are hardly ever fed into it. And so it is that officials end up using the personal computer only as a printing press and a duplicating machine. That is, the computer presently at headquarters is for the most part nothing more than an expensive toy.

But what is it like when someone at headquarters dares to use the personal computer to solve a problem? The computer room really turns into a monkey house. Before solving a problem, the officer must leaf through a pile of papers to collect the necessary data. Then these data have to be reprinted in the typing pool. And only after that are the data fed into the computer. Things could be entirely different if this officer were able to obtain all of the information he needed from a databank simply by pressing a key.

During a recent command-and-staff exercise the senior chief said good things about the level of automation in the district's rear services headquarters. But Colonel V. Kryazh, a department chief of this headquarters, openly confessed: "There is nothing to praise us for." And in fact, the computer was being used basically as a typewriter and as a telegraph instrument.

There can be no debate that automating command and control processes in the army and navy is a matter of priority importance. All the more so because the armed forces are undergoing reduction. It is no secret, after all, that staff reductions unavoidably increase the load on staff officers. Electronic helpers could of course greatly ease their labor. But it would be naive to suppose that we could solve the problem simply by equipping the headquarters with personal computers. A single computer at headquarters will not raise the effectiveness and dependability of command and control of the units. Computers must be "tied together" into a single system with a common databank. That is, the army needs its own computer and information system. Only in such a case could we discuss an automated troop command and control system (an ASUV).

This problem, let's call it a technical one, brings up another—the impossibility of teaching officers how to work in an ASUV through general courses. Logic would have it that this should be done locally, at headquarters. But how are they going to learn with primitive equipment? On one hand we hear persistent appeals for officers to acquire computer competency. On the other hand little is being done to organize and develop automated command and control systems. Moreover, as was rightfully noted at the All-Army Officers' Assembly, this is not always considered in efforts to improve the personnel structure of the troops. This is judging from my own district.

Until recently, officers used large and personal computers only in the headquarters in which Colonel V. Losev serves. Computers are combined into a single network and a databank has been created here. But in connection with transition to a new manning and organizational structure, the number of specialists involved in such work was reduced at headquarters. A similar department at the headquarters of the district's rear services, headed by Colonel Kryazh mentioned above, was reduced by over half.

What is the result? While life itself demands automation and computerization of command and control processes, we are witnessing reduction of engineer-programmers and computer specialists. Is this sensible, given today's situation with regard to organizing and developing ASUV?

Take for example the automated control system subunit of our district's headquarters. It is in its second year of being reequipped with computers of greater power. But the staff of specialists has remained the same. Subunit chief Colonel O. Stroganov and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel S. Yakhovlev, made a comparison with the computer centers of civilian organizations in which computers of equal power are installed. They calculated that the staff of the subunit should be increased by more than a factor of three. In the words of the officers, given today's manning it is simply unable to support the work of the entire system.

Inquiries were made in this regard at the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the corresponding directorate of the General Staff. But the answer was always the same: Acquire your own specialists by reducing the staffing in the district's troops. I don't think there is any need to explain what it means to increase personnel by a factor of three basically by bringing in officers and warrant officers but without establishing official positions.

And is it really possible to work normally, and to teach personnel when expendable materials are in such short supply? Before, prior to reequipment, the subunit was supported by the district's signalmen: It received boxes of magnetic disks, tapes, typing ribbon and so on. With the beginning of modernization, its support was taken away. And the supply issue has still not been resolved (this is now the second year). What is Stroganov doing to solve the problem? He is utilizing what came with the computer. Meaning that the kit of spare parts, tools and accessories accompanying the systems has already been depleted by half. How and when is he to replenish his supplies?

Obviously there is certainly just one solution here: Reduction of the army must be approached in a more differentiated manner. I can understand that we need to cut back on everything of secondary importance, on the ballast. But at the same time it is very important to preserve our intellectual potential. The matter of preserving the scientific and technical potential of defense enterprises in the course of conversion was raised before the government at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Why aren't we showing the same sort of concern for the "drain" of valuable specialists from the army as a result of reduction?

If we base ourselves on priority objectives, on the future, obviously we should not disband or halve departments concerned with communications and automation at the headquarters level. When the troops become "saturated" with computers, who is going to tie them together into a

single network, work with them, and teach specialists? The military schools and academies teach only the basic skills of working with computers. Are these skills really enough for competent use of ASUV resources? This is not a problem that can be put off until tomorrow in the army and navy. If we do put it off, what will we have to do tomorrow: create computer departments at headquarters all over again, and expand them?

Why not organize unique regional centers for the training of staff officers to work with ASUV resources out of departments presently being reduced and reorganized? Rather than dismissing officer-programmers and computer specialists, we should bring them together into groups at these centers. We could create such a training center in our district right now, for example out of the automated control system of the headquarters in which Colonel V. Losev serves. A sizable number of computer-equipped officer work stations were freed here as a result of staff reductions. I think that it would be reasonable to have such centers in every district. We could also think about a unified system of centers in the armed forces based on regional centers. And in the meantime officers specializing in computers and programming are leaving for the national economy. Some of them are drastically changing their work profile by going over to command positions. Colonel Stroganov said that he filled two vacancies with officers from the troops. Senior Lieutenant A. Karpov (an engineer-programmer) had been serving as a battery commander. Captain S. Makhov (a computer engineer) was serving as a unit assistant chief of staff.

Only a few are remaining in the army. First of all, given that workers with their specialties are in short supply, it is easy for them to find work in the civilian world, and the pay is high. Second, officers specializing in programming and computer electronics do not see any future in the service. Only a few are able to rise to ranks of even captain and major.

A paradoxical situation arises: Everyone knows that after a certain while, life will compel us to increase the manning of automated control system subunits of the district headquarters. We will have to seek specialists, and spend time and money to train them to work with the new computers. While the problem could be solved right now painlessly and without extra expense, for some reason it is not being addressed. And in the meantime a day does not pass in which Lieutenant Colonel Stroganov submits requests to send him specialists whose positions are axed by the reduction.

Understanding the entire significance of automating command and control to upgrading the quality of the forces, the district's headquarters has requested the necessary computers and equipment. But the headquarters is not certain as to what it will actually get. In the last quarter of the past year, for example, the rear services headquarters was supposed to have received a personal computer, but it didn't.

As you can see, there is still much work ahead of us associated with introducing automated control systems into the activities of commanders and staffs. Under such conditions can we really "squander" officers of the corresponding specialties?

Until such time that we unite computers into a single system, personal and other computers at headquarters will be relegated to the role of printing presses and duplicating machines. And using them in this way is equivalent to driving nails with a miniature calculator.

Numbers of Veterans, Pensions, Benefits Noted

90UM02494 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Retired Major General I.F. Klochkov by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "Respect Toward Acts of Gallantry"]

[Excerpt] We are interviewing Ivan Frolovich Klochkov. A country lad from Ryazanshchina, he began fighting the war at 18. He walked along front-line roads wearing soldier shoulder boards and later junior lieutenant shoulder boards. He became a hero of the Soviet Union. Now, Retired Major General Klochkov is a USSR People's Deputy and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Veterans of War and Veterans of the Armed Forces and Reserve Internationalist Soldier Affairs.

[Passage omitted]

[Dokuchayev] Ivan Frolovich, how many veterans of war are there in the nation today?

[Klochkov] Five million seven hundred thousand survived. Hundreds of thousands of them have not been provided with individual housing [units]. These numbers are approximate and this is also an indicator of our concern about veterans that no one has been engaged in compiling these statistics until the present time and right now we are clearing up the picture. For example, about 70 percent of the 280,000 war participants in Leningrad live in communal apartments. We cannot foresee any progress for now.

Let us take this specific example. Timofey Timofeyevich Ivanov, chairman of the Society of Veterans of War of our city's peoples militia division, resides in a communal apartment. On 23 June 1941, he appealed to his fellow countrymen on Leningrad Radio to stand up in defense of their native land. Both he and his wife fought. But the Petrograd Party Raykom and the Ispolkom of this Rayon ignore this warrior's requests. What does this say about other veterans...

Or take this number. Until October of last year, about 23 million Soviet people received a pension of up to 70 rubles and millions were on the edge of poverty. Of them, 51 percent of the people are over 65 years old. That means that 10-12 million women and men of the

front-line generation, those who fought on the front or who dressed and fed this front-line are on the edge of poverty.

And take the Ministry of Health hospitals that serve invalids. Twenty percent do not have sewage systems and 61 percent are in old buildings not suitable for health care. Some are simply located in schools that were built during the pre-war years where wounded soldiers ended up by chance. Who can remain complacent at this comparison? There are 172 outstanding hospitals in the United States of America for veterans of war (and there are few of them in comparison with our [veterans]) and there are a total of 71 in our nation and those we do have, as I have already stated, are in deplorable condition...

[Passage omitted]

New Assignment, Biographical Notes on Lt Gen Gorelov

90UM0384A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990
(Signed to press 02 Feb 90) p 73

[Biographical notes on Lt Gen Gorelov under "Appointments" rubric]

[Text] He was born in 1935 at the Rodomanovo state farm in the Gzhatsk Rayon of the Smolensk Oblast, to a large worker's family. In 1941 the family was evacuated to the Urals along with the enterprise at which his father worked since returning from the Soviet-Finnish war. In Kamensk-Uralsk Rudolf was graduated from trade school and worker youth school, and for a year afterward worked at a plant as a tuner of precision radio equipment.

In 1954 he entered the Sverdlovsk Suvorov Officer's School. After the school he was sent to serve in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now the Western Group of Forces) as the leader of a rifle platoon. For the next nine years he was involved in Komsomol work, as the secretary of the Komsomol organization of an automotive school, later of a tank regiment, as the deputy chief of the political section for Komsomol work of a tank and a motorized rifle division, later in the political section of the Army, as a senior instructor and deputy chief for Komsomol work.

In 1968 he was appointed deputy commander of a tank regiment for political affairs. Then he was the chief of the political section of a motorized rifle division, on a foreign duty assignment. From 1977 to 1981 he was in the apparatus of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, an inspector in the inspectorate of the directorate of organizational-party work. He left there a member of the military council, to be chief of the Army political section. After four years he was the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. For the last two years

he has been a member of the military council and the chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1975 he completed the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin by correspondence, and studied twice at this Academy in the higher academic courses for refresher and advanced training of senior political personnel.

He is Russian. He joined the ranks of the CPSU as secretary of the Komsomol organization of the automotive school in 1959. He was elected a member of the bureau of the municipal CPSU committee, a member of the CP Central Committee of the republic, a deputy of the Moscow Council. He was a delegate to the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU.

For successes in combat and political training, maintenance of the combat readiness of troops, and mastery of complex technology, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (1982) and the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd Class (1975).

He was made a Major General in 1981, and has been a Lieutenant General since 1988.

He was married in 1957. His wife Nelli Nikolayevna is a radio technician by profession. Their daughter was graduated from the Moscow Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin, and is married to an officer of the Soviet Army. He has a six-year-old grandson.

Lines of a Portrait (from comments of colleagues)

"Industrious, possesses good methodological skills."

"Energetic in his work, shows party principle. Disciplined, honest, and effective."

"Among communists persistently affirms an atmosphere of comradeship and trust, respect and exactingness. Self-critical. Implacable toward sham efficiency and smugness."

From his responses to questions on "KVS" questionnaire:

How many times have you changed your places of assignment, and apartments?—Seventeen.

Which of your jobs do you most recall, and why?—My job as deputy commander of a tank regiment for political affairs. A sense of independence, scope for initiative, creativity.

What do you most value in people, and what arouses your greatest dislike?—Honesty, truth, the ability to defend them, i.e. will. I dislike lying and servility.

Your attitude toward smoking?—Negative. I don't smoke.

What pleases you and what saddens you in Army service today?—I am pleased by the democratization, the awakening of initiative in officers, and I am saddened by the dominance of ignorance, the low level of professionalism in some officers, the drop in prestige of service.

What would you wish for young political workers?—Erudition, competence, professionalism. That they be warriors of the CPSU.

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Moscow's Armed Forces Language Institute

90UM0270B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen A. Tyurin, chief of the Military Institute, by Maj L. Gusakov: "We Train Translators and Lawyers"]

[Text] The editors' mail includes letters the authors of which, for example, D. Filimontsev, D. Yeliseyev and many others, are interested in the Military Institute. Our correspondent turned to its chief, Lt Gen A. Tyurin, with a request to answer certain reader questions.

[Gusakov] Aleksey Nikolayevich [Tyurin], many have heard about the Military Institute. But far from everyone is familiar with its history and specialization. Would you please tell us briefly about this?

[Tyurin] The genealogy of the institute goes back to the Military Faculty established on 1 February 1940 under the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages and the Military Faculty Under the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies established a little later. Thus, this year we are celebrating the 50th anniversary. On 12 April 1942, by orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, both faculties were united and the Red Army Foreign Languages Military Institute was established. Over the years of the Great Patriotic War, it trained over 4,000 skilled military translators.

In 1956, in line with the cutback in the Armed Forces, the Military Foreign Languages Institute was abolished but in May 1968 it was again reestablished. In 1974, a military legal faculty was incorporated in it and our VUZ was named the "Military Institute."

We train military translators, military lawyers and political officers with a knowledge of two foreign languages for the Armed Forces. Their work is complicated and at times dangerous. Suffice it to say that just in the last year, 83 of them were awarded orders and medals. The institute even has a women's faculty but it is ceasing its existence. This year will be the last graduating class. The elimination of the faculty is related to the cutback in the need for military translators generally and particularly for women translators. Incidentally, we have good material to choose from. For example, last year, the number

of applicants who completed school with a gold medal for certain faculties was greater than the number of student places.

[Gusakov] Has the institute considered the increased need for legal knowledge, for competent specialists who have a legal education?

[Tyurin] Undoubtedly so. For example, structural changes are being carried out on the military legal faculty. As of last year, here they opened a department for training military judges and legal consultants from officers with a higher education up to 27 years of age. The period of instruction is three years. This department possibly will be enlarged.

[Gusakov] What new has appeared in the life and studies of the officer candidates in light of the presently occurring renewal of the higher school, democratization and glasnost?

[Tyurin] The institute is a military institution of learning and for this reason the conduct, order and rhythm of life of the officer candidates are determined by the general military regulations and the orders of the minister of defense. Recently a new provision went into effect on the higher military institutions of learning. This has taken into account those democratic processes which are occurring in our society. In particular, the senior students during off hours now have the right not only to go into the city freely, but also wear civilian clothing.

As for studies, the officer candidates are involved in the administrative activities of the VUZ and are members of the academic councils of the institute and faculties. The proposals made by them have had a noticeable influence on the restructuring of education and training and on the daily life of the institute personnel.

Much is changing. Suffice it to say that the institute has worked out and is implementing a plan for restructuring the training and educational process. With its aid, we would like to resolve several important problems all at once. This includes deepening the theoretical training of our graduates, arming them with profound knowledge on the level of the most recent achievements of the corresponding science and raising their practical training in performing service duties, the developing of their cognitive capabilities and instilling the habits of self-education.

The faculty personnel is a particular concern for us. Certainly with good reason it is said that what sort of teacher there is so will be the student. At present, there is a major renewal underway and young people are arriving without sufficient experience in pedagogical work. To help them, the institute has established an effective system for improving the skills of the young instructors and this guarantees a high level of training for our officer candidates.

Lt Gen Krivosheyev Briefing on Spring Call-up

90UM0433A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev: "The Spring Draft Is Beginning"]

[Text] How will the Spring Draft for Active Military Service be conducted? What are its specific features? These and other questions were reviewed at a briefing organized on 30 March at the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center.

Speaking to the journalists, Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, pointed out that henceforth release of those who have served their prescribed terms of service and the draft will be carried out in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision and in accordance with the Council of Minister's Resolution. This measure is caused by the fact that border, internal, and railroad troops have been separated from the composition of the Armed Forces. It undoubtedly must increase the responsibility for the results of the draft not only of military commissariats but also of local government organs, Party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations, and workers collectives.

We must consider that pacifist sentiments exist among a portion of young men of draft age. Informalists and extremist oriented elements frequently seize the initiative. We have had occasion to run into such cases in the Baltic and Transcaucasus Republics. In the Lithuanian SSR, where the Republic Supreme Soviet has proclaimed "the independence of the Lithuanian State," the matter is reaching the point of direct incitement of draftees to avoid military service.

Having spoken at the briefing, Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, talked about the role and significance of the mass media in forming defense consciousness among the population and about the need to pay greater attention to the military-patriotic theme. Ongoing preparations in the country for the 45th Anniversary of the Victory [WWII] will create favorable conditions for this.

Officials from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff including Lieutenant General I. Matveyev, Major General V. Nikitin, and Colonel N. Yermilov, chief of the Mosgorvoyenkomat [Moscow City Military Commissariat] Department, participated in the briefing.

Proposal To Improve Savings on Aircraft Missile Maintenance

90UM02564 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Bulygin: "Is the Voice from the Troops Heard?"]

[Text] More and more often, questions are being raised in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA concerning economic problems in the armed forces. Certainly, this topic is extremely timely, for considerable funds are needed to carry out a series of social tasks. Where are we to get them?

I believe that effectively organized work in the units aimed at saving resources can become one source of finding these funds. I am an aviation engineer. For three years I have been spending off-duty time performing tasks of organizing the optimum expenditure of costly air weapons resources. Based on statistical material gathered in 14 years of maintaining air weapons, I was able to discover that the system existing today is extremely wasteful.

According to these calculations, totally unjustified losses of air weapons resources reach 22 percent. What is more, this system, beginning at a specific moment, does not ensure the assigned level of combat readiness of an air regiment due to a decrease in the reliability of the air weapons equipment beyond allowable norms.

The problem is that a missile ammunition maintained in storage retains its operational fitness life for a considerable number of years. But missiles hung on aircraft on combat alert "survive" one-sixth to one-seventh as long. The remaining variants of storage and operation make it possible to preserve the life in this time interval. Since with existing methods the life of a fighter regiment's ammunition load is depleted in an increasing manner, only a more rational, economically sound organization of storage, replacement, and maintenance of missiles makes it possible to achieve a substantial savings and, accordingly, an increase in the level of a unit's combat readiness. This can be achieved by maintaining the reliability of all missiles in the basic load without exception, no matter where they are stored, at the required level throughout their entire life. (I am not dwelling on technical details.)

Calculations show that the introduction of the methods I am proposing, say, in just one regiment of MIG-29s promises a savings of 300,000-400,000 rubles annually. It is understandable that today this is a conditional savings, but tomorrow it is real money that will be able to be used for resolving social problems. The methods, by the way, can be introduced not only in aviation, but also in places where items are used whose service life depends on the conditions of storage and maintenance.

But who is interested in using these developments? My experience, unfortunately, shows that no one needs this.

Thus, one and one-half years ago I reported the preliminary results of my work to Col R. Solovyev, an aviation armament specialist. There was no response. After this, I submitted the material successively up the chain right up to the chief engineer of the Air Force. Again—no response, no results.

In October of last year, after appealing to the leadership of the Air Force, I was granted the opportunity to present my report at a meeting of the scientific and technical council at one of the scientific research institutes. In their conclusion, the specialists gave a favorable assessment of the work I had done, but said nothing about the feasibility of introducing the proposed methods.

All my requests to the party-political bodies, to the command authorities, and, finally, to the Officer's Meeting Council to be granted the opportunity to complete the work over three to four months and introduce the methods as an experiment in several aviation units ran into a wall of a lack of understanding and open unpleasantness...

Thus, the proposed solution of a specific economic problem is being rejected without grounds at all levels, and the issue raised is simply closed.

PVO Unit Unable To Service Additional Flight Equipment

90UM03804 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3 Feb 1990
pp 23-24

[Letter to editor by Capt. S. Dmitriyev: "Aircraft First?"]

[Text] Our PVO unit is conducting an experiment to put some order in the work day of flight and ground personnel. The ground personnel were separated from the flight personnel. The pilots were happy, of course; they were freed of personnel concerns. Now they could spend more time in independent training, and they still have the same job categories. The ground personnel also got their "piece of the pie": we received two colonel and four major slots. At first everyone was satisfied: prospects for growth appeared. They had been slight for us, as is known. But we saw what had actually happened after working for a while within the framework of this experiment.

Here is what happened. With practically the same engineer-technician personnel in the aviation technical squadrons, the number of planes to be serviced grew. To service this many aircraft in a quality manner, I will not fear to say this, is impossible, and at times, especially when we have been working to correct defects, everything has been reduced solely to filling in the documents.

I judge this with full knowledge of the work, as the chief of an aircraft inspection and maintenance group. All the aircraft come to us periodically; their quality dropped markedly in the maintenance period of operation.

Different commissions came. They didn't like the data they collected. They said that we, the engineer-technician personnel, especially were blocking this experiment. They came again, but that didn't make things any better.

The organization that set up this experiment was cut long ago. For three years now they have been promising our unit that personnel would be organized in a common organic structure, but in fact nothing is done. In the Air Forces this experiment has been over for a year now, and everyone has returned to their old ways, but it looks like they forgot about us. Now we have the Army reduction. And who are they reducing? I will not talk about all the groups, just my own.

I have two warrant officers under me, two Soviet Army employees, and one ordinary soldier. They are cutting one warrant officer and one soldier (the only one). As a result we have three executing entities. So who will work on the aircraft? Who will give it the guarantee of excellent operation in the air? The employees have an eight-hour work day. It is not I, whose service day is "unregulated". So who will service the aircraft—one warrant officer?

And here is something else I would like to mention. Higher authorities keep sending down all these instructions about improving accident-free service in PVO aviation. Then they themselves take and reduce the workers. And where are my people going, the ones they are cutting? One had 19 years in, another 12, and both without apartments. They are losing all their benefits, all their gains, essentially they have to start over... In general there still remains much to be said, but I think all this is useless. The people making the cuts never even came to the unit, never studied or asked who should be cut and who should stay. Later on we'll get more memos about accident-free operations

Capt. S. Dmitriyev

An analogous situation has also developed in the other aircraft inspection and maintenance groups. Of course, there are groups where not a single warrant officer was cut out of four, and where, in a group of two warrant officers, a cut was made. So after learning that I wrote this letter, other group chiefs also decided to sign it—comrades Vasilyev, Antonov, Klochkov, Snizhko.

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Chernavin Commemorates 80th Anniversary of Gorshkov's Birth

90UM0453A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 3, Mar 1990 (Signed to
press 07 Mar 90) pp 85-9

[Article by Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin: "His Life—Loyalty to Duty and the Navy: (On the 80th Anniversary of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov)"]

[Text] We do not always observe how swiftly time passes in our endless everyday affairs. And only some kind of significant event forces us to sort of pull ourselves together, to also look more attentively and closely at ourselves and at those around us, and to give a more stringent and valid assessment to what we have lived through. You sense losses very sharply at such moments.

I also experienced something similar to that when I learned about the death of Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov two years ago.

I knew this man for several decades. And more precisely since 1955 when he was assigned as first deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Of course, at that time Admiral S. Gorshkov hardly knew anything about Submariner Captain Lieutenant V. Chernavin from a remote polar garrison. I had not had the opportunity earlier to meet the already famous naval leader.

According to stories of senior comrades who remembered Sergey Georgiyevich through his deeds at the front, I, like other young Northern Fleet officers, learned a lot in a short time about his terseness and strictness in ratings and about his exactingness and respectful attitude toward fleet officers.

When I, already a submarine commander, was from time to time invited to various types of fleet meetings that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy participated in, I noted more than once in his speeches and reports the logic that is characteristic of people with a mathematical mentality that permitted him to rapidly get to the essence of the issue being examined. We, commanders of ships and task forces, liked and understood those terse and even specific speeches of Admiral S. Gorshkov.

Certainly few then knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich's love for accuracy and specificity was, if I can put it that way, hereditary. His father, Georgiy Mikhaylovich, honored teacher of the RSFSR, taught mathematics and physics in schools for more than 50 years.

In 1926 when Sergey was 16 years of age, he entered Leningrad University after graduation from Kolomenskiy Middle School. Having successfully completed the first year in the physics-mathematics department, Student Gorshkov, who became enthusiastic through the common movement of young people—to serve in the Navy, decided to enter the Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze in 1927.

The glorious history of the school that had educated more than one generation of seafarers and that gave the world famous naval leaders, rich traditions, first encounters with the sea, experience on the cruiser *Aurora* [Aurora]—all of this made a lasting impression on a future sailor that he carried throughout his life.

S.G. Gorshkov began his officer career as a navigator on the Destroyer *Frunze*. This ship became a lucky launching pad for the 20-year old Lieutenant.

A year later, competent commanders were required during the course of a reorganization of Far Eastern Naval Forces and S. Gorshkov and a number of others were sent to the Pacific Fleet.

The growth stages of the young Red Commander during seven years of service in the Far East included navigator of the Minelayer *Tomsk*, brigade navigator, commander of a patrol combatant and later a destroyer, and flag officer of the 7th Destroyer Brigade.

In 1939, 29-year-old Captain 2nd Rank S. Gorshkov became the commander of a Black Sea Fleet destroyer brigade. A year later, he headed one of the leading Naval formations—a cruiser brigade. Captain 1st Rank Gorshkov, while attaching special significance to training and education of commanders, developed his work practices with them. The brigade commander encouraged any display of creativity or initiative, especially while accomplishing combat training missions, and he attempted in no way to take their place while stressing the right of each person to the commander's independence and to his own style.

From the first days of the war, the brigade's ships were involved in aggressive combat operations. Successful accomplishment of assigned missions required flexibility, a search for new tactics, and a departure from prewar stereotypes on the part of Brigade Commander S. Gorshkov and his subordinates. Before the war, primary attention in cruiser combat training was paid to firing against naval surface and air targets. The war itself nominated ship artillery strikes against coastal targets to be among the primary missions which at the same time required close coordination with ground forces. Lack of experience in this type of operation resulted in the composition of a large number of combat documents while planning them that frequently duplicated each other and frequently also allowed contradictions or a lack of coordination. S.G. Gorshkov became thoroughly involved in the situation that had taken shape, analyzed it, and proved the advisability of changing the existing organization: To accomplish the ground force commander's requests that were received through communications channels or through the special purpose brevity code chart.

In September 1941, Captain 1st Rank S. Gorshkov led the first maritime assault landing on the Black Sea that contributed to a successful counterattack by the Odessa Defensive Rayon forces. And here Sergey Georgiyevich's capabilities were manifested with flying colors: The

course of the operation was calculated in hours and minutes. The most unexpected variants of the development of events were envisioned.

Some time later Admiral of the Fleet I. Isakov wrote: "The assault landing from combat ships under cover of cruisers and destroyers was so surprising and dynamic and coordination with support fire ships and aircraft was so accurate that the enemy flank that was so firmly dug in on shore was overrun."

The assault landing was still continuing when a radiogram arrived stating that S. Gorshkov had been promoted to the rank of rear admiral. He was 32 years old.

In October 1941, Rear Admiral S. Gorshkov was assigned as commander of the Azov Flotilla. Flotilla Chief of Staff Captain 3rd Rank A. Sverdlov subsequently recalled: "With the arrival of Sergey Georgiyevich, we all immediately sensed a firm hand. A fresh current flowed into all of our duties."

The Great Patriotic War entered quite a few glorious pages in S. Gorshkov's biography. While constantly participating in engagements of varying significance, the flotilla commander displayed flexibility of thinking, initiative, and independence in everything. During the course of the Kerchenskiy-Feodosiyskiy Assault Landing Operation (December 1941) by flotilla forces under stormy conditions and while experiencing strong enemy resistance, he organized an assault landing (approximately 6,000 men with combat equipment) on the Kerchenskiy Peninsula. This operation permitted disruption of the enemy invasion across the Kerchenskiy Strait to Tamanskiy Peninsula.

During the winter of 1941-1942, reconnaissance and assault elements of flotilla seamen completed more than 80 raids into the enemy rear against a coast occupied by the enemy.

The flotilla commander constantly monitored the operations of the assault elements. He studied Ground Forces manuals and regulations. This subsequently helped S. Gorshkov—during the defense of Tamanskiy Peninsula, while protecting Novorossiysk, while commander of the 47th Army, and while liberating the Crimea and the cities of the Sea of Azov Region.

In April 1944, Rear Admiral S. Gorshkov was assigned commander of the Dunay Military Flotilla. And he used the tested method—surprise—in the new theater and under the new conditions. The assault across Dnestrovskiy Estuary was carried out without artillery preparation and while observing maximum secrecy.

Under conditions of a rapid advance, S.G. Gorshkov and his staff precisely controlled their forces and constantly improved their coordination.

The operations of Dunay Flotilla's task forces and units received a high command rating during the liberation of

Romania and Bulgaria. The name of S.G. Gorshkov is mentioned more than once in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

During the last months of 1944, the flotilla's ships completed 20 tactical assault landings, carried out a river crossing of about one million troops with weapons and equipment, cleared mines from 2,500 km of rivers, and participated in the liberation of Belgrade and Budapest.

In January 1945, Vice Admiral S. Gorshkov was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet as a surface combatant squadron commander.

During those years, many naval service regulations were introduced into the squadron that have been preserved to the current day. An assembly-approach system and a system requiring satisfactory completion of certification examinations to independently command a ship, command department, or area of responsibility entered into practice. It encompassed all categories of seamen—from sailors to ship and task force commanders. For the first time in the Navy, a series of ship utilization tactics were substantiated and conducted in the squadron at that time. It is no coincidence that quite a few prominent military leaders came from the squadron. Among them are Admiral of the Fleet S.M. Lobov and Admirals V.S. Syoyev, V.V. Mikhaylin, V.G. Novikov, and others.

In November 1948, Vice Admiral S.G. Gorshkov was assigned as chief of staff and, in August 1951—Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Each duty level prepared him for that high mission to which he would devote almost thirty years of his life.

In 1956, S.G. Gorshkov became the commander-in-chief of the Navy.

The mid 1950's. The times were hard, complicated, and contradictory. The rapid scientific technical revolution had a direct impact on the role of the Navy and on prospects for equipping it. The increased threat to the USSR from the ocean axes, concentration of the naval forces of the leading imperialist states near our shores, and the unrestrained maritime arms race advanced the question about reliable defense of maritime borders.

Major work began on development of a mighty nuclear missile ocean navy that foreordained a new stage in its development. And here the major role belonged to the commander-in-chief and his views, experience, and intellect. Admiral Gorshkov persistently sought a balance of naval forces, thorough consideration of the experience of the last war and postwar conflicts, the capabilities of a modern level of development of science and technology, strict adherence to Naval missions and force training trends of the probable enemy it faces. The commander-in-chief attached special significance to prediction and scientific substantiation of the future of [Naval] structural development.

At the very highest Party and government levels, extremely contradictory views were being expressed with

regard to the influence of nuclear weapons on the nature of war. One extreme opinion even refuted the possibility of naval operations at sea and subsequently the nation's need for a Navy. Understanding the responsibility that was his fate forced S.G. Gorshkov to act with circumspection and to be extremely restrained in making final decisions.

The difficult position of the new commander-in-chief of the Navy was worsened by the fact that, under the influence of advocates of all possible development of missile weapons that were allegedly capable of replacing all traditional types of weapons, the country's highest leadership decided to eliminate from the Navy not only the majority of obsolete conventional-armaments ships but also bomber, mine-torpedo, and fighter aviation, a large portion of coastal artillery, to eliminate Naval PVO [Air Defense], and the main thing, to dismantle for scrap metal not only all major conventional-armaments ships that were being built but also ships that had actually already been built such as the cruiser Admiral Kornilov that had already undergone state trials.

Sergey Georgiyevich understood the error of this approach and attempted to defend these ships. Later, as Admiral of the Fleet N.D. Sergeyev recalls, while Gorshkov shared his tribulations at that time with Admiral Sergeyev, Gorshkov stated bitterly that although he had sort of convinced the minister of defense in the correctness of his position during his report, the minister of defense did not support Gorshkov in the Government. And this subsequently required a great deal of exertion to restore what had been lost. Although, says Nikolay Dmitriyevich, we also did not get by without S.G. Gorshkov's extremes. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Main Staff, he defended the idea of keeping obsolete M-type submarines in service.

At this time, construction of a large series of sea and ocean diesel submarines was occurring and the development of the leading nuclear submarine was ending. All of this required a fundamental review of the personnel training system, basing, combat training, supply, and many other questions. Unfortunately, we did not succeed in resolving all of these issues in a balanced manner.

Development of the Navy assumed a strictly scientific selection of the design variant of some ship, aircraft weapons systems, and determination of their quantity and optimal distribution throughout the theaters. S.G. Gorshkov personally directed this complicated work.

S.G. Gorshkov's personal contribution was enormous in supplying Naval ships and aircraft with cruise missiles. At that time when serious attention was not attached to this work in the West, he insisted on the development of variously-tasked cruise missiles in our country. As a result, we moved ahead significantly in this area and only subsequent reassessments of the capabilities of this type of weapon caused massive development and introduction of cruise missiles on ships and aircraft in the NATO countries.

We need to particularly point out S.G. Gorshkov's major contribution to the creation, mastery, and development of nuclear submarines, ships on dynamic maintenance principles, aircraft carriers and missile ships, and missile-equipped aircraft.

We can consider that the Ocean Navy was essentially developed in our country by the beginning of the 1970's. The Okean [Ocean] Maneuvers that were conducted in April-May 1970 under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov and in which all fleets and a large number of ships and aircraft accomplished combat training missions on broad areas of the World Ocean, became a demonstration of its capabilities.

The Navy's access to the ocean required radical improvement of command and control of forces, strengthening headquarters, increasing efficiency in their work, and imparting the capability to them to process and analyze the constantly growing stream of information.

We must mention the great deal of work that S.G. Gorshkov performed to reorganize and renew the entire command and control system, both in the fleets and at central headquarters, based on new achievements of science and technology. Automation and formalization of command and control processes were broadly introduced both on ships and in the command post system. At exercises, headquarters personnel were regularly trained to assess the situation, process combat training documents, and rapidly and reliably disseminate missions to subordinate forces.

S.G. Gorshkov created a series of works whose significance to some degree goes beyond the framework of the theory of naval art. He persistently strove to introduce the idea of the ever-growing role of the World Ocean in the life of mankind into the consciousness of his contemporaries. The chapters of his books "Voyenno-Morskoy Flot" [The Navy], "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva" [Sea Power of the State], and "Na strazhe Otchizny" [Guarding the Fatherland] are dedicated to this.

Therefore, we are justified in asserting that S.G. Gorshkov was a proponent of strengthening the naval might of our state in every possible way. Furthermore, he often faced no less authoritative opponents. Thus, he boldly challenged views on the role and place of the Navy that were concentrated in the work "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, whose authors viewed the Navy, according to S.G. Gorshkov's expression, only as "the Soviet Army's helper." Unfortunately, adherents of this opinion also exist today. The admiral consistently proved that this approach deprives the Navy of the prospect of successfully combating a powerful maritime enemy.

The idea of achieving a total balance of the Navy contributed by him from his many years of experience in

guiding the Navy's structural development and substantiation of the prospects of development of all classes of combat ships occupied a large place in his works. He was an ardent advocate of construction of a major nuclear missile submarine force, modern multipurpose submarines, naval aviation, but at the same time knew how to thoroughly substantiate and to defend to the end the requirement to have the required number of cruisers, destroyers, and antisubmarine warfare ship task forces and, of course, aircraft carriers in the Navy.

During the years that coincided with S.G. Gorshkov's activities at the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, we saw profound changes in the military personnel training and educational system. Course training was significantly improved and broadened and teaching the fundamentals of tactics and the operational arts reached a new level and the prestige of the Naval Academy increased.

Having served in the Navy for more than 50 years and knowing its history well, Sergey Georgiyevich jealously regarded the honor and glory of the Navy. The Commander-in-chief constantly stressed: The heroic past of the Navy is the invaluable property that motivates the young generation to fulfill their duty to the Fatherland in an exemplary manner. I myself have become convinced of that more than once, especially based on the example that has a direct relationship to the crew of the nuclear powered submarine that I commanded.

Submarine K-21, commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union N. Lunin, became famous in the Northern Fleet during the war years. This boat had seventeen victories, including the attack of the Fascist Battleship Tirpitz. How happy and proud the seamen were when they learned that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had decided to transfer the K-21's flag to the at that time latest nuclear powered submarine that I was commanding. From the first nautical miles under that famous flag, our crew very acutely acknowledged their responsibility to the Navy's history, to its present and its future.

He remained in the ranks until the last day of his life. The admiral worked hard and productively on the second half of his memoirs in which he wanted to describe the structural development of the Ocean Navy and about those who created it and who mastered the powerful equipment. He did not succeed in revealing this to us but ships—his brainchildren—remained in the fleets and on them serve people—students of S. Gorshkov, who will describe it from the time that their commander, teacher, and—Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov—did not have time to.

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New Assignment, Biographical Notes on Rear Adm Selivanov

90UM0385A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990
(Signed to press 02 Feb 90) p 74

[Biographical notes on Rear Adm A. G. Selivanov]

[Text] He was born on 23 August 1941 in the city of Melitopol in the Zaporozhets Oblast. His father was a construction engineer, and died at the Stalingrad front in 1943. Until he came of age, Aleksandr was raised by the parents of his father in Melitopol. After graduation from secondary school he moved to his mother's in Irkutsk, where he began his working life as a laborer, and later as a laboratory assistant. After serving three years of active military duty in the Pacific Fleet, he entered the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze.

He began his lieutenant's career with Komsomol work, as the assistant chief for Komsomol work in the political section of a guided missile ship unit. Two years later he was assigned to a submarine as the deputy commander for political affairs. Then he worked for almost six years as the deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Pacific Fleet for Komsomol work. From this position he was appointed chief of the political section of a brigade, later a division, of surface ships.

For a year he was the chief of the propaganda section of the Pacific Fleet Political Directorate. From this post he was promoted to the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee while remaining in the Navy. Since 1987 he has been the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Northern Fleet.

In 1977 he was graduated from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin (by correspondence), and later, in 1981, took higher academic courses at this Academy for refresher training and advanced training of senior political personnel.

He is Russian. He became a member of the CPSU in his first year of military school. He was elected a member of the bureau of the CPSU rayon committee, a member of the CPSU oblast committee, a deputy of the kray Councils of People's Deputies, and a delegate to the 17th VLKSM Congress.

He has been awarded the order of the Red Star (1982) and the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd Class (1978).

In 1979 he received the rank of Captain 2nd Rank ahead of his peers, and has been a Rear Admiral since 1988.

He married during his third year of military school. His wife Elena Petrovna is Russian, was born in 1941, and is an engineer-radio physicist. They have two sons. The elder was graduated last year from the same military school as his father, and presently serves at the Lenin-grad Naval Base. He is married and has a one-year-old daughter. The younger son is in the ninth grade.

Lines of a Portrait (Comments from colleagues)

"Possesses good organizational abilities and propagandist qualities. Very highly developed sense of responsibility for his assigned job."

"Industrious and zealous at work. Modest, honest, energetic."

"Principled, cultured, a tactful officer."

From Answers to Questions in the KVS questionnaire

The greatest joy in your life?—A good, strong family, sons who make me proud.

What do you think is slowing perestroika in the Armed Forces?—The unreadiness of leaders at all levels to work under the new conditions, low performance discipline, a non-objective evaluation of the state of affairs.

What do you think of the cases of voluntary withdrawal from the party by communist officers—I am convinced that in such cases the party gains rather than loses. In each specific case, there are serious expenses in selecting and educating communists for the party.

Is there a question to which you have not found the answer?—Indeed, there are many. One of them: how have some "figures", remote from the needs and concerns of the people, managed to achieve recognition, fool the Soviet people, sling mud at them, and remain respected?

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Survivors Interviewed on Lessons of 'Komsomolets' Disaster

90UM0230A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Capt 1st Rank B. Kolyada, Capt 3d Rank S. Dvorov and Capt Lt I. Kalinin by Nikolay Cherkashin: "The Submariners Did Everything They Could..."]

[Text] A group of submariners from the crew of the atomic submarine "Komsomolets", which suffered disaster in April of last year by Bear Island, visited Moscow. Submariners who survived the icy waters of the Norwegian Sea took part in the concluding phase of a government commission's investigation of the causes and circumstances of the atomic submarine's demise.

Our correspondent met with Captain 1st Rank B. Kolyada, who was the senior officer aboard the "Komsomolets", turbine group commander Captain 3d Rank S. Dvorov, and Captain Lieutenant I. Kalinin, an engineer of the sonar group.

Never has there been as much written about a tragedy of our modern navy as there has been about the demise of the "Komsomolets". For the first time in the history of reporting on such disasters, almost the entire truth about

the ship, the people, their heroism and their rescue has been told. Alas, this truth was not believed, because it was told by persons who were no longer trusted—highly placed officials. And it was told in official departmental publications. It was not believed that there was only one reactor aboard the submarine, that it was shut down dependably, that there were no missiles aboard the "Komsomolets", that Norwegian helicopters were unable to save the submariners.... And more. Too long the newspapers had glorified the navy: "ocean-going, missile-carrying, atomic...." In the bad times, which passed not that long ago, the demise of the "Komsomolets" would have been invariably blamed upon the crew. It seems that for the first time in the entire history of our naval disasters not only was the crew of the sunken ship not punished, as had been the common practice, but it was even rewarded, with regard for all of the circumstances of the accident, and for the selflessness with which the seamen fought for the life of the submarine. Nonetheless many questions remain which compel us to return to this terrible but uniquely instructive story.

And so, officers replied to questions from IZVESTIYA.

[Cherkashin] Let's begin with the particular features of the submarine. The "Komsomolets" is an experimental vessel. What does this mean?

[Officers] An experimental vessel is a ship specially equipped and adapted for conducting various tests on new armament and structural units of the hull, and experimental research on propulsion units, propulsive devices and other technical resources at sea. Series-produced ships and vessels are usually refitted for these purposes, while in some cases experimental vessels may be built on the basis of a special design.

This is precisely the class into which the submarine fell. The "Komsomolets" was designed and built as a unique item. It completed its first phase of operation in June 1987. We began the second program of tests of all kinds in August 1988. And it is even more important to say that the "Komsomolets" was conceived and built not as a scientific research submarine but as a warship. Only actual combat service could conclusively confirm this quality of the submarine. This is why it was nominally placed in the "first line"—that is, in a combat formation. In a word, combat operation of experimental submarines is widely practiced in the USA, in France and in England.

The "Komsomolets" was unique not in that its hull was made from titanium, but in that it was capable of submerging to a depth of 1,000 meters and remaining there for a long time—something no submarine can presently do.

[Cherkashin] We know from the documents that the senior officer aboard did not take charge of damage control. What is the reason for such behavior?

[Officers] Had the commander become confused or given the wrong orders, I, as the senior officer on board,

would have been obligated to assume command. But in reality this means stripping the commander of his command, writing down my decision in the ship's log, and acting at my own discretion. There was no need for such actions: Vanin made the right decisions. In any case, ones which came to my mind as well. Therefore my participation in damage control was confined solely to advice.

[Cherkashin] Nonetheless, the crew was subjected to the following reproach: "Can there be any talk of competent actions by the crew when fire destroyed one of the atomic submarine's compartments in the first minute, and another two by the seventh, together with all that were alive in these compartments...?"

[Officers] The fire in compartment seven began with an explosion, and therefore it would be blasphemous to accuse Senior Seaman N. Bukhnikashvili, who died, of not acting in the way he would have in a trainer. He was stunned, he was killed in the very first seconds of the accident. The situation in the adjacent sixth compartment was about the same: Burning oil spilled into it.... We were technically powerless to block the fire's penetration into compartment six. The ship's experimental nature also had its effect in this case. Unfortunately, the emergency situation grew unpredictably, in geometrically increasing proportions. No habits previously learned were of any use: We were forced to make nonstandard decisions.... Anyway, the story of our actions in damage control was published in the open press together with excerpts from the ship's log, in which the actions of the personnel and the ship's command are recorded minute by minute.

[Cherkashin] What sort of preparation did the crew undergo prior to the cruise?

[Officers] "The full circuit," as we say. This means that we prepared for several years for our independent long cruise, we went through the entire course of combat training both at the base and in a special naval training center: we got good and excellent grades on the course projects, and we completed a program of combat exercises in trainers and at sea. It stands to reason that we also practiced different variants of damage control. Unfortunately we were prepared least of all for emergency egress from the ship while surfaced. Our hope was that the rescue rafts and the VSK (surfacing rescue chamber.—N. Ch.) would not let us down in view of the simplicity of their design, and in general that matters would not go that far. High pressure at considerable depth was felt to be the principal adversary.

These were not green recruits that embarked on the cruise. Thirty-three persons of our crew had even participated in ocean cruises before, including aboard the "Komsomolets". Among them were Senior Seaman N. Bukhnikashvili and Warrant Officer Kolotilin. They perished, absorbing the first blows themselves. Part of the crew was in attendance when the ship was accepted from industry, and attentively took in the experience of

operating the machinery from the first crew, without exception. And here is one other important fact: Only two persons were victims of the fire. As a rule, major fires aboard submarines produce by far more saddening statistics.

[Cherkashin] A question often asked is this: Why did you find yourself in the water without individual rescue resources?

[Officers] First of all some of them were damaged by the fire, and some were in hard-to-reach places. Second, some of the gas cylinders on those individual protective resources were expended during damage control in smoke-filled compartments. And finally, the main thing: We went topside not to jump into the water. We had but one goal—to get some air, and meet the tender, which was on its way.

None of us expected the aft compartments to be flooded so quickly, such that the ship's fate was decided in just a few minutes. These fleeting moments were clearly not enough to go below into the compartments and bring up over 50 flotation outfits. The decision to use the rafts was the only one the situation would allow. That the design of the rafts turned out to be so imperfect, that it was so extremely difficult to remove them from their airtight containers, and that they were so easily upset by waves is another matter.

[Cherkashin] On what was your certainty that the submarine could remain afloat for a long time based?

[Officers] First of all on the fact that the fire in the aft compartments was confined and sealed off. The temperature of the forward bulkhead of compartment six was gradually decreasing. The hope appeared that the fire would abate. For practical purposes the submarine was on an even keel until 1600 hours. And this was a sure sign that water was not entering through the hull. And finally, the main thing: We all knew that no submarine in the world has ever sunk in just hours after a fire. Sea water did not penetrate into the compartments through burned-out packing glands for a day, two days and even more.

[Cherkashin] What was the cause of such swift and unexpected penetration of water through the pressure hull?

[Officers] If we only knew! It has already been eight months that a commission consisting of the most prominent specialists has been trying to find an answer to this question.

[Cherkashin] Does the crew have its own explanation?

[Officers] Of course. And not just one. First of all, the metal of the hull might have cracked due to the enormous temperature difference: It was thousands of degrees within the hull, and plus three outside it. Second, titanium may burn at high temperature and high pressure. The hull may have burned through where it joins

with compartment bulkheads. Several other probable causes could be suggested as well.

[Cherkashin] What can you say about the VSK—the surfacing rescue chamber, which one of your former associates described as a “killer chamber”?

[Officers] First of all, this is a highly emotional assessment. What is a VSK? It's a rather spacious egg-shaped capsule with a watertight entrance from below and the same kind of exit above. There are three tiers of seats for all crewmembers around its inside circumference. Its purpose is to deliver the personnel to the surface from a sunken submarine. The chamber can remain afloat for several days. Because its design is the product of the world's collective thinking, today such an apparatus is the most dependable means of rescue from a submarine incapacitated at maximum depth. There is nothing murderous about this chamber. The problem with our VSK was that it was secured very lightly to the hull, and there was a case where it surfaced spontaneously. At that time the company's representatives reinforced the locks, but they overdid it. This is why five men who were in the VSK at the moment the submarine sank were unable to disconnect the chamber in time, and it apparently finally separated spontaneously. But even in this case the chamber surfaced, with the submariners still alive. Three men died because they were poisoned by carbon monoxide that entered the chamber together with smoke and became especially toxic at higher pressure. A fourth was killed when his head struck the edge of the hatch as it was blown open by compressed air. Had the hatch been secured as required, and not hurriedly, by just one of the locks, the chamber might have remained afloat, and saved not one person but at least two.

[Cherkashin] What do you believe to be the main lesson to be learned from the demise of the “Komsomolets”?

[Answer] The tragedy of this submarine lay not so much in the fact that a fire occurred—given all of its severity, we were able to handle it with minimum losses (there are no fireproof submarines in the world, anyway), but in the fact that the country's rescue services were unprepared to pick up men from the surface of the sea in a critical situation. In this case we're not even talking about a difficult task such as rescuing a sunken crew from beneath the water, from the depths. Seamen of any department, passengers, pleasure boat crews and fishermen might have been in our place, after all, and all would have been confronted by the same fate—watching out-of-reach rescue resources disappear, and freezing in icy water. After the sinking of the steamship “Admiral Nakhimov” not that long ago, one could certainly understand how hard it is to rescue people at sea. Understand, and make conclusions.

[Cherkashin] What was the subsequent fate of the crew of the “Komsomolets”?

[Answer] The crew was disbanded in December of last year. To our extreme regret we were scattered among different ships and garrisons. Thus far, hypothermia has

had lasting effects only on Warrant Officer Eduard Kononov. He was given a medical discharge. No matter where destiny might take us, each of us will know and remember—should things suddenly turn bad for us in the sea of life—that we have friends in the world with whom we clung to a raft in the icy hell of arctic seas.

Yemelyanenko Disputes Navy on Komsomolets Sinking

90UM02944 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by A. Yemelyanenko, USSR people's deputy and deputy editor in chief of SOBESEDNIK: “The Undercurrents”]

[Text] Following the dry lines of the TASS report on the loss of the nuclear submarine “Komsomolets” and 42 members of its crew, many central publications carried reports permeated by sorrowful and at the same time heroic pathos. Subsequently, representatives of the Navy command, reserve officers, and active-service submariners took the floor... Different, at times contradictory, points of view on the causes of the emergency were voiced; versions, suppositions, and guesses were born. At the same time, the journalists were showered with rebukes for being incompetent and covering the events in a biased or lopsided manner. There was no dearth of advice and rebukes to our industry and the Navy. The sound of disparate voices in the press which died down at times and then flared up anew reflected the unseen struggle which accompanied the proceedings of the State Commission for investigating the circumstances of the loss of the “Komsomolets.” As reported, the commission was headed by General of the Army D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O. Baklanov, and Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I. Belousov. The commission included the most experienced specialists in the field of designing, building, and operating combat vessels of this class. The task was set to analyze profoundly and comprehensively the direct and indirect causes of the loss of this unique nuclear submarine and, taking into account previous severe accidents, work out measures aimed at improving the entire situation in the submarine fleet.

Industry, the Navy, and specialized design organizations agreed with this approach to the issue. Why then the struggle, misunderstanding, and rebukes? I have been trying to sort out this complex situation for more than half a year now beginning with the day when a phone rang in the editorial office and two naval architects requested a meeting. They would have never brought themselves to do this before because, having dedicated decades to building nuclear-powered vessels, they used to rule out any contact with the press for obvious reasons and became accustomed to reporting their every step to their superiors. They brought themselves to do it at this time, perhaps, believing that they would be able to succeed in telling the entire truth no matter how bitter it

happens to be and, perhaps, also relying on the credentials of the USSR people's deputy which I was handed the day before... This appeal also was a desperate gesture when all previous attempts to prove the obvious turned out futile and resentment boiled over in their souls...

However, resentment is putting it mildly. What develops is real malice and venom deep down. You devote eight years to this vessel beginning with laying it down and to berth and subsequently see trials, you study the layout and all peculiarities of the submarine. After that, you get to see how individual interested parties try to put up a smoke screen by emasculating the essence of work of the State Commission and adjusting its conclusions one way or the other...

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Chuvakin was the commissioning official in charge of this design, and he remembers many details associated with building it and subsequently transferring it to the Navy. Eduard Leonov, the check-out mechanic who went on the trials together with Chuvakin, distinctly remembers the day of berth trials.

"We did not conceal this fact then and now we say openly: There was an emergency—when we were going back we 'lost' the surfacing capsule. It was raised, and the design mistake was eliminated not only in the 'Komsomolets' but also in other submarines equipped with the surfacing capsule. The capsule was tested by an actual surfacing from a submerged position and showed its reliability when used for its immediate function. I did not happen to do it myself but Chuvakin did surface in the surfacing capsule with the test crew..."

Undoubtedly, my interlocutors who started the conversation with this admission were sincere and highly competent. However, both Chuvakin and Leonov who were officially enlisted to work in one of the sections set up by a decision of the State Commission expressed their disagreement with the conclusions proposed by the Navy leadership. Having refused to sign, they outlined their special opinion. The point of view of Chuvakin and Leonov was supported by Deputy Chief Designer D.A. Romanov. In brief, the essence of their demands was to advance the investigation from quasi-admissions to determining the real picture of the development of the accident and actions of the crew in the crisis situation.

They could not by any means agree with the hazy and reassuring wording of the Navy command concerning the fateful, atypical turn of events in the course of this accident, as well as with the statement that the "Komsomolets" was a submarine in a class by itself which was operated on an experimental and trial basis; on top of it, it was taken out to sea by the second crew which does not happen often. In a word, there are no reasons for broad generalizations and any concern for the entire submarine fleet.

Going along with these conclusions meant keeping everything as it is: The system of personnel training for submarine duty which exists in the Navy and is beginning to fail; well-established but inefficient procedures

for the inter-cruise servicing and maintenance of the submarines which are due to the poor technical equipment and low professional standards of the shore technical services; mounting social problems on the bases...

"Signing it under the circumstances means going against your conscience." Having stopped for a moment, Chuvakin said the unexpected: "If the commission does not come to honest and profound conclusions one option will be left—to quit. I will not be able to design submarines anymore..."

Our first conversation turned out to be frank but not long. Several days later, it was to be continued at the office of CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov.

It looked like Oleg Dmitriyevich was waiting for this call. Having found what the issue was, he did not postpone the meeting. Captain First Rank Ye. Selivanov, until recently the commander of a nuclear submarine and currently the chief of a junior submarine specialist training school, was summoned to the Central Committee together with Chuvakin and Leonov. In 1984, there was a fire on Selivanov's submarine. There were fatalities.

Selivanov grilled himself for all of these fatalities more severely than even the strictest investigators, and he has been doing it to this day. How is a fire on a submarine to be prevented and how are the people to be kept safe? Can spontaneous self-ignition be prevented? Why do fires usually occur during the last days of self-contained cruises, before returning to base?

He has studied the literature on the subject, the description of various accidents and fires, and talked to many submarine commanders who have had fires like him... He has sought out the addresses and visited many centers and leading research institutes of fire protection.

They have not particularly interfered with this search by Selivanov but they have not been in a hurry to give him real support either. Perhaps, some people in the command believe that the captain was shielding himself... At any rate, multiple attempts by Yevgeniy Nikolayevich to secure the restoration of his party membership after the criminal charges were dropped have been rebuffed by the Political Administration of the fleet.

He continued his research. Textbooks for the course of general chemistry appeared on his desk. He decided to figure out himself the characteristics of the gas composition of air in compartments because he did not particularly believe the authorities. What should the optimal oxygen content be? What is the role of other components in life-support processes? The "Komsomolets" fire and the loss of the submarine and 42 members of the crew made Selivanov confident that he could not stop at a halfway point. He did not know personally the submariners from Ye. Vanin's crew; however, he graduated from the Higher Officer Course in Leningrad together with the commander of the first crew, Yu. Zelenskiy.

...It so happened that in the office of O.D. Baklanov the naval architects Chuvakin and Leonov and a representative of the Navy, submarine officer Selivanov, turned out to be on the same side of the table. This became symbolic: They spoke from different positions and used different words but with the same common goal in mind: To find the truth in order to actually improve the situation.

Having attentively listened to all arguments and sought details of the facts and calculations brought up in the process, Oleg Dmitriyevich said in summation: We will have to deal with ambitions and have a serious fight. He asked to be prepared for this. "If we do not secure changes in the Navy on the occasion of the 'Komsomolets' we are not worth much..."

We were to meet yet again, but not in Moscow. By that time, an intermediate meeting of the commission had been held, and the results of work of the sections had been reported. Right at the meeting Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov decided to relieve N.I. Burkov, deputy chief of the Navy Search and Rescue Service, of his command which IZVESTIYA reported on 6 August without mentioning his name.

The mentality of popular rumors and that of the supreme command are strikingly similar. The main point is to find a culprit and pin all the blame on him. In the case of the "Komsomolets," the rescue services which could not remove the crew from the vessel in distress at a critical moment were that culprit. The evaluation of the actions of rescuers was harsh but just. However, is the case now closed? Why is the leadership of the Northern Fleet so careful to skirt the issues of crew training, professional education of the personnel, its skill in fighting for the survival of the vessel? After all, this is the root cause of the tragedy rather than the failure of the pilot of a rescue plane to accurately drop airborne life-saving devices that the sailors are not trained to use...

"The sinking of a deep-water submarine from a surface position is so vexing and painful that it is hard to express. This is shameful for us..."

The officers sitting opposite Chuvakin were in no hurry to contradict him. The meeting was well into its fourth hour, and the ashtray was full of butts. However, my interlocutors just could not stop talking. I listened with particular attention to the words of Captain First Rank Zelenskiy, commander of the first crew of the "Komsomolets."

He confirmed: "Commander Vanin's crew took a full course of training, the course which the documents envisage. However, the existing conditions for training are such that, without access to a vessel, second crews cannot train properly on simulators alone, all the more so for a submarine which did not have an analog... In a word, they studied the course but did not develop the skills. This is stool or, as they call it in the fleet, thwart training. I would agree that they knew the documents even better than we did but, pardon me, this knowledge

is not keyed to your fingers. In a situation when you have to act instantaneously, when you get cold feet, your brain does not kick in, your subconscious is operative..." "In here, your soul has to be firm, and fear should not be your advisor."

This is why when the newspapers write that "the submariners did all they could" this is merely a half-truth.

Ye.N. Selivanov joined the conversation: "I remember this statement. However, I would like to refer to something else now: Even at the stage of design, at the stage of building a vessel we should rule out the very possibility of a fire. A system of preventive measures has to be found..."

Chuvakin who was smoking a cigarette next to the window turned around abruptly:

"However, when a fire does happen you've got to know how to fight it. After all, you said yourself that fires on submarines are not our scourge only; the Americans are running into the same problems..."

Given this situation, we should not panic but should rather learn the lessons and draw honest conclusions regardless of whose interests are affected. However, attempts to cover things up quickly are still going strong. Instead of analyzing an accident thoroughly, the Navy tries to forget it as soon as possible; a submarine officer who dared to voice his opinion is branded in a collective letter an incompetent person who has betrayed the interests of the Navy and "is playing up to industry..."

These accusations leveled at the commander of the first crew of the "Komsomolets", Yu.A. Zelenskiy, are testimony to the fact that the officers who have signed the letter have no objective or complete information on the accident.

Selivanov snapped: "A person who cannot understand within a minute what is happening on a submarine has no business serving in the submarine fleet. The main command post of the vessel had at least 15 minutes to localize the fire in Compartment 7. However, the accident alert was sounded with a delay. The personnel did not assume their stations envisaged by the damage control bill in a timely manner, did not seal the compartments, and did not take other primary measures fully which should be executed without orders."

The procrastination which was allowed to occur at the outset predetermined the entire subsequent course of the accident. As the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK reported, the "Komsomolets" was equipped with powder gas generators—a special system which ensures emergency surfacing with propulsion shut down and electric equipment partially shut down. However, the main command post of the submarine gave a different command—to surface with the mechanisms operating.

Furthermore, high-pressure air (VVD) was pumped to blow the stern group of main ballast tanks; in contravention of the manuals, additional pipelines in the compartment on fire were used, and they burst. Their hot walls could not withstand the pressure. High-pressure air burst into the fiery compartment, and created a blast-furnace effect. It was established that pressurization lasted 44 (!) minutes. What kind of pressure control in the compartments and the high-pressure air system could there be? Temperature in the center of the fire rose to between 800 and 1,000 degrees centigrade. Compartment 7 and the tanks adjacent to it lost their sealing, and water burst into the hull...

This is indicated by the appearance of the trim. However, according to entries in the ship's log, due significance was not attached to it at the main command post of the vessel though the trim is noticeable even in pictures taken from a plane at around 1500. A further increase in the trim unavoidably brought about the loss of longitudinal stability of the floating submarine without sea cocks. This fact alone was reason enough to consider the situation of the vessel dangerous, prepare in a timely manner on-board life-saving devices, and order that the submarine be abandoned in an organized manner. However, the command for the personnel to prepare for an evacuation was not given until 1642. The nuclear submarine sank 26 minutes later, the trim by the stern being about 70 degrees, with its shut-down reactor, two torpedoes with nuclear warheads, as well as members of the crew who were left aboard or dead...

This view of the course of the accident is different in principle from the one outlined in the preliminary conclusion of the commission. However, this is the position of professionals who made the words of Socrates "Plato, you are a friend of mine, but the truth is dearer to me" their commandment. At our first meeting, they also made me promise that I would not take advantage of my right as a journalist to publish in the press until all other ways to determine the truth are exhausted.

This request was to be explained to me, to be sure, much later, by Vice Admiral Chernov, deputy chief of the Grechko Naval Academy. He, a most experienced submariner and hero of the Soviet Union, transferred to his teaching post from the position of the commander of a flotilla of submarines—the very flotilla to which the "Komsomolets" belonged. Chernov accepted this new vessel and led the trials himself. At times, he took risks trying to squeeze everything possible out of it; he also sailed as the senior on board during the first deep, 1,000-meter dive...

So, as Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich was leaving one day he said putting his hand on a leather file which was strapped tightly shut:

"In here, all things are called by their own names. If they do not want to see me and listen sympathetically I will still give this report—it is secret—to the commander in chief... There was a time when we sailed on the same

submarine: Chernavin was the commander, and I was the chief mate. It seems we understood each other at the time. I would like to believe that we will understand each other this time."

The conversation took place on 28 December in the Hotel Rossiya in the presence of Yu. Zelenskiy, Zelenskiy, formerly the commander of the "Komsomolets", and currently the chief of staff of a unit, was summoned to Moscow along with Chernov to take part in yet another conference which CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov held. For the first time, we got to see at the same table those who designed the first deep-water submarine, those who built it, those who performed combat service aboard the vessel, and those who were meant to survive the icy hell of the Sea of Norway.

In opening remarks at the conference, the CPSU Central Committee secretary once again asked everyone not to lapse into the defense of only the brand of the plant or the Navy uniform, not to point fingers at each other, and to look for one's own shortcomings first of all. However, the very first speaker, Vice Admiral M.M. Budayev, made it understood that his command did not intend to abandon the position taken. The version stating that the situation on the "Komsomolets" required that the crew perform incompatible actions, that the outcome of the struggle for survival was a foregone conclusion, and the personnel virtually could not do anything was repeated almost verbatim. The speaker said that all other evaluations and points of view are probable in nature and have no bearing on the resulting conclusions and evaluations.

The Central Committee secretary had to interrupt Rear Admiral O. Yerofeyev, a flotilla commander, when he rose up and started making an angry speech against those who, supposedly, disparage the memory of the submariners fallen and still alive through irresponsible statements and publications in the press... Subsequently, rebukes addressed to the designers and shipbuilders started pouring in from the other end of the table: They did not take into account this, did not take care of that, and what came out was not a combat vessel but a collection of flaws... Commanders of nuclear-powered vessels said that, and there was some truth in these words. Design deficiencies and equipment failures are becoming an increasingly frequent factor on submarines; there have been three more accidents in the Northern Fleet since the April tragedy. However, the following is characteristic: The Navy leadership decided not to let the press know about the last one, in December. At issue is an accident on a nuclear submarine which was conducting inert launchings of ballistic missiles. Luckily, there were no fatalities. However, much damage was done to the sea area and adjacent territories.

Besides, how can we do without all kinds of emergencies if boys fresh out of vocational technical schools are sent to serve in the nuclear submarine fleet and on nuclear-powered guided-missile carriers. After all, it is not any

easier to sail on a long independent cruise on a submarine than to go on a space flight—this is no exaggeration, this is what knowledgeable people are saying. However, are the guidelines for the selection of astronaut and submariner candidates comparable? Besides hundreds of first-rate specialists from the Flight Control Center follow the flight of a spaceship which, as a rule, proceeds automatically. Who is going to double-check the skipper of a nuclear-powered vessel who goes with his crew out to sea and performs around-the-clock combat service for several months at a time?

A fleet newspaper asserts in the words of the skipper of a nuclear vessel: "The materiel and weapons of the submarine are as reliable as the people in the compartments in their capacity as specialists and strong-willed individuals." In the fall of last year, a test of the general educational standard of incoming cadet-recruits, high-school graduates, was administered at the junior specialist school which Ye.N. Selivanov commands. Mathematics, physics, and Russian-language assignments at a level of grades six through nine were offered. They were extremely simple; I saw them and solved them myself. I also saw a summary table with grades: They were almost solid "D's..."

Are we going to keep pretending that all is fine?

From the Archives of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA

The tragic date 18 June 1984 intervened between these two pictures.

On that date, a fire broke out on the submarine commanded by Capt. First Rank Selivanov.

Senior Missile Specialist Petty Officer Buyanov of Company 2, who had received a commendation from the commander for his exemplary service the day before was severely burned but survived. Thirteen other members of the crew died in the fire and of asphyxiation.

As a combat unit, the submarine missile carrier was preserved and returned to the base on the surface. However, the commander of the submarine was immediately relieved of his post and expelled from the party. Criminal charges were filed.

Only one persistent request of the commander was honored: to recommend for an award Warrant Officer Khudyakov. He was the one to see to unsuccessful attempts to put out the flames of the burning people, batten down the hatches, and prevent the spread of the fire to the stern compartments.

Open Letter From Former Komsomolets Crew Members

90UM0294B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 4

[Open letter by former "Komsomolets" crew members B. Kolyada, S. Dvorov, I. Kalinin, and A. Kopeyko]

[Text] On 17 December 1989, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published the article "Eight Months Later." As we see it, the interview published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was not objective, and it was written with insufficient competency. It betrays a biased approach not supported by facts which is particularly impermissible in the case of A. Gorbachev, the former commander of a nuclear submarine.

Indeed, the first nuclear-powered submarine [PLA] with a titanium hull was built many years ago. However, it will be quite an exaggeration to describe it as "alive and well" because in 1988 it was withdrawn from the combat assets of the Navy and scrapped. However, the "Komsomolets" was unique due to its ability to dive to a depth of up to 1,000 meters and remain there for a long time, which no PLA of the USSR Navy is capable of doing regardless of the material it is made of.

Indeed, all of us were certain until the last minutes that we would succeed in rescuing the submarine.

We know just as well as Reserve Captain First Rank A. Gorbachev about an accident aboard a Soviet submarine in the sixties, and we did not rule out the possibility of this outcome. In the course of the entire accident, the status of the vessel was evaluated almost continuously.

Undoubtedly, a thorough analysis of the causes of the accident and the course of events has once again raised a number of issues and acute problems for scientists, designers, industry, and the submarine personnel. The personnel of our unit has developed and submitted a set of specific proposals for improvements, changes in the design of many systems and mechanisms, primarily those ensuring the endurance of submarines and enhancement of the quality and reliability of material.

Currently, the development of the accident and actions of the crew in the struggle for endurance are evaluated on the basis of the final result, proceeding from certain initial data. Both the specialists and the journalists proceed from the opposite. In the process, the actual, extraordinarily extreme and contradictory situation that emerged in the damaged compartments of the PLA and on the vessel as a whole is virtually not taken into account.

The absence of a comprehensive system for evaluating the situation in the damaged compartment on the basis of objective data on the vessel, especially in the event the personnel are absent or incapacitated, initially made it impossible to evaluate the situation in the damaged compartment.

The loss of control of some systems and equipment and means of propulsion of the vessel from central consoles and disabled communications with the damaged compartments brought about the deterioration of the situation on the vessel.

Putting it mildly, the assertions by Comrade A. Gorbachev concerning the standard of crew training are

far-fetched. We took a full course of combat training, prepared for several years for our independent "big" cruise, studied at the Navy Training Center, passed course tests with good and excellent grades, and performed combat exercises.

Our training was carried out in complete compliance with guiding documents. Naturally, we worked on the issues of struggle for endurance, we checked life rafts. However, due to their design deficiencies they did not perform their rescue functions. We also tested the surfacing capsule in advance.

The personnel carefully studied the system operation experiences of the first crew.

Just because we were on our first extended cruise does not testify to our poor training.

Comrade Gorbachev also knows full well that, regardless of training, a senior who has extended-cruise experience always accompanies the commander on the first cruise. This is why the deputy commander of the unit was on board the vessel.

Indeed, it does happen in real life that crews have to be put together within days. However, Comrade A. Gorbachev knows full well that, first, this is due to acute necessity (sudden illness, family affairs); second, such cases are very rare.

In summation, we would like to say that we did not intend to make a statement in our press prior to the completion of the work of the government commission. However, the publication in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, which was prepared without profound expertise, on the tragedy of the PLA "Komsomolets" and the heroic (we are not afraid of this word) death of our comrades made us uneasy.

We are compelled to state with bitterness that the notions of military duty, dignity, honor, and loyalty to the Motherland are disappearing from the vocabulary of journalists. We would like to ask V. Yunisov: "Who needs this article and why write it when the government commission was still establishing the cause of the accident?"

[Signed] On behalf of the surviving crew members of the submarine "Komsomolets", B. Kolyada, S. Dvorov, I. Kalinin, A. Poyko

Hydrographic Unit Undermanned

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
in Russian No 3, Feb 1990 (Signed to press
02 Feb 90) p 16

[Letter to the editors and responses: "What If the Seaman Had Not Written?"]

[Text]

First Letter

Dear Editors! I am a seaman in compulsory service with the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet. I am 19 years old. I am from Moscow Oblast. The group to which I am assigned performs navigational and hydrographic work. Personnel strength is at less than the 50-percent level. With the situation being so, we stand watch every second day.

I realize that the oath I took states that it is necessary for the serviceman to face all the hardships of military service. Nevertheless, I cannot understand why we must do everything but receive combat and political training. I am ashamed of being a permanent orderly, one who knows nothing about weapons or equipment. I am even not speaking of our everyday living conditions: no showers, sewage facilities, or heat, even though we are located in a city. We could do much on our own if we only had the means to do so.

Seaman D. Alekseyev

Second Letter

This is to inform you that Seaman D. Alekseyev's letter has been considered. The problems he cites are judged to be worthy of consideration. New arrivals have made it possible to effect some reduction in demands placed on service personnel relative to assignment to various details. However, it is still not possible to bring the unit up to full strength. The problem will be taken up in 1990.

With regard to living conditions, we report that there are two summer type showers and a boiler room; local resources are being utilized to install a permanent hot water shower. The difficulty relative to providing normal sewage facilities, heat, and repair of the barracks is associated with a shortage of funds and materials, and with the fact that the local rayispolkom has denied permission for hookup to the district heating plant bordering on the unit's premises due to the fear that this may cause a drop in steam and water pressure in nearby buildings.

The problem of unit facilities cited in Seaman D. Alekseyev's letter will be taken up during the planning of material and technical provisioning of the hydrographic service this year.

E. Chukhrayev, First deputy chief, Political Directorate,
Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet

Third Letter

Dear Editors! In my first letter I told you about my serving in a hydrographic service group. I thank you for your reply and your willingness to consider the problems. However, I do not know why you forwarded the letter to the Pacific Ocean Fleet. From the Political Directorate it was forwarded to the Political Section, then to our group commander. That was all. So much for perestroika.

Seaman D. Alekseyev

From the editors: A reading of the above correspondence does not indicate why Seaman D. Alekseyev continues to be dissatisfied. Is it because his letter was treated as if it were a boomerang, winding up at the place of its origin? The measures that were taken as a result of the letter?

We—and we believe readers of Seaman Alekseyev's letter—are both gladdened and dismayed. We are gladdened by the forthright and spirited attitude the man displays toward service in the Navy and his profound sense of military duty. On the other hand, we are dismayed at the fact that Naval authorities took up the problems brought forth by Comrade Alekseyev only after he had written his letter. Had he not taken up a pen and written to the editors, would there have been a change in the situation?

We remark in passing that Comrade Alekseyev's fellow servicemen will hardly be comforted by Comrade E. Chukhrayev's stating that in the unit there are two **summer type showers, with a hot water shower** only now being installed!

Another point. Why are the unit's provisioning problems to be "taken up in the planning this year"? Under discussion here are problems that affect the everyday life and activity of people that should be resolved as soon as possible. This determines people's frame of mind, their attitude toward the service, and, finally, the level of combat readiness. Lastly, why were these problems not considered previously? Will they be taken up in other units? Or will this be a case where officials will prefer to wait until another seaman gathers the courage to write the editors?

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Maj Gen Melkonov on Need to Improve Armenian Civil Defense

90UM0241A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
17 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen L. Melkonov, chief of staff of Armenian SSR Civil Defense: "Strengthening Civil Defense"]

[Text] Perestroyka has embraced all aspects of our life. Noticeable changes have also been seen in civil defense. In recent years, especially following the Chernobyl tragedy, attention to civil defense has increased. Ministry, department, industrial enterprise and institution executives organizing production are addressing problems associated with supporting civil defense in areas under their jurisdiction more and more frequently. Civil defense plans consisting of the entire complex of measures applicable to both wartime, in the event of the enemy's use of modern weapons, and peacetime, to protect the population in natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes, have been written.

In our republic this work has taken on an objective character following the tragic earthquake of 7 December 1988. Together with civil defense staffs and the participation of active trade union and Komsomol members and other public organizations, party and soviet organs have directed their efforts into practical matters and begun dealing directly with the moral, political and psychological training of the people, and with preparing them for practical action in the face of accidents, catastrophes, earthquakes and other natural disasters. The leadership's attitude toward the concerns of paramilitary formations has changed noticeably.

At the initiative of the Armenian Komsomol Central Committee and with the active assistance of the Armenian SSR Civil Defense Headquarters, an Armenian rescue operations service is being created with the purpose of providing timely and effective assistance to victims and conducting emergency rescue operations in natural disasters and accidents, and doing jobs for the national economy in extreme conditions. This service's subunits will be equipped with modern search and rescue resources.

The tragic experience of Armenia graphically demonstrated how costly it is to be unprepared for such events. In this connection the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to create a national quick response service as soon as possible; this will significantly increase readiness and mobility in rescue and emergency work.

Civil defense chiefs and staffs of the cities of Leninakan and Kirovakan and of Sovetskiy and imeni 26 Komissary rayons of the city of Yerevan have already improved their work significantly. Executives of the ministries of communication, health, culture and motor transport, of the Academy of Sciences and of the Armenian Civil Defense Administration have started devoting greater attention to civil defense problems.

Active participation of many subunits and paramilitary formations in earthquake recovery also indicates that there has been some success in restructuring civil defense. By as early as the last hours of 7 December paramilitary formations with a total numerical strength of 11,000 persons and 1,200 units of various equipment were conducting rescue operations in the disaster zone.

Actions of subunits of the republic's Ministry of Health deserve attention. The disaster did not catch them unawares. Literally 20 minutes after the earthquake, without waiting for orders from above, the first columns of emergency rescue vehicles set off for Leninakan, Kirovakan, Spitak and other regions in the disaster zone. In just the first days, thousands of human lives were saved through the efforts of the republic's medical personnel.

Unfortunately there are also examples of another sort. Some executives think about civil defense measures only when drawing up their quarterly or annual reports to higher authorities, or they delegate all of the work of this important mission to the civil defense chief of staff, forgetting that they are the civil defense leaders, and that they bear full responsibility for the status of civil defense. This is typical of the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services, the Main Administration of Consumer Services and a number of other departments, cities and rayons.

In just seconds, dozens of cities and towns in the republic's north were transformed into ruins, and thousands of people were trapped in collapsed housing. This was a time for efficiently initiating reconnaissance and rescue operations, but many executives simply lost self-control and were therefore unable to fully comprehend the situation in the first hours, and naturally it was difficult for them to make the right decisions. Unfortunately, paramilitary formations found themselves unprepared for action in extreme conditions at a number of the capital's major enterprises, even though they were described as being fully prepared in the reports of civil defense chiefs. Most civil defense formations possessed outdated and frequently unprepared equipment, their skills in conducting rescue operations were poor, and they were insufficiently mobile, which naturally caused additional losses in the population. Attempts at coming to the assistance of victims in organized and timely fashion ended unsuccessfully for many of them. In the best case volunteer detachments were created in place of the paramilitary formations, but their actions were not always very effective due to the absence of the needed equipment. For the sake of justice it must be said that some volunteer detachments, the core of which consisted of personnel from paramilitary formations, acted selflessly, and they were of considerable help. Thus, a large volunteer detachment from Megrinskiy Rayon (the republic's most remote rayon) arrived in Leninakan by late 8 December with its equipment—three cranes, one excavator, eight dump trucks, and nine trucks of food. The detachment was led by Karchevanskiy Sovkhoz

director David Matevosyan. The detachment was credited with saving several lives, including that of 10-year-old Gegam Agadzhanian, who was extracted from concrete rubble on the third day after the earthquake.

The attitude of the executives of some rural rayons toward the problems of civil defense, and especially toward regular civil defense workers, elicits alarm. Ararat Oganessian took charge of the civil defense headquarters of Gukasyanskiy Rayon just a year ago, and naturally he did not have very much practical experience. The rayon's executives, and particularly rayon executive committee chairman A. Sarkisyan, did not provide him with the help he needed. Moreover when a permanent recovery headquarters was established in the rayon following the earthquake, they forgot to include the rayon civil defense chief of staff in it, even though he was the head of the working organ of the permanent emergency services commission back before the earthquake. With such an attitude toward the effort, we could hardly restructure the work of civil defense such that it could perform its functions of protecting the population at the needed moment in natural disasters.

The problem of publicizing civil defense and teaching the population what to do in emergencies has not been fully solved in the republic's rural rayons. Executive committee chairmen, who are simultaneously the rayon civil defense chiefs, did not devote adequate attention to this work and did not utilize mass media available in the rayons for this purpose. And yet, it does not take much effort and resources to publicize civil defense in a rural rayon, and it does not involve sizable material outlays. To solve the problem it would be sufficient to draw up a simple joint plan with the participation of the rayon civil defense chief of staff, the editor of the rayon newspaper and the radio broadcasting director. Monthly radio broadcasts and articles in the rayon newspaper could provide considerable support to preparing the population for civil defense functions both in peacetime and in wartime.

As far as preparing civil defense for wartime is concerned, engineering structures (bomb and radiation shelters) and individual protective resources are the principal means of protecting the population in war. Accumulation of a fund of protective structures requires considerable material outlays. Unfortunately, many protective structures are not prepared to accommodate people because executives of national economic facilities have an irresponsible attitude toward their maintenance. There are executives with a careless attitude toward storing and safeguarding individual protective resources and other civil defense property.

As the saying goes, we learn from our mistakes. That would be all right if the cost of the mistakes were small, but what about when a mistake costs tens of thousands of human lives and billions of rubles? How do we solve the problem, how do we act in emergencies without mistakes? The solution can be found in that same old

training, but it has to be constant, planned and purposeful training. It must be organized by enterprise and institution executives jointly with civil defense headquarters.

We need to set things up in such a way that all enterprises and institutions, including cooperatives, the number of which is increasing with every day in the overall balance of the national economy, would make whatever contribution to nationwide defensive measures that is within their means.

In this connection there is a need for dwelling briefly on the principal missions of civil defense. Their spectrum is extremely broad, and it is diverse both in volume and content on one hand, and in purpose on the other. They may be divided into three groups in terms of the goals toward which they are directed. First of all there is protecting the population from mass destruction weapons, increasing the stability of the function of sectors and facilities of the national economy in wartime, training and preparing forces and resources, conducting rescue and emergency recovery operations in centers of natural disaster, and providing assistance to casualties. Providing timely, dependable warnings to the public in regard to an impending danger is another priority mission of civil defense. The success of the matter depends to a significant degree on how efficiently and completely the people are informed of a situation. The mass media need to play a major role here. They must know that what people need the most in any accident, catastrophe or natural disaster is efficient, competent and dependable information that would allow them to come to grips with the situation, and behave competently and reasonably in it.

As a rule, lack of information and absence of elementary knowledge result in unjustified and untimely decisions which must then be paid for dearly.

As we can see, the missions of civil defense are legion, and it is our responsibility to carry them out. We have a certain amount of experience in doing so: Just in 1988 we were subjected to two serious trials—first the accident at Spandaryanskoye Reservoir, and then the terrible tragedy in December in the republic's north. Moreover many blue and white collar workers and executives, including regular civil defense staff workers, have worked and are presently working in the area around the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Uniting the efforts of all party and soviet organs, the trade unions and the Komsomol, DOSAAF and the Red Cross, and other public organizations, and directing their efforts at unconditionally fulfilling the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government concerning reinforcement of civil defense are the tasks that must be carried out today. So that tomorrow our carelessness would not result in new tragedies.

Discussion of Underground Civil Defense Construction

90UM0272A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (Signed to press 11 Dec 89) pp 34-35

[Article by Yu. Kammerer, N. Dunayevskiy, and V. Shcherbakov: "Underground Construction"]

[Text] It is technically possible, economically feasible, and vitally necessary. It holds the future, the authors of this article believe.

The Memory of the Fiery Years

The subway was of great importance in the life of Moscow during the Great Patriotic War. Its percentage in urban transport increased from 14.3 percent in 1940 to 34.3 percent in 1945.

During the first half-year, 13.2 million people took shelter from enemy bombings under the reliable arches of the stations and tunnels, adapted as massive bomb shelters.

Do many know that:

—at 4:30 on 27 June 1947, exit traffic light No 65 at "Kirovskaya" Station was disconnected, and it was ordered "christened," the General Staff began working here;

—the total length of the flooring of plank panels reached 36.5 km, and 80 folding walkways were installed; 3,800 children's cots and 4,600 trestle-beds were brought to 22 stations. And now at some stations, if you look closely, you can still see at the end of the platforms concrete ledges or metal supports for scaffolds and gangways, over which Muscovites went down into the tunnels;

—about 70,000 residents received medical aid in the subway bomb shelter. About 300 medical volunteers were on duty every evening. During the air-raid warnings, 217 babies were born in the subway stations in specially equipped rooms;

—concerts by instructors and graduate students of the Moscow Conservatory were organized every other day at "Arbatskaya" Station. Performances were given by the Beethoven Quartet, D. Oistrakh, L. Oborin, G. Ginzburg, and others;

—a reading hall, which operated from 19:00 to 24:00, was set up at "Kurskaya" Station, which at night sheltered up to 40,000 women, elderly, and children;

—at 19:15 on 6 November 1941, a ceremonial session devoted to the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution began its work at "Mayakovskaya" Station.

Dear reader, when you find yourself at "Mayakovskaya" Station and stand still, enraptured in the tall station hall formed by two rows of columns sparkling with strips of stainless steel set in dark-gray marble and red rhodonite,

look at the domes of more than 30 ovals of mosaic panels made from sketches of the outstanding master A. Devnaka. But the Moscow Subway (mem V.I. Lenin) can take pride in more than just the marble splendor of the stations. Decisions emerged under its arches that anticipated our great victory. It provided a reliable refuge for millions of Muscovites in the hours of terrible ordeals, when the fate of Moscow, the homeland, and the people was being decided.

The rapid development of cities poses a number of complex problems for builders: How, in the current city conditions, to provide the required, constantly increasing level of comfort for the population, resolve transportation problems, and more rationally use land that is expensive and in short supply. One of the ways of solving them is to develop underground construction. As the wealth of foreign and domestic experience indicates, virtually everything that does not need natural lighting for normal functioning can be placed underground. Moreover, the ground is a reliable element of protection, therefore, much of what is built underground can be used for civil defense.

The underground space has been widely used for a long time in foreign practice. For example, the 11-level system under La Defense Square in Paris, the crowded trade street in Tokyo, the Central Train Station in Warsaw, the 1400-car parking garage under Lake Geneva, and many other structures are quite effective. We have learned from the press about the underground construction of refuges and shelters for the population, hospitals, storage of food and fuel, and other civil defense structures in the United States, Sweden, Norway, the FRG, and other countries.

The history of developing underground space goes back to ancient times. Recently discovered underground tunnels from the Kremlin to the Moscow River and to the Pashkov Home, where the tsar's court was then located, date back to the times of Ivan the Terrible. The white-stone tunnels, one meter wide and taller than a man, are well-preserved today. And in subsequent centuries underground construction in Moscow and in other ancient cities of Russia did not stand still.

Underground structures played a significant role during the Great Patriotic War. When the war began, mass construction of refuges and shelters began, particularly in Moscow and Leningrad. All deepened structures were registered, since the durable basements of many old buildings could withstand the load from the collapse of the upper floors. In weaker structures, the floors over the basements were reinforced with wooden and metal structures. Shelters were equipped, as a rule, in two stages: first, protective measures against the shock wave and collapse (bombing) were envisioned; then, sealing and filtration and ventilation measures.

They had to protect not only the people, but also the most important equipment at defense installations and

national economic facilities supporting the vital activities of cities, for example, water supply and electrical power stations. To do this, they built traverse walls, flooring, or welded construction members over work positions.

The postwar experience of underground construction also provides quite a few examples of successful space-planning decisions. Thus, underground reinforced concrete frames, the cavities of which are used for production, cultural and welfare, and other purposes, became the foundations of all tall buildings adorning Moscow. The complex of residential houses in the Lebed Microrayon on Leningrad Highway combined with a 300-car underground parking garage was an original design. We should also mention the capital's residential area of Chertanovo-Severnoye, where parking garages for 3,500 vehicles, engineering equipment for the buildings, and subsidiary facilities of stores are located underground.

The underground space in Yerevan and Tbilisi is used on a wide scale, where underground complexes used as their back-ups have been created under the central squares. In Yerevan, for example, it links pedestrian traffic with the subway entrance. Here they have found room for a movie theater, exhibition and lecture halls, discotheques and amusements, an ice cream parlor....

However, if we turn to the experience of recent years, we must sadly admit that underground construction as a whole sharply lags behind the requirements of cities. In the pursuit of illusory economy, builders have virtually abandoned building basements under school buildings and residential houses. Most of them are being built without basement floors, which could be used for economic and production needs and for protection.

And here is what is strange. It seems everyone recognizes that it is advisable and even necessary to more widely develop the underground space of cities, but underground construction itself is proceeding extremely slowly. Just what is the matter?

One of the main reasons, we believe, lies in the fact that the builder has received and receives the land for nothing, and he has no incentive to conserve it. In capitalist countries the land is private property and costs a pretty penny. For example, recalculated in our money, one hectare of land costs 16 million rubles in Paris, 30 million in London, and 70 million in New York.

In Moscow in 1988, the decision was also made to charge a fee for land allocated for building. The price for one hectare of land is quite unreal and varies from R1 million on the outskirts to 5.2 million at the center. The fee, also being introduced in other cities of the country, it seems will force builders to use the land more productively.

Planners are also not very concerned about conserving land: its value is not taken into account in projects, since

the value of one square or cubic meter of a planned building or complex serves as the main indicator

Another reason is the outdated fireproof and sanitation standards, which require, say, construction of an individual isolated exit from each tier of an underground parking garage. But overseas they build underground parking for motor vehicles in 12-16 floors.

In the United States, more than 1.5 million school students study in underground classrooms. This is harmless to their health (there is an artificial climate and no drafts), and their progress is higher. Our health and education agencies are afraid even to put school cloak-rooms underground.

The lack of standards documents has also hampered the use of underground space in Moscow. They have now been approved by the Moscow Soviet and have been implemented beginning in 1987. The standards call for building underground tiers under most of the buildings and structures.

The most important and complicated work is in production zones, particularly in those being newly formed. In the past they were established according to the "estate" principle: each enterprise has its own territory and its own infrastructure (engineering service lines, water treatment works, heat networks, roads, and so forth). For the most part, this has resulted in a chaotic development of the zones. With an extremely low density of the territory, industrial zones occupy a vast area—one-fourth of all the city land!

A decisive transition to the strengthening and cooperation of small enterprises and to locating them in common multistoried buildings and complexes with the same servicing units would make it possible not only to conserve significant land areas, but also to obtain a variety of convenient protective structures for civil defense needs. The first realistic plans of buildings and structures with underground floors confirm their high effectiveness. The Mospromproyekt Institute, for example, called for construction of a 96-vehicle garage under a first aid building. Thanks to this, the cost of a vehicle parking place will decrease by 1,100 rubles.

Overall, construction of parking garages is one of the important and promising directions in developing underground space. Of the 600,000 motor vehicles "registered" in the city, only one-half have a permanent place for storage, and only one-fourth have garages. As a rule, trucks and passenger transports "spend the night" under the open sky. Nevertheless, the time is not far off when the capital's motor vehicle fleet will pass the one million mark. So it is necessary today to think about how to resolve this problem, of course, using foreign and domestic experience. As world experience indicates, underground parking garages can be built at the expense of the vehicle owners.

Underground structures, we believe, are feasible in all multistoried buildings. Facilities are also needed for

work with the population (clubs, discotheques, gymnasiums, various workshops, and so forth), as is done in the GDR, for example, and for parking garages and many other purposes.

The subway creates ideal conditions for civil defense. Its tunnels penetrate the underground space of the capital in all directions. Plan studies and foreign experience confirm that the underground space above subway structures can be effectively used for motor vehicle parking and warehouses.

Moscow ranks near the top in the world in the number of underground passageways. There are more than 300. Millions of people use them each day. But that is precisely why we should call attention to the significant shortcomings permitted during their construction. Practically all the passageways, even developed and complex ones such as under Nogin, Dzerzhinskiy, and Komsomolsk squares, perform one, purely transportation task—they provide passage for a calculated amount of pedestrian traffic. Now this is not enough. The underground passageways, particularly under the main streets and squares, should provide accommodations for trade in consumer goods and for facilities of information and the service sector.

It is feasible to use underground levels even under structures with a small area, such as a central heating station, a transformer station, or a building for cultural and welfare services. In essence, there is not a single sector of the city economy in which locating various facilities underground would not promise more rational use of land areas and more compact and convenient space-planning decisions.

Modern construction technology makes it possible to obtain facilities for practically any purpose and any level of comfort underground. But to do this, it is necessary to prepare enterprises of the construction industry accordingly and supply them with special machinery and equipment. Finally, we must develop and put into production new building designs and new construction technology, and pay very serious attention to the layout of the waterproofing of underground structures, particularly those intended for civil defense purposes.

Developing underground space and forming in it a developed and stable infrastructure—this is an objective requirement of city planning, corresponding to the intensification of development of the national economy and civil defense. The potential protective properties of underground structures can be increased with comparatively small additional costs, and, if necessary, the premises can be used both for protecting the population and for sheltering stocks of food, medicines, medical equipment, rescue equipment, and other important physical assets. They may prove to be very needed during natural disasters, catastrophes, and accidents.

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"Patriot", "Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

Kirghiz Council of Ministers Discusses 1989 Civil Defense

90UM0266:1 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col A. Ladin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Elements Will Not Wait"]

[Text] A discussion of the results of civil defense work in the republic last year took place in the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers.

These facts were cited: 19,861 sources of mud flows, about 100 lakes in danger of rupturing, about 662 mud ponds, and 770 areas of avalanche formation have been discovered on the territory of Kirghizia. A considerable portion of Kirghizia is located in the 7- to 9-point seismic zone.

Department chief Col V. Naumov, deputy chief of staff of civil defense for the Kirghiz SSR, told a KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that last year civil defense agencies, in close cooperation with the republic commission for emergencies, implemented a set of measures reducing the material and human losses from natural disasters. Fifteen specific inspections were made from the air of inaccessible mountainous regions, with aerial photography of moving glaciers hanging on the slopes and of snow accumulations filling the high-elevation depressions with water. The operational chart of the forecast situation for the entire republic has been updated.

A local system for notifying the population in areas most susceptible to the effects of natural disasters has also been put into operation. Radio stations and television networks are connected to it, and loudspeaker equipment has been deployed. Today more than 400 stations, posts, and laboratories continually monitor atmospheric changes, the behavior of the glaciers and high-altitude reservoirs, and the seismic vibrations of the earth's crust.

Does all this guarantee rapid assistance during a natural disaster? Not completely. Thus, last fall, as a result of heavy downpours, mud and rock slides made a lot of trouble on one section of the Frunze-Osh highway. Public and personal transport suffered, and people died. The road was blocked for 26 km. More than 50 people found themselves cut off from the outside world. Traffic on the highway was restored in three days through the efforts of territorial civil defense formations.

The mobility and technical equipment of civil defense subunits remain low. They began creating a special rescue detachment back last year, in which all tasks would be performed by professionals. But so far they have not even determined how many people are to be in it or its structure.

These and other issues, it was stated at the meeting, require swift and fundamental measures

Ukrainian Defense Industry Official on State of Conversion

90UM0237A Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 52, Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with Vasilii Dmitriyevich Kryuchkov, head of the Defense Industry Section of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, by *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* special correspondents S. Bik and V. Shloma, Kiev: "In the Bastions of Conversion"]

[Text]

[Correspondents] Tell us, Vasilii Dmitriyevich, is there a single agency directing the conversion in the republic?

[Kryuchkov] No, unfortunately. The USSR Supreme Soviet has not yet adopted a state program for conversion of the defense industry in the republic—nor, apparently, in the nation—and this process is proceeding as a mixture of random and sometimes spontaneous elements. The conversion came into being at a time when a 5-year plan was in effect and annual programs had been established. Add to this the fact that as of this year all enterprises in the defense branches have gone over to economic accountability and self-financing, and you can understand the difficulties which these collectives have to surmount.

Particular responsibility fell upon the party committees of plants and production associations in this situation. It is very important right now for everyone not to dissipate the high-quality labor capability built up over the decades, to define the priorities correctly and organize effective retraining for the workers. It goes without saying that the workers in our section and the defense industry sections of the party obkoms are attempting to exert their party influence upon the course of the conversion through the Communists.

[Correspondents] The idea is developing in public opinion that the "defense people" need only to restructure, and the shortage of goods will begin rapidly disappearing. Such opinions have been expressed also by people's deputies of the USSR. How much basis is there for these attitudes?

[Kryuchkov] Indeed, a trend involving a simplistic approach to the problem can be seen not just in individual speeches and articles in certain newspapers and magazines. In general, the opinion is taking shape that the conversion is a panacea for all our troubles, and if we also sharply reduce the space programs.... This position is in great "vogue" today. This is precisely why, in my opinion, it is important to have a competent opinion and considered assessments, and not unsubstantiated promises.

Now I would like to discuss the problem of the priorities on which the state conversion program must be based.

The first thing one should bear in mind is the fact that such defense industry branches as aviation, space and missiles—and others as well—whose products are comparable and sometimes even superior to corresponding foreign items are capable of competing in the world market not just with modern aircraft and missile systems, but also with the intellectual capability accumulated during their development and production.

The Ruslan aircraft, developed by the Design Bureau imeni O.K. Antonov, for example, is well known throughout the world. Five years ago it was determined that this aircraft surpasses similar Western aircraft in its cargo capacity. Our designers succeeded in developing a package of modeling programs which made it possible to optimize the aircraft's specifications and performance characteristics most effectively. According to Western aircraft builders and scientists, no Western company will be able to build such an aircraft in this century.

The greatest thing which the Design Bureau imeni O.K. Antonov has yet accomplished, however, was to obtain authorization to form the Ruslan commercial transport firm to fill orders from Aeroflot and Western companies. Naturally, with such world-renowned air carriers as the *Mriya*, *Ruslan* and the AN-74, advantageous agreements can be concluded. All the more, since advertising came along at the right time. I refer to the unique transport operation of delivering the *Buran* spacecraft from Baykonur to Kiev and then to France to take part in the international aerospace display at Le Bourget.

Such deals are essential in international relations, of course. But should this trend be considered crucial for effective participation in the conversion program by organizations such as the Design Bureau imeni O.K. Antonov? It seems to me that these jobs would be better left to Aeroflot. The design bureau specialists should do their own job, develop intellectual capability ahead of Western companies and develop a new generation of machines, which will always be in demand and command a considerable price. This route will make it possible to sell expensive, science-intensive products and earn currency with which we can acquire everything needed for the civilian branches and the consumer market.

Moving on, it is possible today to use the capacities freed by reducing the production of military equipment for manufacturing products similar to defense items in their technology. The nation's civil aviation is experiencing a shortage of economical and comfortable passenger liners for medium and long hauls and the fishing fleet needs large and small seiners. This is the direction in which we need to develop the work of the design bureaus and the aviation and ship-building plants. And while producing modern passenger aircraft for ourselves and providing our own airlines with them, we can simultaneously think about exporting the new aircraft abroad. This will reduce the outlays required and make it possible to achieve a return more rapidly.

In addition, we must make maximum use of the technological and material foundation already available in the defense branches of industry. A quite recent example is the display and sales fair held in Moscow in mid-November, where trade organizations sold components of the medium-range missiles being eliminated. Power units for automation and control disappeared literally within hours. This is understandable, because the items are distinguished by original design, good quality, reliability and compactness. A considerable list of such products could be compiled.

An even more pressing matter is the transfer of progressive technology, new materials, computer equipment and software, diagnostic, monitoring and testing equipment to the nation's economy. This is an untouched area of the work, and we are only beginning timidly to turn over the virgin soil. I believe that it would not be a bad idea to place some things onto a planned foundation.

[Correspondents] Behind these examples, Vasilii Dmitriyevich, there is obviously a very complex problem: how to avoid taking a superficial approach to conversion and dissipating that intellectual and production capability which have always distinguished the collectives of the defense industry enterprises. Will we not begin driving nails with an "electronic hammer..."?

[Kryuchkov] That is just the point. And as we answer those questions being raised for us by the national economy today, in my opinion, we must not spread ourselves too thin and expend our efforts on "patching over holes." It is very important "not to scatter" the advanced industrial capability and ultimately lose the specialists and traditions.

I believe that at the current stage the forces of the defense complex should focus on the resolution of those problems which are beyond the capability of other industrial branches. This needs to be done in order to eliminate our export dependency in the area of household electronic and other complex household equipment, medical equipment and equipment for the food industry. Our republic has already developed special programs for specific types of goods—personal computers, tape recorders and color television sets, for example. Inter-branch consortia and associations are being set up to implement them.

The collectives in the defense branches have begun working harder to develop modern, high-quality medical equipment. The Association imeni S.P. Korolev, the Mayak, Monolit and Kvant associations, the Saturn Scientific Research Institute and others have already begun regular production of "artificial kidney" machines, electrocardiological and ultrasonic instruments and pacemakers. A decision was adopted literally the other day to set up the production of disposable hypodermic needles at plants of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building located in the republic.

The Arsenal [plant] in Kiev has developed a new mirror camera with world-class technical features. Preparations for its mass production are presently underway.

We already have specific proposals for the manufacture of fundamentally new types of "peacetime" products at defense industry enterprises. The designers of missile and space equipment, for example, are vigorously developing wind-driven power units with a capacity of 100 to 1,000 kilowatts. Experimental models are almost completed for testing. The wind-driven power units will not take the place of nuclear-power plants, of course, but as ecologically clean sources of energy they can play a significant role in the Crimea and other regions.

Or take the Tochmash plant at Donetsk. Its team has found itself in an extremely difficult situation because of the drop in special orders. Thanks to the vigorous mobilizing work of the party committee and management, however, it has rapidly set up the production of shut-off devices of stainless steel for the dairy industry and drilling tool joints for the petroleum and gas industry and is setting up the production of small spin dryers for laundering.

I would point out, however, that far from all of the collectives are restructuring so rapidly. It is apparently not easy to get rid of the old mentality of having a permanent and guaranteed client and consumer in the USSR Ministry of Defense. I would cite just one example in this category: the Zavod imeni Malyshev production association at Kharkov. It has an experienced team of workers and a strong design bureau. In general, it has everything it needs to have begun the production of equipment for the agricultural tenant long ago. The mass production of mini-tractors has been discussed for three years but it is not planned to begin producing them until next year. Furthermore, the team of workers there is capable of rapidly developing and placing into production a large number of the small diesel engines so needed in agriculture and even by anyone with a personal plot of land.

[Correspondents] And what is the situation with enterprises of the former Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry turned over to the defense industry? This was actually one of the first special projects of the conversion, after all.

[Kryuchkov] As you know, the condition of those plants was simply lamentable. All of them are presently in the stage of technical retooling. A fairly large number of difficulties are involved. The main one is the shortage of construction capacities in many areas of the republic. Things are moving along, however. We have not managed to avoid a certain kind of errors, to be sure. When the Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry was broken up, for example, plants performing the same job of producing canning lines, for example, went to different departments of the defense complex. And there was no coordination on the part of the

agroindustrial complex. What was the result? The modernized plants are beginning to produce equipment for the meat and dairy industries, but they have no real concept of how much equipment is needed in the nation and in individual regions.

Another example: Some farms in the Ukraine are already obtaining corn yields of up to 100 quintals per hectare. What kind of combine is needed to harvest this kind of crop? No one can say. I believe that the clients should adopt the operating methodology of the defense branches and work out long-range, scientifically based programs—as is done for the development of new types of military equipment, for example. Things will simply not progress without the necessary forecasting and proper coordination. We shall waste funds and time. In "peacetime" production this is called "marketing," a word no less fashionable than "conversion."

In conclusion, I want to return to the matter with which we began our interview. The republic has a large industrial capability, and I do not believe there is justification for counting on the center to resolve all the issues. In order to resolve all the problems which arise, with flexibility and concern, we need to have a single agency for controlling the conversion process under the Council of Ministers of the Ukraine. It should have its own rights and authority and have direct access to the State Military Industry Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers.

And naturally, we must accelerate the development and adoption of a unified conversion program for the entire nation, with the priorities thoroughly worked out. We need to proceed on the basis of a triune mission: to preserve and develop the scientific and technological level of the defense industry and to maintain the principle of prudent adequacy for the nation's defense capability while reducing the armed forces and actively influencing the civilian branches of industry and the state of the consumer market.

Interview on Defense Industrial Department of Council of Ministers

90UM0237B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 25, Dec 89 pp 6-7

[Interview with S.G. Guchmazov, department head, by V. Lvov, under the rubric "The Military-Industrial Complex and the Society": "Defense: Substantiation and Correctness of Decisions"]

[Text] **National defense.... It is both our shield and our burden. Responsibility for the decisions adopted and for their political, economic and social consequences is particularly valuable. The Section for Defense Branches and Administrative Agencies of the Administration of Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers has an important role in the complex system of preparing these decisions. Today we discuss for the first time this subdivision of the government apparatus. Department chief S.G. Guchmazov answers questions from the editors.**

We introduce the interviewee:

An Ossetian, he was born in 1936. He graduated from the Moscow Air Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze. He is a candidate of economic sciences and a member of the CPSU.

He has worked in scientific research organizations of the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR and the Ministry of General Machine Building of the USSR. He worked in the USSR Gosplan from 1969, as a department deputy chief and then chief. Since 1987 he has been in charge of the Department for Defense Branches and Administrative Agencies of the Administration of Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Lvov] Soslan Grigoryevich, to use the military terminology to which you are accustomed, what do the strategy and tactics consist of?

[Guchmazov] Practically all matters requiring a decision at the government level and affecting the defense branches of industry and the Union ministries of defense, internal affairs, communications and civil aviation go through our department. The department constantly studies the situation in these areas, identifies definitive trends and attempts to understand and forecast them. This analytical principle is presently undergoing active development in our work and constitutes its strategy. An in-depth, objective and comprehensive study of issues and thorough calculation of the economic, social and political consequences of adopting specific decisions are required of the government apparatus today. The important and complex projects which the department is called upon to prepare include such projects as the state conversion plan, specifying the levels of outlays on defense, the social and economic development of the defense complex, and others.

Leading specialists from various branches, prominent scientists, entire research collectives, ministries and departments are participating in their development, of course. The department's job, however, is to weigh dispassionately all the pros and cons, to assess these projects and objectively inform the government when submitting them for its decision. The substantiation of our proposals perhaps constitutes the department's area of strategic responsibility.

Describing the tactics of the department's work, I would define my demands this way: to perform competently, with initiative and objectivity. After all, success in strategy is achieved in life by constantly reviewing specific issues, the number of which is rarely less than 250 per month for the department.

[Lvov] The State Commission for Military Industrial Matters of the USSR Council of Ministers is among the government's permanent agencies. How are that commission's functions delineated from those of your department?

[Guchmazov] We work in close contact with the State Commission for Military Industrial Matters of the USSR Council of Ministers. But our functions differ, of course. The State Commission is the government agency for controlling the defense branches. Its work focuses mainly on the nation's military-industrial complex, which it manages. Unlike the State Commission, our department does not manage the complex. From this standpoint we do not interfere in the affairs of defense branches—and we do not have the authority to do so. As applicable to the defense industry, our task is one of objectively evaluating the performance of the complex and matters submitted for a decision of the government. These can be military or civilian programs, plans for development of the branches, the development of new equipment and the structure of management agencies, economic and other matters.

[Lvov] Today, when there is debate about the role of centralized planning, it is useful to remember that it has fully justified itself in defense matters. How is the planning system set up in the defense complex? How do Soviet military programs come into being?

[Guchmazov] Unlike the civilian area, a system of special program planning was introduced in the defense complex at the end of the '60s. The objectives and the tasks involved in the development of the nation's Armed Forces and their equipment were specified for a period of up to 10 years, based on the military doctrine and other factors. Based on this and taking into account what we already had in our arsenal and how the capability of a likely enemy would develop, we arrived at the qualitative (tactical and technical) specifications for the development of weapons and military equipment and assessed how realistic it would be to achieve them with the specific scientific, technical and production capabilities of Soviet industry. We also estimated the resources necessary for achieving these goals.

The next stage was the compilation of draft weapons programs for 10 years (revised every five years), in which we specified all of the basic types and models of weapons and military equipment which had to be developed and tested, their production mastered and delivery made to the forces. For each item included in a program we defined its characteristics and the stages of its development, the resources needed and the target dates.

Only after that, based on the special, balanced programs, did we break them down by branches (the "portfolio of orders") and work out 5-year and yearly plans for scientific research and experimental design work, production and delivery and construction of the industrial capacities.

Incidentally, some people have the mistaken impression that there was no ceiling on expenditures for implementing military programs. Perhaps there were sometimes too many of them and they were beyond the capabilities of the national economy, but rigid ceilings were always set for them.

It is in fact a very centralized system. Its merit lies in the fact that the client, the developer and the appropriate planning, financing and management agencies take part in putting together the "portfolio of orders" from the very earliest stages (from the inception of the concept of the model itself). Also of fundamental importance is the fact that the new equipment produced in the defense complex is monitored throughout its life cycle in the program, from the rough draft to the first mass-produced specimen delivered to the client's arsenal. Practically all significant military models travel this route, whether it be fighters or strategic aircraft, ships, tanks, radar stations and so forth. All of them first came into being in the weapons programs in the form of assignments for the development of rough drafts and "travel" a long route within the programs to their first flights and tests and their adoption into the arsenal. Furthermore, the specimen is constantly within the realm of control and is personally monitored by the client, the developer and the manufacturer at all stages.

Today, with the advancement of the economic reform and the extensive development of the conversion, we too have to make certain adjustments in this system, to be sure. But that is a different matter.

[Lvov] How do you regard the process of declassification underway in the defense area?

[Guchmazov] It is a normal thing. I like the principle of prudent sufficiency. It should operate also in matters of secrecy. When the matter first affected me personally (I was working in the USSR Gosplan at the time), I was in fact against it. It seemed to me that the actual amount of outlays on defense differed so greatly from foreign assessments that we would not be believed in any case. I was affected even more by the fact that, judging from figures published abroad, the NATO military specialists had erred significantly in calculating our defense outlays, not just in the total amount but also in their actual structure. To us specialists this meant that their sources of information were unreliable and their models imperfect. By announcing the actual figures for our military budget, we would enable them to correct both to some degree.

This was a professional reaction, so to speak, and I did not conceal it. Later came the understanding that revealing our military budget was an important step in the process of democratization and glasnost and another demonstration of trust in our people. And trust obligates both him who trusts and him who is trusted. I have now become convinced both as a specialist and as a human being that the decision to declassify the Soviet military budget was a correct one. It removed many barriers.

We declassified outlays on space programs, for example, and many things were immediately cleared up. In the first place, people learned that these outlays were not so inordinate after all. In the second place, both we and the entire world saw, understood and believed that our results, technologies and solutions are achievements on

the world level. In the third place, the declassification is enabling us to a significant degree to eliminate our "internal COCOM," to apply the discoveries, inventions and technologies of the "space industry" in the national economy.

I repeat, however, that although positively disposed toward the process of declassification, I am for prudent sufficiency in its implementation. Precisely that, prudent.

[Lvov] The Armed Forces exist to perform defense missions. With their large material and technical capability, however, they unquestionably assist the national economy. How is this assistance rendered?

[Guchmazov] The army has offered the national economy equipment and other goods worth half a billion rubles during the past year alone. The military numbers were replaced by civilian ones on 7,000 motor vehicles, for example, 370 tanks were converted for national economic purposes and more than 3,000 tanks are now at plants for dismantling. All of this is taking place as part of the current reduction of the Armed Forces, which is proceeding strictly according to schedule—even ahead of schedule in certain respects. It should be noted, incidentally, that the army is sacredly carrying out all the decisions on this matter.

Here is another example. The military transport aviation has joined in the hauling of national economic cargo in accordance with a government decree. Since VESTNIK has already written about it, I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to establish the truth and say that the idea of enlisting the military transport aviation for this purpose came from the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at whose personal assignment the USSR Ministry of Defense and our department began working out the matter. More than one conference was conducted with D.T. Yazov, and the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and individual scientific institutes and design bureaus were involved. There were numerous questions, opinions and arguments, but only slightly more than two weeks was enough to weigh everything and prepare the draft decision. Now we have the first results. Since April of this year An-124, Il-76, An-22 and An-12 aircraft have made almost 950 trips and hauled more than 25,000 tons of cargo. Among other things, the military pilots have been of great assistance in the delivery of fruits and vegetables to the capital and to remote areas of the nation. They have also delivered more than 11,500 tons of cargo on 366 paid international flights. In short, a large and promising undertaking is underway as a result of the new approach.

Repair plants of the Ministry of Defense are also increasing the output of consumer goods. Their products—garden dwellings, garages, spare parts and sports equipment—are in great demand. A total of 160 million rubles worth was produced this year, and 300 million rubles will be produced in 1990.

[Lvov] The idea of establishing a professional army has frequently been proposed of late at various levels—both in the press and by the people's deputies. What do you think of this?

[Guchmazov] Let us consider just the economic aspect of the matter. Calculations have been made for the different versions. In general, the conclusion is obvious. A professional army, even one theoretically reduced by half, would be significantly more expensive.

Think about it: Would a professional soldier serve for R 7 a month? Clearly, he would not. One must also consider the fact that this would require an appropriate increase in the pay of warrant officers and officers.

The service term for a professional soldier would obviously also have to be longer. And his load, both physically and on his nerves, would be greater. This means that the living and personal conditions would have to be different. He would have to be fed better and clothed better and more attractively. And this means additional expenses.... It would also be necessary essentially to organize anew the entire system of professional training for such an army and establish a large and ramified training system.

In short, establishing a professional army would require funds which I believe we simply do not have, given the current situation of the economy.

[Lvov] The concept of "conversion" has become firmly established in the lexicon of the restructuring. A great deal is being said and written about it, linking great expectations to it. How do you assess its possibilities?

[Guchmazov] Looking at the problem from the standpoint of the economy and the organization of production, the task is a very complex one and we cannot count on an immediate return. We have operating production facilities, and we need to decide what items to take out of production and write off the losses, what products to continue turning out and, finally, what new products to begin producing. The enterprise (shop or section) will need to be redesigned for their production and retooled, after ordering the proper equipment. The planning institutes calculate that one and a half to three years will be required for this stage alone. That is, the respecialization of production requires considerable time and outlays.

We should therefore not expect an immediate effect from the conversion. It requires considerable funds in the first phase. The switching of a part of military production onto civilian rails is a complex and expensive undertaking with a large number of social and economic consequences, and I believe that the outlays for this undertaking will be commensurate in the first stages with the total reduction of outlays for defense.

An important problem of the conversion is how not to waste but to preserve the large scientific and technological capability of the defense branches and the high level of technology and discipline. This is of fundamental

importance for all enterprises in the complex producing military equipment, but particularly for those possessing the secrets of producing aviation and space equipment, optical, computer and radar equipment, and so forth. It would be extremely foolish, even criminal, to convert them to the production of products at "yesterday's level" of complexity.

I believe that the problem of converting a part of the large capability of the experimental design and scientific research organizations in the defense complex is a separate and no less complex problem. We must not permit the level of the development work to drop or the valuable cadres to lose their skills. Their capabilities need to be focused on advanced areas of scientific and technological progress, assigning them, let us say, the task of working on the problems of artificial intelligence and having an informed society, creating fundamentally new communication systems and developing new civilian aircraft, ships, vessels, equipment, engines, motor vehicles and household electronic equipment at the world level.

Relying on the achievements and the intellectual treasure of the defense complex, we have an opportunity to make a leap forward in the highest-priority areas of scientific and technological progress. We must not miss this opportunity. I believe that it is clear to everyone today that Soviet military equipment is strong and competitive because intelligence is embodied in it. The corresponding "intellectual strength" of our civilian products and consumer goods is considerably lower. This is in some ways the fault of us "defense people." The conversion is designed to reduce this gap. If we succeed in doing this, the conversion will justify itself.

Defense-Industrial Open Meeting on Conversion

90UM0237C Vilnyus SOVETSKAYA LITVA
in Russian 5 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by Yu. Tyun, APN, under the rubric "The Restructuring in Action": "The Conversion Does Not Need Secrecy"]

[Text] The subject of discussion at the session of the State Commission for Military Industrial Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers was about how the conversion program adopted in 1987 is being carried out. This was the commission's first session attended by journalists. Minister of General Machine Building O. Shishkin (the branches producing missiles), however, took the floor and expressed doubts that their presence was necessary. I. Belousov, deputy head of government and chairman of the State Commission, stressed the fact that contact with journalists is simply essential, that it should help with the resolution of practical conversion matters. This was an extremely characteristic dialog for an understanding of the processes occurring in our nation.

One could judge from the speeches by many session participants how much harm is caused by excessive secrecy and the absence of open information. For

example, the chief designer for one of the military plants, which was assigned the task of setting up the production of equipment for processing silk cocoons, said that it had taken them a long time to find the basic data for the design work. After they had produced a unit operating on high-frequency current, they learned that equipment for processing cocoons was already available in Uzbekistan and had been operating since 1983. To the honor of the defense designers, the unit produced by them turned out to be far more efficient. This incident graphically demonstrated how harmful excessive secrecy is to the development of technology and the economy as a whole. Conversion involves, among other things, extensive utilization of glasnost and enlistment of the mass media to see that no more such "blank spots" remain.

A total of 176 enterprises which previously produced purely military products are operating for peaceful purposes in the Soviet defense complex today. Next year the number will reach 233. Within the Ministry of the Defense Industry alone 56 enterprises and 45 scientific research institutes and design bureaus are producing equipment for processing agricultural raw materials. A total of around 30,000 workers are engaged in this work.

When I heard these figures I recalled how matters of conversion were discussed 10-15 years ago at many international meetings. The Soviet delegates fervently supported the idea. In their speeches, however, they referred to data provided by Western experts, primarily American, who cited precise computations for possible scales of conversion in their nations. Our turn finally came. The convention of total secrecy is being destroyed. The approval of the composition of the government by the USSR Supreme Soviet was an important phase of the process. It was openly stated there for the first time what ministry handles what, including those under the jurisdiction of the State Commission for Military Industrial Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, the existence of which was also announced for the first time.

This does not mean, of course, that military production is being totally curtailed. The job of maintaining the defense capability continues both in the USSR and in every other nation, and no one plans to abolish secrecy in this area. The principle of prudent sufficiency is gradually advancing also in the area of secrecy, however.

The lifting of unjustified limitations on freedom of information is essential, among other things, for the development of international business relations of enterprises participating in the conversion. We know, for example, that we lack many types of equipment and technology for producing consumer goods. At the same time, it was explained at the commission session that a number of defense enterprises are producing equipment, including equipment for processing agricultural raw materials, which measure up to world standards and can compete well in the foreign market. By selling it we can obtain funds for purchasing the equipment we need. As a result of this new business approach implementation of

the conversion program is becoming one of the important elements in the USSR's more active involvement in world economic relations and in the international division of labor.

Not everything is yet proceeding smoothly in the implementation of the measures outlined. In addition to overcoming the purely technical complexities, we must also have a certain mental reorientation and the elimination of stereotypes which have existed for decades, including stereotypes in defining priorities. The important thing, however, is that the conversion has begun and is gradually gaining strength. This is of practical importance both for the resolution of our economic problems and for an overall improvement of the international climate.

Interview With Chief of Metrology Service

90UM02164 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Popov, Chief of the USSR Armed Forces Metrology Service, by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dolgikh: "The 'Sore Spots' of Military Metrology"]

[Text]

[Popov] I am not about to bore you with age-old truths and lengthy definitions. Let me simply note that metrology is the science of measurements, of the methods and resources of achieving their unity, and of the means of obtaining the required accuracy. We achieve this by transmitting the dimensions of physical variables from military standards by way of standard measuring resources to working and special measuring resources, and from them, directly to the armament and combat equipment. Why do we go through all of this?

It would be sufficient to say that a one degree error in measuring the fuel temperature of some tactical rockets may result in large launching errors, a three decibel inaccuracy in measuring the power of a tactical-level radar transmitter can cause an error of several kilometers in range determination, an insignificant decrease in a generator's calibration signal could reduce the range of detection of airborne targets by 15 percent, just a 0.1 percent error in setting the frequency of communication radio stations will disrupt alphanumeric communication, and an inaccuracy of one-hundredth of a microsecond in fixing the position of long-range missiles (of ground and onboard apparatus) reduces the accuracy of a hit by several hundred meters.

As you can see, our science is a serious one. And according to today's yardsticks, an extremely necessary one. Including to combat readiness.

[Dolgikh] Yes, the success of contemporary metrology is impressive. Especially what we see of it in exhibitions. It is more a miracle than technology. But in what way are these "miracles" being introduced into the daily life of the troops?

[Popov] Not without problems. It will not be until the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan that we will receive the necessary quantity of third and fourth generation measuring instruments, ones which can provide high precision in the harsh working conditions of the field. This equipment is used not only to automate the taking of measurements and information processing on the basis of complex algorithms, but it will also monitor its own units—that is, it will be capable of self-verification.

The second direction in instrument making which is presently developing in response to our orders is functional-modular design of measuring resources. Assume for example that we need to measure a frequency. We hook together the appropriate module, and measure the frequency; assume we need to measure power. We hook together the appropriate module, take the measurement and so on. That is, we would have a general-purpose measuring resource.

What will this give us? The present pool of special instruments in the troops consists of several million items. And each requires testing by a special approach. This naturally makes the work more difficult. With the introduction of the above-mentioned equipment, the pool of special instruments will decrease and become unified, which will reduce the volume of verification jobs and raise accuracy.

The troops need to have metrological work done today right in the places of permanent deployment. And this would require mobile automated laboratories possessing the measuring equipment. We already have such equipment today, and it is operating successfully.

[Dolgikh] All of this is of course encouraging. But we do know that accidents and disasters, unsuccessful missile launchings and so on still occur. Do metrologists feel a share of responsibility for such events?

[Popov] Without a doubt. Because the metrologist is within the chain of participants who prepare equipment and armament for combat use. But is he always in a position to decisively influence the end result? The fact is that this equipment and armament is repaired and serviced by those who operate it—that is, privates and seamen, under the supervision of their commanders. In this case they sometimes fail to utilize measuring instruments—of which there is a sufficient supply in the troops, I might add—when they tune or test a particular piece of equipment. They simply lack the knowledge and the habits. As a result technical service is often carried out poorly, not in the full volume, which results in a decrease in the effectiveness of the armament, and so on. Every officer, every member of a crew or team must have a knowledge of metrology.

[Dolgikh] Today, in other words, the issue of universal metrological competency must be raised on par with the requirement for universal computer competency.

[Popov] Precisely so.

[Dolgikh] What do you see as metrological competency?

[Popov] To be brief, a person taking measurements or assessing the effectiveness of armament which he operates must know how to account for all possible errors. And he must understand how they influence the results of particular tasks.

[Dolgikh] That is, he should work as an analyst.

[Popov] Precisely. But it sometimes happens today that certain servicemen work like robots. Let's assume that such a serviceman is told to maintain some particular parameter. He picks out an instrument (the right one, if we are lucky), and measures it. Readings appear. But now they must be evaluated—that is, the serviceman must understand whether or not they correspond to the tolerances which the designer initially imposed on this parameter.

[Dolgikh] How often does it happen that the metrological instruments that are employed are less accurate than is required by modern combat equipment? After all, the rate at which the latest high-precision equipment is entering the troops has grown.

[Popov] There is no problem here for the moment. We are trying to forecast the development of technology. For example, the superhigh-frequency range of electronic armament is constantly changing. Before, our stations worked in the megahertz range, and then they went up to the gigahertz range. But long before the advent of the latest equipment we ordered instruments from industry permitting us to measure superhigh-frequency parameters in an even wider range.

[Dolgikh] Let me ask in this connection: What is the training level of our engineers, in your opinion? After all, the bulk of the military schools graduate specialists of precisely these qualifications.

[Popov] The problem is precisely that engineers do not have a working knowledge of metrology. We are especially alarmed by the state of affairs in the navy and in the ground forces. Were the training of specialists to remain at the present level, the possibility is not at all excluded that in 10-15 years, when our present lieutenants who had not learned the principles of military metrology become lieutenant colonels and colonels, they will be unable to ensure the high combat readiness of armament and equipment.

A firing practice was recently held by a certain tank unit. The results were very low. Why? Recall how the combat readiness of a tank is sometimes checked by certain deputy commanders for armament. They look the tracks over: No rust—that's good. The kit of spare parts, tools and accessories is in its place. The keys? Also in their place. Excellent—the tank is combat ready. They almost never check out the tank radio sets: their power, sensitivity, deviation. Even though they have all of the resources for doing so. That is the way the technical

condition of a combat vehicle is assessed. But that's an outdated way of doing things.

[Dolgikh] But what if, for example, we increase the manning of the metrological service. Would this solve the problem?

[Popov] You will never be able to assign one individual to each instrument, to each unit of combat equipment. There is but one solution—to teach the people. We have already proposed introducing metrology as a separate, mandatory subject in the commander training system on several occasions.

An official specialist is extremely necessary in every unit, aboard every ship. There is of course a metrologist at the division level, one having a divisional measuring equipment shop at his disposal, plus a warrant officer and a private, but this is extremely meager. Would he really be capable of testing all of the formation's diverse equipment? No. Sometimes we hear the suggestion that unofficial specialists should be trained. But this is absurd. Would anyone ever really consider giving orders to train, for example, unofficial physicians, if they are lacking in numbers as well?

[Dolgikh] What rights does a metrologist possess today? He is, after all, obligated to maintain surveillance over the quality of equipment and armament maintenance and repair.

[Popov] He does not possess any serious rights at the moment. An order is now being written which will possibly grant him a certain amount of power. In particular, the power to stop maintenance and repair of equipment and armament if metrological rules or military standards are violated, the power to reduce proficiency ratings, and to deprive blue and white collar workers of their bonuses.

Metrological expert examination prior to introduction of a new model of equipment is an important problem today. Such examination makes it possible to subsequently reduce the number of measurements significantly, which ultimately means a 15-20 percent decrease in operating costs. For example, if an airplane costs a million rubles, 20 percent would be 200,000. Now that's a real savings.

Incidentally, metrological expert examination must be carried out by special groups, but they have been disbanded in a number of main and central client directorates.

[Dolgikh] Are you saying that while we are dreaming of enlarging the service, it's being reduced?

[Popov] Yes. And the fault lies both with the executives of these directorates and with metrologists who possess neither knowledge, nor rights, nor initiative.

In a word, we have many problems. And solution of most of them is hindered quite simply by ignorance of the value of metrology on the part of certain executives. I

feel that this situation has now become a hindrance to reinforcement of the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

Continued Discussion of Military Freight Transport

90UM0216B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article: "So Is There an Alternative to the Existing System of Safeguarding and Escorting Military Freight?"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has discussed problems associated with the organization of military transport on several occasions. This was the topic of discussion in the articles "Suffering on the Road" (29 March 1988), "Dead Ends of the 'Green Street'" (7 May 1989) and others. One of the acute problems of improving the present system of safeguarding and escorting military freight was also touched upon in an article by Major-General (Reserve) V. Tkachenko, "There Is an Alternative....", published 12 September of last year.

Lieutenant-General Yu. Vorontsov, Chief of the Central Directorate of Military Transport of the USSR Ministry of Defense, responded to the article:

"Major-General (Reserve) V. Tkachenko presented his own alternative for the system for safeguarding and escorting military freight on 12 September 1989 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and he accused the leadership of the TsUP VOSO [Central Directorate of Military Transport] of subjectivism and prejudice.

"Things are in fact so. Comrade Tkachenko's proposal was attentively examined and discussed back in 1985. A response to Comrade Tkachenko's work was received from the Ministry of Railways on 12 May 1985.

"In the unanimous opinion of the chiefs of district military communications services on the railways, and of Comrade V. Maltsev, Directorate Chief of the Ministry of Railways, the system developed by Comrade Tkachenko is unpromising and unrealistic. It is a serious hindrance to operation of railroad stations in connection with the significant increase in idle time of transportation at bottleneck stations—from three to eight days, instead of the normal five hours.

"There are now 117 special guard cars on the country's rail net. They are being utilized intensively, and they are not destined to idleness, as Comrade Tkachenko believes.

"Effective measures are being implemented to improve personal, material and technical support to guards and to improving the entire system of organizing, safeguarding and escorting freight on the railroads.

"I feel that it would be suitable to simultaneously publish alternative viewpoints in the newspaper, so as not to evoke sharply negative opinions from specialist officers

and railroaders concerning the articles it publishes, such as the ambitious article by Comrade V. F. Tkachenko."

We will leave the irritatingly pedantic tone of the article to the conscience of the author of this response to the editor. However, we can in no way agree with the conclusion that Comrade V. F. Tkachenko's article elicits only "sharply negative opinions." Nor are we persuaded by the other, more-detailed arguments contained in Lieutenant-General Yu. Vorontsov's article, also received by the editor's office. As an example here is what Major-General A. Ratnikov, acting chief of one of the directorates of the General Staff, writes.

"Tkachenko's proposal for combining separate military trains on the same route helps to reduce the number of allocated guards. His proposal was partially reflected in a new statute on safeguarding and escorting military freight carried by rail and water transport, drafted jointly with the Central Directorate of Military Transport."

RSFSR civil defense chief of staff Lieutenant-General B. Perfilov also agrees with this opinion. "I read the article in the newspaper, and decided to state my own opinion," he writes. "In 1983-1987 I served as chief of staff of the Ural Military District. In the district we had several occasions to implement Major-General V. Tkachenko's proposal for organizing military traffic. Life made it necessary for us to do so. The separate battalion tasked to escort military freight could not allocate the needed quantity of guards. Over a thousand guards had to be detailed out of the troops in a single year. The guard cars (baggage cars essentially) used in the district only made the problem worse.

"As follows from the article, the problems have still not been solved. Now that I am at a new position, I have become convinced that V. Tkachenko's proposal has acquired even greater urgency. Cases in Arzamas, Sverdlovsk and other places where I took a direct part in correcting the consequences confirm this. In my opinion the proposed system will produce an economic impact, and it will make it possible to improve the conditions of and control over military freight traffic."

Here is one other opinion from Colonel Yu. Kirsanov, candidate of military sciences, senior instructor of the Military Academy of the General Staff, and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission on Transportation Problems:

"Major-General (Reserve) Tkachenko's proposal deserves attention. What he suggests is combining, as an experiment, military trains together with escorting guards as early as while en route to the principal routes, and at specially designated 'key' stations, and raising the responsibility of the military districts for safeguarding military trains traveling both within the district and outside the district, and providing full support to escorting guards.

"What would this do? First of all the demand for the number of guards to escort military freight and for cars

for them would decrease, which is of course important. In addition, the objective of bringing the military trains together and subjecting them to 'stepped' routing is to increase en-route (daily) train speeds, and consequently reduce freight delivery time. It would be easier to monitor the guard service and support its work. Not everything in Tkachenko's proposal is undebatable, but it does contain sensible things as well."

At the editor's request, Major-General (Reserve) V. Tkachenko submitted figures for the savings on warming cars and, correspondingly, guards.

These figures cannot be ignored; they were arrived at by a highly qualified specialist. Major-General Tkachenko headed the district's military transport service for seven years, and he served for a long time as chief of one of the directorates of the TsUP VOSO. One could hardly call his article "ambitious." The author, after all, is proposing an alternative, and he is in no way transgressing upon the authority of opponents.

In these times of perestroika, alternative proposals are especially valuable and important, all the more so if they are based on a desire to improve the state of affairs in the given area. They deserve something different from what Major-General (Reserve) V. Tkachenko's proposal encountered in the Central Directorate of Military Transport.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Conversion Blamed for Arms 'Black Market'

90UM0269A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Feb 90 pp 1, 4

["Commentary" by A. Dyatlov: "The Tanks Did Not Pass"]

[Text] As we have already reported, a train carrying 12 tanks and guarded by two civilians arrived in the port of Novorossiysk on 22 December. The recipient of the shipment was not military: The interdepartmental state-cooperative concern "ANT." Cooperative tanks?!

The news was startling: Its gist was too frightening—combat vehicles were snatched from under the control of the state and were traveling around the country under the "protection" of two workers from Uralvagonzavod [Ural Railroad Car Plant]. How?! Where to?!

The story is strange, improbable even for our unpredictable time. It was a mixture of everything: Negligence of the economic managers and the laudable aspirations of their enterprises for economic independence, a craving for money and a fascination with big names and generals' ranks, and meaningful innuendoes from "above..." The USSR Council of Ministers studied all of the facts of this affair.

As TASS reported yesterday, on 29 January the USSR Council of Ministers examined the circumstances

relating to the participation of a number of officials in this affair. The meeting was conducted by N.I. Ryzhkov.

The interbranch state-cooperative concern "ANT" was created for purposes that are a priority today for the development of our society: With its participation, it was contemplated activating efforts and broadening capabilities to saturate the consumer market with high demand consumer goods, including making use of privileges and implementing barter operations. Of course, within the framework of the law.

However, the concern took the path of illegal actions and deception of the state. The evidence of this is an extraordinary event with tanks... The first and decisive step in ensuring the concealment of this illegal operation, it was emphasized at the meeting, was taken by V.K. Dovgan, general director of the scientific production association [NPO] "Vzlet" of the USSR Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry], who assisted in the acquisition of tanks by the concern, and who was counting on receiving part of the profit from the deal for the NPO. V.S. Seryakov, the general director of a defense plant, approached the question on the sale of the tanks absolutely irresponsibly. Senior workers in the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry also did not take the necessary measures.

Also demonstrating an intolerable lack of principles were officials of the Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry]—the co-founder of the concern "ANT," which granted "ANT" the right to conduct export-import operations on its behalf. An unforgivable lack of concern was also shown by some officials of the USSR Minoborony [Ministry of Defense] who did not stop the train.

It was observed at the meeting that unconscientious persons from "ANT," in violation of existing procedures for commercial transactions with military equipment, exploited instructions relating to granting the concern a number of privileges in buying up products cheap and selling dear; the instructions were signed, according to representations of senior workers of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers, by V.K. Gusev, deputy to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

For gross violations of legislation in force concerning the export of arms and military equipment and the approval of the illegal charter of "ANT," which was the basis for the illegal operations of the concern; A.G. Bratukhin, first deputy minister of the aviation industry, was discharged from his position. Also discharged was V.K. Dovgan, general director of "Vzlet."

It was noted that V.S. Seryakov, general director of the production association Uralvagonzavod of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, also deserves being discharged from his position. But taking into account the fact that he has been in the position of general director only a few months, he was severely reprimanded. Also severely reprimanded were USSR Minister of the Aviation Industry A.S. Systov, USSR Minister of the

Defense Industry B.M. Belousov, USSR Minister of the Radio Industry V.I. Shimko, Deputy Minister of the Defense Industry M.A. Zakharov; Yu.A. Pekshev, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Relations Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; the first deputy chief of the department of this commission, V.S. Grinev; and others who to some extent participated in the illegal activity of "ANT."

Our Commentary

It is not necessary to open secret safes to convince oneself that our country, like many others, sells arms abroad. For example, these are just published data (unfortunately, they are not from the USSR Ministry of Defense, but from Swedish economists who are handling similar problems): Of the total of more than \$30 billion of world shipments of basic systems of conventional weapons, our country's share comes to about one-third. The U.S. share is 20-25 percent. Also, while the shipments of American arms, according to the same data, constituted about six percent of the total volume of U.S. exports several years ago, the index for our country was then 17.5 percent. And while all state arms exporters delivered to the countries of the "Third World" 12,898 tanks (for the years 1982-86), our share came to 4,345 vehicles. Of 3,079 combat aircraft, 1,545 were Soviet; and of 1,750 helicopters, more than 900 were Soviet.

One can argue about the moral aspect of the arms trade between states in general, but, in any case, it should be under the control of the state.

Or is it necessary now to say that it was under the control of the state?

I spoke with many participants in this private "trade operation" with tanks (except for the management of Uralvagonzavod). They, however, are also mentioned in official reports.

Unquestionably, a key role in this was played by documents signed at the very highest level—all the way to the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Statements that are scattered in letters, the ANT charter, and permits are in themselves harmless. But when they came together on the desks of the general directors of the NPO "Vzlet" and Uralvagonzavod, they formed a password for permission to purchase: A provision from the ANT charter that it can buy armaments items is a government mission—permission for plants of the defense branches to sell ANT above plan products and inconvertible stock (it was explained to me that in ANT they had "peaceful" above-plan production in mind, but it turned out to be tanks); a letter on a foreign trade level permitting part of the freight of ANT to be transported abroad without licensing (there are also no arms on this list, but the principle is important!), but the main thing is that the Minaviaprom organized the concern jointly with ANT specifically in order to have—even if in the future—its own channel for the direct sale of its products on the foreign market, including aviation systems.

If this folder of documents is multiplied by the fact that the intermediary in the story was an enterprise of the Minradioprom and, besides, of a like "defense" profile, then one can appreciate the "negligence" of Uralvagonzavod, which was pinning its hopes on "high recommendations."

Undoubtedly, a vicious role was also played here, on the one hand, by our interminable striving to attain maximum economic independence, and, on the other hand—to earn more money.

Look at how the action of this "ruble accelerator" is formed: At the end of the year, Uralvagonzavod (only it?) has nothing with which to meet the 13th payroll, and there is a mass of other financial problems, but then 14 "surplus" tanks are taken. And there is no haggling over price. And the purchasers are their own, not off the street, but from the domestic "defense establishment." True, I was unable to clarify which one of the triple alliance was victorious in precipitating the transfer of money—they are all blaming each other. But a fact is a fact: On 30 November, a draft was drawn up by which ANT transferred 4,494 million rubles [R] to Uralvagonzavod through the USSR Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity].

"It is true," I was told in ANT, "the sum was set too high... about R120,000 for each 'prime mover.' But they explained: 'This covers expenditures for disassembling tank equipment.'"

"And further?"

"Silence... And later we were informed from the port: 'The tanks have arrived!' But we did not go near the train," one of the ANT directors set a package of cigarettes edgewise on the table, as if barricading himself from the specter of 12 "T-72" tanks still standing in the port of Novorossiysk. "There is no delivery and acceptance documentation, and we do not know the full composition. And you yourself know all of the rest, and what was on the platforms. Only someone wrote that there was also a basic load of ammunition there—there was none..."

I almost added "fortunately."

I do not know how events will unfold in the future. It is not excluded, for example, that the extraordinary event will be exploited for a new campaign against cooperatives in general—what an excellent cause! And we have already learned how to make the most of causes, sorting out neither the innocent nor the guilty.

It is likely that the question of the extraordinary event will have to be heard not only in party organs, but also in sessions of the Supreme Soviet. This would be logical: The independence of an investigation of this complicated affair is a guarantee that, nonetheless, we will get as close to the truth as possible, and that we will answer the

question: If this was not, as I said, simply a chain of absurdities and coincidences, then who needed this extraordinary event?

There are very many questions.

But among the dozens of these questions and problems, one of them can get mislaid.

It seems to me that we have fallen into euphoria from conversion.

I agree that we, the journalists, also had a hand in this—at times we gave the impression that we no longer had a defense industry, and that henceforth it will be engaged only in the output of sewing machines and coffee grinders.

I am not asking that the necessity for conversion be doubted; I simply want one thing not to be forgotten: So long as arms are produced, they remain arms.

But here is a newspaper report

"Workers in the oil and gas industry have long been using 'demobilized military equipment.' For example, 100-mm guns are puncturing holes for field research, and they are hammering anchor ties into the ground... Now the mortar has mastered a peaceful profession... The mortar is being readied for battle again. But it is loaded with water, and not with a mortar shell. There is a volley—and a fountain shoots up over the silver firs, and new data appear on the instruments... The conclusions of an interdepartmental commission: The mortar is performing its task in good working order. The first "battery" can be dispatched to the seismic prospecting party..."

We read in another newspaper that a general reports: "The Pioneers are even buying tanks from us for pedestals!"

But there are other reports from the "hot spots": Extremists employed cloud-seeding [protivogradovyye] anti-aircraft artillery guns, and members of volunteer militia employed mortars, machine guns, and assault rifles... At weapons collection points, as was reported in one telecast, even two howitzers were turned in.

In fact, today a black market in arms exists in the country. Many of us are fully familiar with prices for them: A pistol is R200-R500, a bulletproof vest is from R30 to R1,000, an assault rifle is R1,300, and a steel helmet—in the area of about R100. This equation will not be a surprise: Since weapons are being bought, it means they are being sold. And if there is a report about the fact that a malefactor has been arrested with 100 pistols, then this is not an episode on the order of "a rayon office of the militia was attacked, and two pistols and 10 training assault rifles were seized"—in any language this is called **many weapons**.

Weapons are moving about the country like commodities. And I fear that conversion in the form in which it is

now occurring—with poor control, minimal expenditures, and the search for advantages first and foremost—can aggravate the situation. It has already been aggravated by removing the responsibility from the shoulders of the Ministry of Defense and the armaments producers for cloud-seeding guns and antiavalanche [protivolavinye] missile launchers.

Even prime movers are still tanks, but with armaments removed.

Incidentally, if the purchase of 12 "prime movers" had taken place quietly, ANT would have bought about 100 of them in the future.

Look at how many people are scurrying around the "defense establishment": customers (from the Ministry of Defense structure), its military representatives, a whole system of military transport communications that transports freight, plant representatives, inspectors, employees of the "first departments [republic KGB]..." But the tanks leave the plant quietly...

It is appropriate to say that, in the story with the tanks, Uralvagonzavod was the least "suffering" party. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, taking into consideration that V.S. Seryakov, its general director, had held his "operational post" for only a few months, gave him a severe reprimand only. I do not crave a general reprisal, but a fact is a fact: It was to Uralvagonzavod that the tanks were dispatched, and it was there that the gates were opened for this armored cargo, and where the train was looked for...

In such a state of affairs associated with arms in the system of the Minoboronprom, there is no certainty that all arms that are moving around the country today, were stolen from depots or taken from the Army or Militia. You see, these are commodities, alas, that enjoy a heightened demand.

And, therefore, I do not now end my commentary with a period, but with three periods.

Volga-Ural MD: Shortage of Motor Vehicle Parts

90UM0368A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Bedula in the column: "Correspondent's Column": "No End to Patching Up"]

[Text] It so happened that the agency vehicle that was to take me to another post to carry out a task for the editorial office was in no condition to leave the motor pool. Captain V. Monin, the deputy battalion commander for technical affairs, explained to me that the brake master cylinder was defective; a spare was not available, and a search for a replacement would have to be made in the city.

The search ended in success on the third day. I understood that the part could not have been obtained without the contacts maintained by the officer.

"You were lucky," said Captain Monin. "Sometimes it takes weeks to find a part. We send people to other cities to do this. The normal supply system is poor. I start out virtually every working day in this way—searching for parts. You should know that this leaves no time to train personnel in technical readiness."

I was later to learn that Captain Monin's situation is not the worst. In general, this place, the motor transport company servicing district headquarters, is a priority recipient of the scarcest parts. One can only wonder about the situation of "rank and file" units that have need of these truly golden items.

Just what happens to spare parts for trucks and passenger cars?

"The problem here is that the Main Motor Vehicle Directorate of the Ministry of Defense cut back on availability of spare parts in 1989," said Colonel G. Stakolnikov, chief of the district's motor vehicle support service. "This has continued into this year. As a result, there is no end to our patching up."

One of the causes listed by support service specialists is the poor driver training administered in the schools of the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], with the result that vehicles are subjected to accelerated wear. Spare parts are issued on the basis of use on the vehicle, not actual condition of the latter.

In this regard, the present structure of the parts supply and repair section of the district motor transport support service clearly is not adequate to satisfy the amount of tasks it is called upon to perform. Combining the two districts—the Volga and the Ural—resulted in doubling the amount of planning, but the section gained only one officer slot: for a chief.

"We are literally being inundated by paper," complained Major V. Sidorenko of the supply and repair section. "We recently sent off 1,500 envelopes containing various reports. How much there is of routine work associated

with documentation on items to be retired or discarded! I must say that an abnormal situation has been created. To write off a storage battery, a unit commander or installation chief must go through the district transport support service chief. That produces mountains of paper. Then a new correspondence cycle starts—to obtain new batteries or tires to replace the ones that are being discarded. This can go on for up to two months. Combat readiness is adversely affected. This solve this problem, it is sufficient to grant us the authority to vouch for the necessity for the write-off. This would require that the pertinent passages in the guidance documents be rewritten."

In addition to the above problems, the motor vehicle people have recently acquired another one: increasingly poor service from suppliers. In the motor vehicle transport service office I was shown a folder containing so-called letters of refusal. Examples: The Kolomna Rubber Products Plant replied in the negative to a request for rubber mats; the Saratov Wire Products Plant refused to supply a needed wire product; the Chapayev Chemical Fertilizer Plant ceased delivering hydrochloric acid; and the Yerevan Rubber Products Plant stated that it cannot fill an order for oil- and gasoline-resistant rubber.

The motor vehicle people also complain about the Center. The Main Motor Vehicle Directorate apparently has not yet become an effective coordinator between the district and the country's motor vehicle plants. What is meant by that statement? I was told that supply terminals are still being provided with spare parts for the ZIL-157, which has long since been sold or given to civilian organizations. Sizeable stores of leaf springs are languishing in all supply terminals; there is also an excess of other parts for which there is little demand. However, the items that are constantly on the shortage list—tie rods, steering gear, and fuel system components—remain only in the dreams of military motor vehicle personnel.

It would appear that the problem could be resolved simply: Require military acceptance officers at motor vehicle plants to make the necessary changes in spare parts delivery contracts. However, the matter is mired in correspondence and drawing up of agreements.

Review of Formerly Classified Book on Early Period of War

90UM0376A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Review of book "Pervyye dni voyny" [The First Days of the War] by L.M. Sandalov (Voenizdat, 1989, 218 pages), by Col (Ret) V. Anfilov, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "The Lessons of June, '41"]

[Text] The Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense has published the book "Pervyye dni voyny" by L.M. Sandalov, who, unfortunately, has departed this life. Issued in a small printing stamped "Secret" back in 1961, this work is truthful and objective. There is nothing secret about the work today, but it has retained its topicality and historical significance.

The book has a rigidly defined framework. It discusses the preparations for repelling aggression, the status of forces of the Western Special Military District prior to the enemy invasion, the combat operations of the 4th Army during the first days of the war and their results and lessons, which are still important today.

Discussing the preparation of the theater of military operations, the author assigns a prominent place to the prewar fortified areas, which are still a subject of debate today: their role, their distance from the border and their armament. In his opinion it was a big mistake to erect fortified areas along the state borders despite the fact that the district military council was proposing a different version in the fall of 1939, whereby the forward edge of the fortified areas would run 25-50 kilometers from the border.

The war found forces of the Western Military District, like the others, at the height of reorganization and rearmament, which it was planned to complete only in 1942. This resulted from a large miscalculation by the nation's political and military leadership. "The miscalculation was made worse," the author stresses, "by the fact that the unsupported reorganization and rearmament of the troops was carried out simultaneously in all the western border districts." "The result was that when the military conflict broke out, they were almost not fit for combat but were still issued combat missions under the cover plans."

The location of 4th Army forces at the beginning of the war prevented them from being rapidly deployed and put into a state of total combat readiness. The rifle and special units continued to engage in combat training and the erection of defense installations. "Neither the district or the army command element nor the formation and unit commanders," Sandalov admits, "expected the attack by the German fascist forces on 22 June."

Why, when there were clear signs of preparations for an attack, were forces of the western border districts not put into a state of complete combat readiness? "The main reason," the author answers, "were errors in assessing the military-political situation which developed in the spring of 1941, faith in the inviolability of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact and confidence that Hitler would not decide to attack the USSR. It was felt that putting our Armed Forces into a state of combat readiness in advance would provoke a war...."

The war took us unaware. Even when the initiation of fighting was reported, it was at first perceived in the district as armed provocation. "The army command element," the author acknowledges self-critically, "actually did not adopt any sort of independent decisions, except the decision to put the forces into a state of combat readiness, during the first two hours of the war."

The 4th Army's main forces were forced to retreat in heavy fighting. They withdrew 300 kilometers to the east under enemy attacks during the first five days of the war. Even in those extremely difficult circumstances, however, those units and subunits which had succeeded in preserving their organization and strength fought the enemy heroically.

"The experience of the 4th Army is instructive," Leonid Mikhaylovich concludes, "in that it opens up our eyes to serious deficiencies with respect to having our forces ready for the war, deficiencies which existed in all the border districts at that time."

If the author were alive, he would undoubtedly clarify a number of points, illustrate more thoroughly the role of headquarters in the organization of combat operations and enlarge his critical analysis of the performance of the front and army command elements. There are certain omissions in the book, but overall it provides a true and instructive picture of the first and most difficult days of the Great Patriotic War.

U.S. 'Global' Planning for War with USSR

90UM0218A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain Dale Erkmeier in the column: "Military Problems in Foreign Periodical Literature"; "War with the Soviets Will Be Global"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] And so, dear readers, we are starting a new column. Under this rubric we will be publishing information taken from foreign newspapers and journals. This information will deal with military problems: doctrines, views on troop combat employment, structure of armed forces. Also to be discussed are engagement in combat training tasks and enhancement of troop fighting spirit. Not all articles will include our comments. However, the editors will do so whenever necessary to inject our point of view. We took this, the first of the articles, from the American military periodical ARMY.

In the light of the recently signed Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the time has come to develop a global strategy for waging war with the Soviets. For this purpose, it is desirable to make plans for employing the Army on a wider scale in the Pacific region without undue effect on obligations with respect to NATO. Unfortunately, the preference which the U.S. Ground Forces give to Europe constitutes an obstacle to developing a more effective Pacific strategy and the formulation of an objective point of view on the Army's role in the Pacific region and its contribution to the policy of containment.

The typical Army officer tends to think of war with the Soviets within the confines of Europe rather than as a global confrontation. This kind of outlook is the result of our entire system of combat training. By using Europe and NATO as examples in the process of instruction, Army schools and courses are gradually limiting the concept of the war to the confines of Europe. Combat training and staff planning are executed largely in European scenarios. Most mock battles involve a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The actions take place in Europe even in popular novels dealing with a future war. All this tends to reinforce the idea that war with the Soviets will be limited to the confines of Europe.

A more effective Pacific strategy is not a counterbalance to our NATO policy, but rather a complement. The Pacific and European theaters (of military operations—Editors) are interrelated, since the United States and the Soviet Union are military powers in both regions. That is why we should assume that war with the Soviets will be global. We must realize that we are something more than just a NATO power. We are a world superpower. As the sole NATO power capable of resolving problems globally, we are obligated to view the Soviets in a global rather than a regional context. Thus, in looking at a war between the USA and the USSR, we must keep in mind that combat activity taking place in the Pacific region

can have an effect on the outcome of a war in Europe. Only then will we be able to understand that the Pacific region is a strategic lever.

An effective strategy in the Pacific will also promote security in Europe. Soviet strategists would like to think that a blitzkrieg carried out in Europe will enable them to bring the war to a close rapidly on their terms before large forces can arrive from the United States.

A Pacific strategy will enable NATO to carry the war to victory. All students of military strategy know that it is better to attack an enemy where he is weak and avoid his strong points. The strong and weak aspects of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are well known. The Warsaw Pact possesses superiority in manpower and weapons, and it will not be easy for NATO to stop its advance. Nevertheless, we are still studying the Soviets' weak aspects in Europe, not from the global standpoint.

In the Pacific region the Soviets have vulnerable places that should be utilized. Facing the Soviets on the southern borders is the Chinese Army, which is an antagonistic if not an enemy military force that is armed with nuclear weapons. The Soviets are forced to keep considerable forces on this border, in spite of the latest initiatives made by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev with respect to the Chinese People's Republic. The transfer of these forces would be militarily difficult and risky. Growing national unrest in Soviet Asia is causing problems for internal security that could be exploited. The Soviets have in the north-eastern part of Asia a long and exposed border that could be reached from the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet transportation infrastructure is limited in the Far East and the Soviet Pacific Fleet is vulnerable, since it must pass through the narrow Japanese straits.

In addition to the advantages we could gain as a result of Soviet weaknesses in the Pacific region, there would be other positive aspects to employing ground troops there in wartime. Soviet strategists would be forced to wage war on two fronts, regrouping their forces and weapons and making plan changes as they go along. This would permit our troops to seize the initiative in the Pacific Ocean. The employment there of our ground troops would send a clear signal to friends, allies, and potential enemies that we are serious about protecting our interests.

Deployment of ground troops in the Pacific region would assist Japan to more resolutely withstand pressure exerted by the Soviets for the country to remain neutral. Bearing in mind general Chinese-American interests, we could see to it that Chinese-Soviet rapprochement does not run counter to the security of the USA. This would also remind North Korea of our obligations to the Republic of Korea.

In a war with the Soviets, it would be unwise to permit them to utilize their prerogatives while not employing our capabilities. However, there are those who still believe that a war should be limited to the theater in

which it originates, with escalation not permitted. This kind of thinking as it applies to Europe would deprive NATO of a strategic lever which it would otherwise possess. This thinking would make it possible for the Soviets to concentrate their efforts in a theater where they and their allies hold the initiative and military superiority. This would simplify considerably Soviet strategic and tactical planning and the logistical effort. The United States would be forced to wage combat with one hand tied behind its back, since the employment and capabilities of our Pacific Fleet and Air Force would be severely limited.

To develop a strategy in the Pacific, the Army must abandon its partiality to Europe and look objectively at waging a war with the Soviets from a global standpoint. It is this standpoint that is necessary to global protection of our interests.

(Above article is published in abbreviated form.)

Operations of 4th Psyop Group in Panama Noted

90UM0218B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy: "American Troops Continue Psychological Warfare in Panama"]

[Text] The first units of American airborne troops air-dropped in Panama were accompanied by psychological operations subunits from the Special Operations Command of the U.S. Armed Forces. As reported in the newspaper WASHINGTON POST, while on the move they initiated actions intended to demoralize supporters of deposed General M. Noriega and proclaim the "legality" of U.S. armed intervention in Panama and of the new government of G. Endara.

The efforts of the psychological warfare specialists included distribution of thousands of leaflets on the streets of Panama, while in the countryside American soldiers handed peasants the leaflets directly. The psychological operations subunits used public-address systems to inflict endless propagandistic tinsel on the Panamanians. The purpose is to justify the aggression, which the international community considers to be a relapse to the American imperialist policy of the "big stick," an attempt to represent it as an effort on the part of the United States to assist in the "economic and political restoration of Panama."

The introduction of psychological warfare is largely the function of the 1st Battalion of the 4th Psychological Operations Group. This effort targets Central and Latin Americas. Incidentally, in 1983 this battalion, acting jointly with units of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division, also praised to no end the "advantages" of American occupation relative to democratization and prosperity in Grenada.

In addition to 250 troops of 1st Battalion, it was reported that up to 220 men of the 96th Battalion from

the same 4th Psychological Operations Group arrived in Panama to work with the civilian population. Included in the missions assigned to this unit was the rendering of "assistance," or more accurately, the injection of American influence into all areas of the political and economic life of the country. Specialists of the 96th Battalion are operating as advisers to the new Panamanian government by supplying it recommendations on the organization of mass information media, political and social organizations; even on selection and placement of cadres.

As announced by Washington, American troops are returning home "in triumph" after having accomplished their missions in Panama. This naturally pertains only to those contingents that were dropped in the Panama Canal area to carry out the aggression. Large and small units of the U.S. Armed Forces that were located there before the American intrusion will remain there. They are being joined by psychological operations subunits that are exerting increasing ideological influence on the Panamanians.

Functions of Ministry of Defense Foreign Relations Directorate

90UM0277A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter to editors and response: "Diplomats in the Military Uniform"]

[Text] Could you describe the Foreign Relations Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense? What are its functions, and who serves in it?—Lt V. Kotov, Leningrad

The UVS [Foreign Relations Directorate] is a structural subdivision of the Ministry of Defense designated for carrying out the latter's official relations with the armed forces of foreign states.

The functions of the UVS include organizing and implementing measures in accordance with the Ministry of Defense's plan for contacts with the armies of foreign nations; maintaining permanent contacts with the military attaches of foreign states accredited in Moscow; directing the activities of the military, naval and air attaches at USSR embassies abroad; working with foreign military observers and inspectors arriving for exercises conducted on the territory of the USSR and in the groups of forces in accordance with the document coming out of the Stockholm Conference.

Within the framework of the above functions the Foreign Relations Directorate arranges and supports official visits sponsored by the Ministry of Defense; conducts various activities for the military-diplomatic corps in Moscow, including visits by military diplomats to facilities of the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy; trains Soviet military attaches and their assistants prior to their departure for the nations to which they are accredited.

The UVS closely interacts with the Protocol and other departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with various organizations and departments.

The directorate has a corresponding structure for successfully accomplishing the missions assigned to it, including several departments: for communications with socialist, capitalist and developing nations and for receiving foreign military delegations.

Officers with experience abroad as military, naval or air attaches, their assistants, workers from military administrative staffs and translators perform duty in the directorate.

The questions were answered in the Foreign Relations Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

U.S. ALCM Test Over Canada Noted

90UM0285A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by A. Kamenskiy: "Comments on Words and Deeds"]

[Text] The American Department of the Air Force has started to carry out in the air space of Canada (with the consent of the government of this country) the next phase of flight testing of its new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), which is designed to destroy ground targets located deep in the territory of a potential enemy.

The ALCMs are usually launched by B-52 strategic bombers flying over the waters of the Beaufort Sea, in the neighborhood of the Primrose Proving Ground, which is located approximately 250 kilometers northeast of the city of Edmonton. The missile, under complete automatic control, flies at minimum altitude to afford the greatest avoidance of detection by air defense systems during its entire flight of more than 2,500 kilometers.

The long range makes the use of cruise missiles possible for virtually the entire depth of the Soviet Union's territory, thus obviating the need for bombers to enter the effective engagement zone of Soviet air defense systems and rendering the missiles an effective weapon for modern warfare. Testing involves monitoring the efficiency and reliability of missile systems, flight accuracy and approach to the target, and missile intercept actions executed by American and Canadian fighter aircraft.

Neither Washington nor Ottawa makes a secret of the fact that American experts selected the Canadian air spaces for a good reason. The relief of the terrain and abundant snow cover are similar to that of the northern regions of the Soviet Union. It is from the north that American strategists plan mass employment of cruise missiles against the USSR in the event of unleashing of conventional and nuclear war.

The tests of the American ALCMs over Canadian territory are being carried out under the terms of a five-year

agreement signed by both sides in 1983 and extended, over the protests of the Canadian public, to 1993. The Pentagon made plans to carry out from 1 January to 31 March of this year the next series of tests in the air space of its northern neighbor; two of them have already been accomplished: on 23 and 29 January.

The Canadian government in the last few years has stated on a number of occasions that arms and disarmament control will remain as its "constant, continuing, and dominant priority of foreign policy." The invariability of this course was recently reaffirmed by General John de Chastlain, chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, at a military doctrine seminar held in Vienna.

However, actual deeds are obviously contradicting the above words. The present tests of the American ALCMs in Canada constitute convincing evidence of this.

Implications Of Withdrawal From Mongolia

90UM0349A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Staff Correspondent A. Mirov: "Soldiers Leave, Apartments"]

[Text] Ulan-Bator, March—"It was a warm and beautiful day in May of last year when the first Soviet troop trains began their journey to the motherland from the Erdenet train station. But it seemed to me that the warmth also emanated from the hearts of the Mongolians who saw their friends off." This is how my Mongolian colleague Enkhee described, in the newspaper NOVOSTI MONGOLII, the start of the second stage of the troop withdrawal from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

But the Mongolian citizens' attitude toward the Soviet soldiers shouldn't come as a surprise. For many years, the Mongolians saw them, along with the soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army, as dependable defenders of their peaceful and constructive life. But that's not all. When circumstances required it, our soldiers readily went to their Mongolian friends' aid in everyday matters. I saw them on many occasions laying in hay and doing other farm work.

True, there was no avoiding some misunderstandings, as is often the case in life. They had to do mainly with the ecological sphere, to which people in Mongolia pay special attention. But criticism from the local community was always heeded.

The soldiers are leaving but their property is staying behind. Our Mongolian friends have already been given, free of charge, residential buildings, dormitories, barracks, mess halls, stores, clubs, medical facilities, and schools worth a total of 500 million togrogs.

Needless to say, not everything can be measured in terms of money. The political aspect of the matter is also important. For this action marks a new stage in lessening tensions in the Asian-Pacific region and has had great resonance throughout the world.

I became convinced of this after returning recently from People's Mongolia's neighbor—the People's Republic of China, where people are following the positive changes in this matter with great satisfaction. Similar satisfaction was expressed by the United States Ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic, Richard L. William, in an interview with the newspaper UNEN. William said that Washington "is interested in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, because it will ultimately make a positive contribution to improved relations between the Soviet Union and China."

There is one other political aspect. It has to do with our boys, who have truly fulfilled their internationalist duty while serving in the Mongolian People's Republic.

"We have a sense of pride in the assistance we were able to provide to the Mongolian people during our stay here," stressed Major General L. S. Mayorov. "We feel

that the Mongolian People's Republic's defense capability has been strengthened, and that a modern Mongolian People's Army has been built. But the most important achievement is the strengthened fraternity between our peoples.

"The Mongolian people needn't doubt that the Soviet Union, should it become necessary, will always come to their aid. One hopes, of course, that no such need ever arises..."

When the Issue Went to Press. Ulan-Bator, March 2 (TASS)—Soviet-Mongolian talks on a schedule and procedures for a total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia ended here today. Under an agreement between the USSR government and the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, the withdrawal will be carried out in 1991 and 1992. The bulk of the Soviet forces' combat personnel will be withdrawn in 1991, and the troop units charged with shipping out materials will leave in 1992.

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